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ABSTRACT

THREE ESSAYS ON PUBLIC POLICY
AND WELFARE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
MAY 2022
JERÓNIMO CALLEJAS
B.Sc., PONTIFICIA UNIVERSIDAD CATÓLICA DEL ECUADOR
M.Sc., BARCELONA GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Debi P. Mohapatra

Developing countries typically implement public policies that modify the market structure to reach a specific goal. However, in this attempt to achieve a policy objective, policymakers may not consider unintended consequences caused by firms’ and consumers’ optimizing behavior. Moreover, the reaction of market agents to the implemented policy may
undermind its effectiveness or lead to an outcome opposite to the one persuaded. This dissertation uses a set of structural models to assess the welfare effect of both intended and
unintended consequences of public policies introduced in developing countries.

In the first chapter, we evaluates the welfare implications of a public procurement program, where the Ecuadorian government procures medicines used for cancer treatment and
distributes it to patients for free with the aim to benefit the poor. First, we consider a
targeting strategy commonly implemented in various developing countries, where patients
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below a given income threshold qualify for the free drug. We compare this with a simpler
drug distribution mechanism where every patient is a potential recipient of the free drug
and the patients are served on first-come-first-serve basis. Our results show that the poor
patients do self-select into the program, and the first-come-first-serve strategy does benefit
the poor more compared to the relatively rich. However, the targeting strategy does a much
better job in serving the poorest patients. Second, we study the supply side implications of
this program Our counterfactual exercises show that when the government procures low-cost
drugs and provides them for free, it distorts the supply side incentives, and hence, market
prices of similar low-cost drugs may increase by about 7% in response. Prices of the high
cost drugs remain mostly unaffected. Therefore, the policy may end up negatively affecting
near-poor patients that did not qualify for the free government drug.

In the second chapter, we study the existing and proposed policies aiming to reduce
emissions from new passenger vehicles in Colombia, which has used preferential sales taxes
and import tariffs to stimulate hybrid and electric cars sales. Using highly detailed data on
vehicle purchases and attributes, we estimate an equilibrium model of Colombia’s market
that includes a random-coefficients logit demand structure and endogenizes firms’ markups.
Using the model to simulate policies, we find that Colombia’s sales tax and import tariffs
have increased hybrid and electric vehicle market shares by 0.9 to 2.7 percentage points at
welfare costs of $40-48 per ton of carbon dioxide reduction. Potentially taxing carbon dioxide
emissions rates of new vehicles would have roughly similar welfare costs. The high welfare
costs of these policies arise from pre-existing distortions caused by market power, which
yields large private welfare costs of shifting from gasoline to hybrid and electric vehicles.

In the third chapter, I evaluate the welfare consequences of Domestic Industrial Policy
implemented by the India government that imposed a tariff on imported mobile phone components to motivate investment in the local mobile phone manufacturing industry. To this

vii

end, I compute the consumer surplus as well as the producer surplus changes due to changes
which would have resulted from the continuing implantation of this policy. Toward this
end, I develop and estimate a structural model of India’s mobile phone market, one where
firms endogenously decide production location, product set, and prices. I evaluate the effects
of the policy through counterfactuals simulated using the estimated structural parameters.
The results suggest that the continuation of this policy will lead to large-scale production
relocation, products exiting the market, and price increases leading to a drop in consumer
surplus.
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INTRODUCTION

The design of a public policy targeting specific markets or groups of customers can have
spillover effects that affects substitute or complementary products and non-targeted consumers. This study uses structural supply and demand models to study this phenomenon
and its implications for consumer welfare. Assessing the impact of unintended policy effects on consumer surplus is especially relevant in developing countries where market-driven
policies may demand fewer resources than alternative policies, leaning developing countries
to default to this option. Therefore an accurate assessment of the costs in the form of lost
welfare is essential when accessing the cost-effectiveness of the policy.

In the first chapter, my co-author and I study the supply-side implications of a procurement program, in which the Ecuadorian government procures medicines and distributes
them for free with the aim of benefiting the poor. Specifically, we study how the competitive
pressure created by the government’s entry into the market by offering free drugs distorts
firms’ supply-side incentives. Our results suggest that the availability of the free drug provokes an increase in the market prices by 7% of low-cost drugs, thereby adversely impacting
the near-poor patient that did not qualify for the free government drug. We also compare
two targeting strategies, one where patients below a given income threshold qualify for the
free drug and one where every patient qualifies for the free drug, and the patients are served
on a first-come-first-serve basis. Our results show that the poor patients self-select into the
program, and the first-come-first-serve strategy benefits the poor more than the relatively
rich.

1

In the second chapter, we analyze the cost-effectiveness of existing and proposed policies
aiming to reduce emissions from new passenger vehicles in Colombia. The analyzed policies
use preferential sales taxes and import tariffs to stimulate hybrid and electric cars sales.
Using a structural model of demand and supply, we study how firms’ pricing decisions on
different types of vehicles vary given various combinations of preferential policies. Firms’
responses affect the market share of gasoline vehicles not targeted by the policy, which brings
total emissions down. Then, we calculate the cost-effectiveness of the policy by comparing
the variation in emissions with the fiscal cost of the policy and the effect on consumer welfare.
We found that Colombia’s sales tax and import tariffs have increased hybrid and electric
vehicle market shares by 0.9 to 2.7 percentage points at welfare costs of $120-510 per ton of
carbon dioxide reduction.

Although the first two chapters of this work focus on different industries, their findings
are similar: The introduction of a public policy may affect consumer surplus directly via
price variation of the affected products, but also indirectly through the variation in the price
of substitute and complementary products, which in turn can affect consumers in different
ways. In these chapters, the supply-side distortions allowed by the model happened only
through firms’ pricing decisions. But in reality, firms have a broader decision space that includes product choice, product characteristics, production location, and entry or exit specific
markets.

In the third chapter, I study the impact of firm supply chain decisions on consumer
welfare. I do so in the context of a domestic industrial policy introduced by the Indian government to improve the local supply chain of the mobile phone manufacturing industry. The
policy imposes a tax on imported components used to assemble phones in India, creating
an additional cost on Indian production. This initiative aims to motivate firms to invest
in the local supply chain and reduce the dependency on imported components. Here, firms
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have three alternatives: assembling products in India, importing ready-to-use products, or
discontinuing the affected product.

I propose a tractable three-stage structural model that estimates the sunk cost of production allocation decisions and the fixed cost of product entry and exit decisions to capture
firms’ behavior. The model allows me to evaluate the first-order effect of the policy on consumer surplus, resulting from either an increase in the production cost of products produced
in India, an increase in production cost due to switching production outside India, or the
removal of products from the market. The model also allows me to assess a second-order
effect on consumer surplus through the price increase of imported products not affected by
the policy. This outcome results from the decay of the competitive pressure due to either the
removal of products from the market or the increase in prices on products affected by the
policy. My results suggest that the policy harms consumer welfare due to increased prices
and reduced availability of products in the market.

3

CHAPTER 1
WELFARE EFFECTS OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT OF
MEDICINES: EVIDENCE FROM ECUADOR1

1.1

Introduction

Access to drugs is a contentious issue in the context of developing and underdeveloped
countries, where limited access has excluded many patients from the benefits of pharmaceutical innovations. This is especially crucial in case of life-saving drugs (e.g. cancer drugs),
where high prices impose significant economic burdens on poor consumers. Governments in
less-developed countries undertake various public welfare programs aimed at the poorer sections of the population in order to ensure that they have access to life-saving drugs. Under
such programs, the below-poverty-line patients receive drugs at subsidized prices (even at
zero cost).

However, implementing such income-based programs in developing countries can be a
challenging task, as the potential recipients may lack credible income records (4)2 . Consequently, there is an increased emphasis on targeting strategies that do not rely directly on
observing incomes. As an alternative strategy, the government may choose to procure a stock
of low-cost generic version drugs3 and provide those to patients on first-come-first-serve basis
1

With Debi Mohapatra

2
Most of the potential recipients of the free drug in developing countries typically work in the informal
sector and may lack verifiable records of their earnings.
3

In our context, Ecuador government procures low-cost generic version of the medicine for free distribution. This is also common practice in other developing countries as this keeps the procurement costs of the
government low. For example, under the ‘Jan Aushadhi’ scheme implemented by Indian government, generic
version of the drugs are sold to the consumers at a subsidized price.
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until the stock is over. This simple strategy will be an effective distribution mechanism if the
poor patients self-select into the welfare program, consume the free generic drug, and rich
patients choose to opt for branded drugs by buying those from the market.4 The efficacy of
this mechanism in serving the poorest depends on the heterogeneity of consumer preferences
for branded and generic drugs that varies among rich and poor patients.

Additionally, implementation of a public welfare program may involve supply side implications. On the one hand, providing subsidized medicine unambiguously benefits the belowpoverty-line consumers and increases their consumer welfare. However, this policy may have
unintended consequences through supply side interactions. Under this program, the poorest
among all consumers have access to the free medicine and hence are much less likely to buy
those medicines from the market. If the low-income consumers are also highly price sensitive,
the residual demand curve that the firms face is less elastic as a result of this policy. As a
consequence, entry by the government and provision of free medicine for the poor may lead
to firms charging higher prices in equilibrium. The extent of price increase in response to
this policy depends on the level of government provision, and the elasticity of substitution
among products in the market. The resulting price increase may lead to lower consumer
welfare for the near-poor (i.e. above-poverty line) consumers who do not qualify for the
welfare program. Hence, the overall effect of the policy on consumer welfare is an empirical
question that we address in this paper by examining the effects of a drug procurement policy
in Ecuador while accounting for firms’ incentives to adjust their product prices in the market.

Our analysis is carried out in the context of drugs that are used for breast cancer treatment. Breast cancer is one of the most common types of cancer in the 40-60 age group and
is the twelveth most common cause of death among females in Ecuador. Our dataset records
4

Several theoretical and empirical studies in the existing literature recognize self-selection mechanisms as
an effective way to design targeted aid programs. For example, see (74), (18), (5)) among others.
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sales and prices of four different types of molecules used to treat breast cancer between
2007 and 2014.5 Since we observe consumer choices as well as the price setting behavior
of the firms, we can ask: ‘would low-income patients self-select and choose the government
drug if the government enters the market and provides a generic drug for free?’ ‘What
would have happened to equilibrium drug prices and consumer welfare if the government
offered free medicine to below-poverty-line consumers?’ To answer these questions, we take
a structural approach and estimate a model of supply and demand where product prices
are endogenously determined. Specifically, we allow heterogeneity in price sensitivity among
consumers by flexibly modeling price coefficient as a function of consumer income. We recover marginal costs for drug production using equilibrium first-order conditions resulting
from firm’s profit maximization.

Our demand estimates reveal the presence of heterogeneity across different consumers in
terms of demand characteristics such as price sensitivities and willingness to pay. In particular, high income consumers are much less price sensitive compared to low income consumers.
Additionally, high income consumers also derive higher utility from branded drugs compared
to the generic products. The high price sensitivity of low income consumers implies that
introduction of free medicine by the government would lead to significant substitution away
from other products available in the market.

With demand and supply estimates in hand, we perform two counterfactual policy simulations. In our counterfactual world, the government procures a generic drug offered in the
market and provides it to the cancer patients at zero cost.6 Our first counterfactual exercise
5

The provision of free breast cancer drugs by the government between 2012 to 2014 was pretty insignificant
(covering less than 1% of the total sales). The government of Ecuador started providing the generic drug
in 2015. Hence in our sample, we do not observe government entry. Please refer to section 1.2 for detailed
discussion.
6

Procurement of generic version of cancer drug is consistent with the government policy in Ecuador, since
the generic version keeps the cost of procurement low, see section 1.5 for more details.
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considers a targeted drug distribution strategy based on income, and compares it with a
first-come-first-serve mechanism. The former (targeted drug distribution strategy) provides
free drugs to the consumers who earn below a given income threshold. It therefore requires
detailed information on consumer incomes, and hence may be difficult to implement in the
informal developing country setting. Under the latter (first-come-first-serve strategy), any
patient irrespective of her income may choose the free government drug until the stock of
free drug is available. This is simple and easy to implement.

Our analysis reveals that the low income consumers do self-select into the welfare program, and hence the first-come-first-serve policy benefits the low-income section of the society
more compared to the relatively rich. Our simulation exercise shows that the consumers with
higher income would opt for the products offered in the market even when the free government drug in available in their choice sets. This is driven by the heterogeneity in consumer
preferences, as high income consumers are less price sensitive and derive higher utility from
branded drugs even when they have access to the free government drug. However, we can not
conclude that the first-come-first-serve policy dominates the targeting policy, as targeting
directs the benefits of the welfare program more effectively among the poorest.

In our second counterfactual policy simulation, we allow the firms to adjust the equilibrium prices in response to the government entry. The government decides the income
threshold, and provides free medicine to the consumers whose incomes fall below the threshold. Hence, the consumers below poverty line may choose to buy a drug offered in the market
and pay the market price or opt to receive free medicine from the government program. The
government provides a generic version drug for free under its program. Note that, if the
preferences for product variety dominates the price effect, then a consumer may choose to
opt for the market product even when the free government drug is available in her choice
set. All other consumers who do not qualify for the government drug choose from the range
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of products available in the market conditional on buying a product.

In our analysis, we fix the income threshold at different levels and compute the equilibrium prices as well as the distribution of consumer welfare. Our counterfactual simulations
reveal that the public procurement program leads to an increase in the aggregate consumer
welfare. The welfare effects are heterogeneous among consumers. The low-income consumers
being highly price sensitive, choose the free government drug in most of the cases and enjoy
significant increases in consumer surplus. However, the choices made by the low-income
consumers renders the residual demand curves faced by the firms relatively inelastic. Our
exercise shows that the firms would increase prices in response to the government entry. In
particular, the firms with low-priced generic products would increase prices by around 7%.
Therefore, the near-poor patients (i.e., the poor patients right above the income threshold)
are more likely to buy the low-priced products, and are most negatively affected by the
public policy. The rich consumers who used to opt for branded products are not affected by
the policy as the prices of the branded products is not affected due to entry of the government. Our flexible demand and supply model captures those differential effects by allowing
heterogeneity across consumers.

Our article relates to two sets of research literature. First, this paper contributes to
an active literature on government intervention and targeted social safety net programs for
addressing the poorest section of the society (for example, see (21), (4), (5), (25), (39), (78)
among others). The majority of studies conducted in developing countries have focused on
the demand side of the targeting mechanism, by considering the role of consumer behavior in
the adoption of a welfare program. Our study contributes to this literature by highlighting
the supply side implications of the targeting policy, its effects on the firm behavior and its
implications for consumer welfare.
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Second, we also contribute to the growing literature on pharmaceutical product market
in developing countries.7 (26) study the Quinolones antibiotic segment in India, and investigate the welfare implications of patent policy while allowing firms to adjust prices. (41)
also addresses welfare implications of patent policy by allowing firms to respond to policy
changes. (38) estimates the price effects of pharmaceutical product patents in the context
of India.

Similarly, (70) studies the price control policy and its effect of drug availability across
various regions in India. Our work complements this literature by estimating the price effects
as well as the consumer welfare effects of a public procurement program aimed at helping
the low-income consumers. In a closely related work, (24) uses detailed data from the public
procurement auctions for a large set of products in the Ecuadorian pharmaceutical market,
and studies the welfare effects of the procurement policy by flexibly modeling the strategic
concerns in firms’ participation decisions in the auctions. In contrast, our study takes the
auction stage as given, focuses on understanding the drug distribution mechanisms in the
post-auction stage, and quantifies the variations in the price responses with varying levels of
the income threshold as the number of low-income consumers who qualify for free medicine
varies in a market.

The rest of the article is organized as follows: Section 1.2 describes Ecuadorian health
system, and the data. Section 1.3 presents the framework for analysis. Section 1.4 discusses estimation details and the results from estimation. Section 1.5 explains the set up
7

A large existing literature models pharmaceutical market in developed countries (e.g.: (28), (7), (20),
(36), (80), (37), (81), (71) to mention a few. Please refer to (30) for an excellent survey). Consumers in
developed countries have access to health insurance market, while majority of the consumers are uninsured
in a developing country. Therefore, modeling the decisions in developing country markets is different from
developed country markets.
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of our counterfactual exercises and reports results from counterfactual analysis. Section 1.6
concludes.

1.2

Context and Data

Our study is conducted in the context of drugs that are used for treatment of breast cancer in Ecuador. In Ecuador, breast cancer is the twelfth most common cause of death among
females, with more than 32.7 cases per 100,000 inhabitants. The treatment protocol of a
patient diagnosed with early stage breast cancer consists of a combination of surgery, radiation treatment as well as chemotherapy to remove carcinogenic tissues to prevent the cancer
tumor from growth. If the cancer is estrogen receptor positive, the patients are prescribed
with hormonal therapy for a period of five years after the surgery, in order to minimize the
probability of a reactivation of the disease.

Therefore, our market definition includes all products ‘available in Ecuador’, and ‘used
to treat post-surgery estrogen receptor-positive breast cancer patients’. Using this definition, we include the four molecules - Tamoxifen, Exemestane, Letrozole, and Anastrozole
in our market. These four molecules belong to the same ATC3 classification,8 L02B. Out
of the four molecules studied here, Tamoxifen is classified as estrogen-receptor modulator
(SERM) while Exemestane, Letrozole, and Anastrozole are classified as aromatase inhibitor
(AI). SERM products are more frequently prescribed to women who have not gone through
menopause, while AI products are typically prescribed to postmenopausal patients. Nevertheless, tamoxifen is still a prescribed treatment for patients who have undergone menopause.
According to the information available in Breastcancer.org, “while an aromatase inhibitor is
the first hormonal therapy medicine choice for postmenopausal women, tamoxifen is the first
8

ATC classification stands for Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) classification system, where the
active substances are divided into different groups according to the organ or system on which they act and
their therapeutic, pharmacological and chemical properties.
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choice for premenopausal women and is still a good choice for postmenopausal women who
can’t take an aromatase inhibitor”.9 This suggests that depending on patient characteristics,
products available in the market are imperfect substitutes of each other.

Note that, in Ecuador, three additional molecules (apart from the four molecules we
include in our market definition) are also available that belong to the same ATC3 group
(L02B). These molecules are Bicalutamide, Cyproterone and Flutamide. We do not include
these three molecules in our analysis, as these molecules are not used to treat breast cancer
patients.10 Therefore, while these molecules belong to the same ATC3 group, these products
are not used as substitutes and hence, we exclude those products from our market definition.

We obtained our primary data from the IMS Health Ecuador. Our data records sales as
well as revenue at the stock-keeping-unit (SKU) level between 2007 and 2014 for the four
different molecules used for treatment of breast cancer (Tamoxifen, Anastrozole, Letrozole
and Exemestane). We define a quarter as a market.11 According to the World Health Organization (WHO), the hormone treatment therapy prescribes a daily dosage of 20mg for
Tamoxifen, 1mg for Anastrozole, 2.5mg for Letrozole and 25mg for Exemestane for an average adult. We use this information to convert the number of units for different presentations
into number of daily dosages. Additionally, we collect data regarding incidence and the total
number of diagnosed breast cancer cases from the reports published by Ecuadorian Health
Authority. The total number of breast cancer cases converted in number of daily dosages
serves as market size in our analysis. Table 1.1 reports the variations in the SKU level prices
9

Reference: https://www.breastcancer.org/treatment/hormonal/serms/tamoxifen

10

Bicalutamide is an androgen receptor inhibitor and is used in combination therapy to treat metastatic
prostate cancer. Cyproterone and Flutamide are antiandrogens which are used in the treatment of androgendependent conditions like acne, excessive hair growth, early puberty, and prostate cancer.
11

For each year from 2008 to 2014, we observe data for all four quarters (28 quarters in total over seven
years). We observe only the last quarter data for 2007, hence we end up with 29 markets in our analysis.
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across products observed in our data. Table 1.2 reports the corresponding product market
shares.

Table 1.1. Descriptive Statistics: Prices across Products
Brand

Product Description

Molecule

Price (in USD)
Mean S.d. Min Max

Astrazeneca

Arimidex Tablet 1 Mg X 28
Nolvadex Tablet 10 Mg X 30

Anastrozole
Tamoxifen

7.72
0.81

0.69 5.69 9.13
0.09 0.67 1.05

11.98
1.26

Medicamenta

Taxus Tablet 10 Mg X 30
Taxus Tablet 20 Mg X 30
Trozolet Tablet 1 Mg X 28

Tamoxifen
Tamoxifen
Anastrozole

0.50
0.98
3.28

0.02 0.46 0.58
0.04 0.71 1.04
0.22 3.21 4.86

0.86
1.72
5.55

Novartis Pharma

Femara Tablet 2.50 Mg 30

Letrozole

4.12

0.33

3.33 4.94

5.62

Pfizer

Aromasin Tablet 25 Mg X 30

Exemestane

3.85

0.51

3.13

6.08

5.33

Product-wise
Ceiling (USD)

No. of Observations: 200; No. of Markets: 29

Notes: This table records the prices for products sold in the market in USD. The product
description refers to the description of the stock-keeping-unit (SKU). Product-specific
ceiling refers to the product-specific cost based price caps mandated by the Ecuadorian
government that remains fixed for the sample period.

Molecule ‘Anastrozole’ is sold by two firms Astrazeneca and Medicamenta. While the
branded version sold by Astrazeneca is priced at 7.7 USD per pack, the generic version of
the molecule is sold by Medicamenta at a price of 3.2 USD. The cheapest alternative Tamoxifen is sold by two firms (Astrazeneca and Medicamenta) and are priced at close to 1 USD
per 20mg. Tamoxifen also enjoys the highest market share among the products sold in the
market. Molecule Letrozole is sold by Novartis and is priced at around 4 USD per unit. Similarly, molecule Exemestane is only sold by Pfizer at an average price of 3.85 USD per one unit.

Since all the four molecules are imported from foreign countries, the corresponding exchange rate plays a role in determining the cost of import and hence the market price.
12

Table 1.2. Descriptive Statistics: Market Share across Products
Brand

Product Description

Molecule

Astrazeneca

Arimidex Tablet 1 Mg X 28
Nolvadex Tablet 10 Mg X 30

Market Share (in %)
Mean

S.d.

Min

Max

Anastrozole
Tamoxifen

2.6
12.6

1.0
4.9

0.0
0.2

5.0
26.5

Medicamenta

Taxus Tablet 10 Mg X 30
Taxus Tablet 20 Mg X 30
Trozolet Tablet 1 Mg X 28

Tamoxifen
Tamoxifen
Anastrozole

36.0 10.9
32.4 8.2
1.1 1.1

0.0
9.9
0.0

49.8
67.2
3.8

Novartis Pharma

Femara Tablet 2.50 Mg 30

Letrozole

Pfizer

7.9

3.2

2.2

18.5

Aromasin Tablet 25 Mg X 30 Exemestane

7.3

7.9

0.2

42.7

Outside Share

25.0

6.1

12.5

36.4

No. of Observations: 200; No. of Markets: 29

Notes: This table records the percentage market shares for products sold in the market.
The product description refers to the description of the stock-keeping-unit (SKU).
Anastrozole molecule is imported from Brazil, Exemestane is imported from Italy, Tamoxifen is imported from Switzerland, and Letrozole is imported from Mexico. We collect data
regarding daily exchange rates from the Ecuadorian Central Bank and use the quarterly average official exchange rate in our analysis. Finally, to construct empirical income distribution,
we collect data regarding the individual income from the National Institute of Statistics and
Census of Ecuador. Note that, the drugs we study in our analysis are prescription drugs
and are acquired with a valid prescription provided by a physician. However, the treatment
of post-surgery breast cancer requires taking medication for a period of around five years,
and hence patients (in consultations with physicians) typically substitute among products
depending on price and other product characteristics.

Next, we briefly discuss the Ecuadorian healthcare system and the provision for drug
procurement. Ecuadorian constitution defines access to health services as a fundamental
right mandated by the state. Since majority of the Ecuadorian population do not have
any form of health insurance, paying for healthcare expenses can be challenging for poor
13

patients.12 Uninsured consumers in Ecuador can acquire medicines from private pharmacies
by paying for the drugs out-of-pocket. Additionally, consumers can also collect medicines
from public hospitals which is available free of cost. However, provision of free drugs is
restricted only to the set of drugs included in the set of essential medicines. The patient
needs to be seen by a doctor in a public hospital in order to get the free medication. As is
commonly observed in developing and underdeveloped countries, obtaining medications from
public hospitals may incur non-pecuniary costs such as delay in getting appointments, and
frequent stock-outs of medicines at public outlets (24). In contrast, a patient can get doctor’s
appointments relatively easily in the private sector and may have access to wider set of drugs.

Given this, to acquire the drugs included under the list of essential medicines, Ecuadorian
government conducts Corporate Reverse Drug Bidding (also known as SICM) to procure
the drugs at minimum cost (1). The Ecuadorian Government first sets the baseline price
(reference price) on each auction, The interested firms (which can be either importer or
local manufacturers), observe the reference price and decide whether to submit an offer or
not. If the offer is accepted by the Government, the firms enter a bidding process where
the firm with the lowest price earns the right to provide the drug to the government for
the following two years. The winning firm in the auction signs a framework-agreement and
agrees to sell the drug to every public institution in the country, at a fixed price. The first
procurement bidding to supply drugs for two years was conducted in 2011 with the goal to
procure drugs starting from January 2012. Although under this program, the government
planned to procure low-cost generic breast cancer drugs, due to problems in planning and
execution, less than 10% of the proposed amount (amounting to less than 1% of the total sales
in the market) was actually procured over the two years. This led to the termination of the
12

According to a report by the Pan American Health Organization, in 2008, about 19% of the population was covered by the civil and armed force social security system and about 3% were covered
by private health insurance. Reference: http://www1.paho.org/hq/dmdocuments/2010/Health_System_
Profile-Ecuador_2008.pdf
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program in 2013. The first successful drug procurement auction and distribution of generic
drugs for breast cancer treatment took place in 2015 where the government procured low-cost
drugs through competitive bidding and distributed those among consumers.13 Given that
our sample ends in 2014, we do not observe the entry of the government in the dataset.14
Therefore, we use a structural approach and estimate a model to uncover the underlying
factors that affect the decisions of the consumers as well as the behaviors of the firms prior
to the entry of the government. We can then use the estimated model to simulate the
entry of government, study the welfare implications of this program and evaluate alternative
allocation mechanisms. Now we describe the structural model in detail.

1.3

Framework for Analysis

In this section we describe the model used to analyze the effect of government procurement on demand, prices and consumer surplus. We first describe the demand model and
then explain the supply side of the market.
1.3.1

Demand

We use a random utility discrete choice model to estimate the demand for cancer drugs
in Ecuador, which incorporates consumer heterogeneity in the valuation of products offered
in the market. Similar discrete choice modeling has been used in (29), (40), (19), and (37)
among others, to estimate demand in pharmaceutical drug markets.
A quarter is defined as a market.
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See the chapter V in the document titled ‘Public Access to Quality Medicines: Public Procurement as a
Mechanism to Guarantee the Right to Health’ for detailed discussion on 2015 procurement mechanism and
its improvements over 2011 system. Link: https://subastademedicamentos.compraspublicas.gob.ec/
pdf/SERCOP_Public_access.pdf
14

Since the government procurement amount in 2012 was a very small part of the entire market, we ignore
the presence of government during that period.
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There are Lm patients, i = 1, · · · , Lm in a given market m. Each patient chooses one out
of Jm + 1 differentiated products offered in the market denoted by j = 0, · · · , Jm . Good 0 is
the outside good or no-purchase alternative. Each patient maximizes the following indirect
utility function, describing the utility derived by patient i for product j = 1, · · · , J :

Uijm = Xjm β + ξjm + [− exp(α + σp incomeim )] pjm +ϵijm
|
{z
} |
{z
}

(1.1)

µijm

δjm

In the above specification, Xjm is a K-vector of product characteristics that are observed
by the econometrician. We include a constant term, dummy variables for the molecules and
year dummies in the Xjm specification. We also include a time trend to capture the change
over time in the valuation of the outside option. Additionally, we include the interaction
of time trend with the brand dummy to flexibly capture the variation in the valuation of
a brand over time. Finally, we also include product-specific ceilings in Xjm that captures
the quality differences across products that may affect utility of a consumer. The productspecific ceilings are cost-based price ceilings mandated by the Ecuadorian government for
each product in our sample.15 In our data, these ceilings are fixed and hence are exogenously
given for the entire sample period. Additionally, these ceilings are never binding in the observed sample, with the maximum of the product specific actual prices around 30% below
the mandated price ceiling on average (as reported in the last column in table 1.1). The
term ξjm is a demand shifter that is unobserved by the econometrician. Price is denoted
by pjm . Household specific variables include (incomeim , {εijm }j∈Jm ): incomeim denotes the
patient’s household specific income and is drawn from the empirical income distribution in
Ecuador. εijm denotes the IID (across patients and products) utility shifter and is assumed
to follow an Type-I Extreme Value distribution.

15

For a specific molecule-concentration-presentation combination, product-specific ceiling is fixed by taking
into account the
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We allow price sensitivity to vary across households depending on the level of income.
In the specification [− exp(α + σp incomeim )], α captures the mean price sensitivity, and σp
captures the variation in price sensitivity across households depending on income levels.16
In particular, a negative value of σp would imply that households with lower income are also
more price sensitive. Capturing heterogeneity in price sensitivity among patients depending
on the level of income is crucial for our analysis. As highlighted by (50) and (52), the supply
side effects of government provision will primarily depend on the heterogeneous price sensitivities and preferences of the households operating in the market. Additionally, to capture
the heterogeneity of preferences for generic products with respect to the level of income of
the patients, we also allow for a random coefficient on the interaction of income with generic
dummy.17 A negative value of this random coefficient would imply that richer patients also
have a distaste for the cheaper generic drugs.

We the define the utility provided by the outside option by:

(1.2)

ui0m = εi0m

Following the specifications used in (15), and (73) the indirect utility can be split into
two terms.
δjm = Xjm β + ξjm
µijm = [− exp(α + σp incomeim )] + ϵij

(1.3)
∀j = (0, · · · , Jm )

The model predicted aggregate market share of product j ∈ Jm is given by
16

The specific functional form helps in fitting the model to the data, presumably since it imposes that all
simulated consumers have the correct sign for their price sensitivity. This functional form specification was
used in (42), (84) while estimating BLP demand models. However, to make sure that our results are robust
to the choice of this specification, we re-estimated the BLP model with the linear specification. Our results
(see the figure A.1) suggest that the estimated price coefficients are robust to the choice of functional form
specification. Please refer to appendix A.1 where we report the results from robustness checks.
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Note that, in our sample, Medicamenta is the only firm that commercializes generic products.

17

Z
sjm =

exp(δjm + µijm )
P
dPD
1 + k∈Jm exp(δjm + µijm )

(1.4)

where PD denotes the joint distribution of income among households.
1.3.2

Oligopoly supply model

The oligopoly model serves two purposes. First, in combination with the demand parameters, it enables one to uncover the marginal costs prior to the government’s entry. Second,
based on the demand parameters and uncovered marginal costs, it can be used to predict
the price effects of the government welfare program.

Each firm f owns a portfolio of products Ff m in market m. Its total variable profits are
given by the sum of the profits for each product k ∈ Ff m :

Πf m (⃗p) =

X

(pkm − ckm )skm (⃗p)M

(1.5)

k∈Ff m

where ckM is the constant marginal cost for product k and skm (⃗p) is corresponding market
share, now written as a function of the J × 1 price vector p⃗ . The profit maximizing price of
each product j = 1, · · · , J should satisfy the following first-order condition:

sjm (⃗p) +

X

(pkm − ckm )

k∈Ff m

∂skm (⃗p)
=0
∂pjm

(1.6)

Note that, while a price increase for a product k directly raises profits proportional to current
demand sjm (⃗p), it lowers the product’s own demand, which lowers profits proportional to
the current markup. Additionally, it raises the demand of the other products in the firm’s
portfolio, which partially compensates for the reduced demand of the own product. If the
first-order conditions hold for all products j = 1, · · · , J, a multiproduct Bertrand-Nash equilibrium obtains.
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To write this system of J first-order conditions in vector notation, define the J ×J matrix
θF as the firms’ product ownership matrix, a block- diagonal matrix with a typical element
θF (j, k) equal to 1 if products j and k are produced by the same firm, and 0 otherwise.
Let s(⃗p) be the J × 1 vector of market shares, and ∆(⃗p) = ∂s(⃗p)/∂p′ be the corresponding
J × J Jacobian matrix of first derivatives. Let ⃗c be the J × 1 marginal cost vector. Using
the operator ⊙ to denote element-by-element multiplication of two matrices of the same
dimension, we have
s(⃗p) + (θF ⊙ ∆(⃗p))(⃗p − ⃗c) = 0

(1.7)

This can be inverted to give the following expression:
p⃗ = ⃗c − (θF ⊙ ∆(⃗p))−1 q(⃗p) = 0

(1.8)

which decomposes the price into two terms: marginal cost and a markup, which depends on
the own- and cross- price elasticities of demand.

We model the log of marginal cost for a drug j in a market m to depend linearly on the
observed cost shifters, wjm and on an additive error term ωjm

log(cjm ) = wjm γ + ωjm

(1.9)

where γ is the parameter vector to be estimated. Since these drugs are products with wellknown technologies, we assume marginal cost to remain unchanged with level of production.
We include molecule dummies for all 4 molecules to capture the cost differences across
molecules. Since all these products are imported from foreign countries, fluctuations in the
exchange rate act as a key contributor to the variations in the (local) marginal cost for
these molecules. We have information about the country of origin from where a molecule
is imported. Hence, we also include the interaction of molecule dummy with the origin
country’s exchange rate in wjm .
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1.4

Estimation and Results

The estimation of demand and marginal costs is similar to that in (15). We construct
moments using equations (1.3) and (1.9), and estimate the parameters using the Generalized
Method of Moments. Endogeneity of price arises in this framework as the firm observes ξjm
while deciding on prices. Hence, to estimate the model it is necessary to specify a reasonable set of instruments. Since all those molecules are imported from foreign countries, the
country specific exchange rate affects the cost of import and hence is correlated with price.
Therefore, we use one period lagged exchange rate for countries of origin as instrument for
price.

Under the exclusion restrictions that the fluctuations in cancer drug market is independent of exchange rate fluctuations, exchange rate is a valid instrument for price. Following
(17), (15), we use characteristics of other firms as additional instruments. Further, we construct two measures of firm presence to capture popularity of a firm in other close therapeutic
categories and use those as instruments. In our data, we observe firms selling not only drugs
to treat breast cancer, but also sales of drugs used to treat other forms of cancer. We construct revenue share of a firm in other related cancer drugs as well as weighted average of
prices of drugs offered by each firm in other forms of cancer and use those as instruments.
Firm presence captures the popularity of a firm in the cancer drug market. We expect
that if a firm is popular in those related categories, then the firm may also enjoy more
brand-recognition and trust among the consumers and doctors in the drug for breast cancer,
therefore may charge a higher mark up. Under the assumption that the long-run popularity
is independent of the short run demand shocks, these firm presence measures act as valid
instruments.

Before reporting the results from the BLP model, we first present the demand estimates
from the logit model. Table 1.3 report estimates from OLS estimation where we estimate the
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demand model ignoring endogeneity, and from 2SLS estimation where we allow endogeneity
and instrument for price. The results from first stage of the 2SLS regression is reported in
the appendix table A.6. The first stage F-stat is 20.8 suggesting validity of the instruments.
Table 1.3. Descriptive Results, Logit Demand
Variable

OLS

2SLS

Price

-0.36
-1.14***
(0.22)
(0.35)
Constant
-5.82*** -5.68***
(0.46)
(0.46)
Dummy Exemestane
0.90*** 1.02***
(0.36)
(0.36)
Dummy Letrozole
2.51***
2.77**
(0.37)
(0.38)
Dummy Tamoxifen
4.75*** 4.89***
(0.30)
(0.30)
Product-Specific Ceiling
0.54*** 1.00***
(0.14)
(0.20)
TimeTrend×Medicamenta Dummy
0.27*
0.21
(0.15)
(0.14)
TimeTrend×Novartis Dummy
-0.41*** -0.26**
(0.09)
(0.10)
TimeTrend×Pfizer Dummy
-0.26*** -0.24***
(0.07)
(0.08)
TimeTrend
-0.24***
-0.13
(0.10)
(0.11)
Year Dummy
First Stage F-stat
No. of Markets
No. of Observations

Yes
29
200

Yes
20.8
29
200

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

The estimated price coefficient in the OLS model is negative, but not significantly different
from 0 reflecting the bias induced by endogeneity of price. Once we instrument for price,
the price coefficient becomes negative and significant. Table 1.4 documents the results from
estimation of the full model.
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Table 1.4. BLP estimates
Variable

BLP
Model-1

Model-2

Non-Linear Parameters
Mean Price Sensitivity

5.33***
(0.74)

5.06***
(0.89)

Price × Income

-5.44***
(0.84)

-5.21***
(1.04)

Generic Dummy × Income

-1.16***
(0.42)

Linear Parameters
Constant

1.96
(1.80)

0.93
(1.80)

Dummy Exemestane

0.47
(0.42)

0.29
(0.39)

Dummy Letrozole

2.36***
(0.37)

2.17***
(0.34)

Dummy Tamoxifen

1.06
(0.88)

1.81**
(0.95)

Product-Specific Ceiling

1.23***
(0.11)

1.24***
(0.11)

TimeTrend×Medicamenta Dummy

0.37***
(0.18)

0.34***
(0.16)

TimeTrend×Novartis Dummy

-0.05
(0.11)

0.05
(0.11)

TimeTrend×Pfizer Dummy

-0.50***
(0.11)

-0.52***
(0.10)

TimeTrend

-0.04
(0.12)

-0.05
(0.11)

Year Dummy
No. of Markets
No. of Observations

Yes
29
200

Yes
29
200

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
We report results from two specifications, in model 1, we allow heterogeneity only in terms of
price sensitivities. In model 2, we report results after allowing patients to have heterogeneous
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preferences for generic products. Note that in our specification, the price coefficient takes
the form [− exp(α + σp ∗ incomei )], where α is the mean price sensitivity and σp captures the
heterogeneity in price sensitivity that varies with household income. The estimated mean
price coefficient is positive and significant, while the coefficient of income is negative and
significant in both the models, implying that the price sensitivity of a patient decreases as
the income of the household increases.
Figure 1.1. Histogram of Price Coefficients
120
Distribution of Price Coefficient
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Notes: This graph plots the histogram of estimated price coefficients. Price sensitivities
among consumers vary with Income.

Figure 1.1 plots the histogram of the price coefficient as a function of consumer income.
There are two key points to note here. First, all price coefficients are negative and bounded
away from zero. Second, there is a tail to the left implying that consumers are highly
heterogeneous in terms of price sensitivity. To gain more insight into consumer heterogeneity,
we plot the price coefficients with respect to income. The plot is given in figure 1.2.
As evident from the figure, the price coefficient monotonically decreases as income decreases.
The estimated random coefficient capturing interaction of income and generic dummy (as
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Figure 1.2. Scatter Plot of Price Coefficients with respect to Income
1
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Notes: This table plots the estimated price coefficient in the x-axis and the log of income
on the y-axis. As income increases, the estimated price coefficient is less negative.
reported in the column ‘model 2’ in table 1.4) is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that richer patients also have a distaste for the generic drugs. As is common in developing
and underdeveloped countries, cheaper generic drugs are perceived to be less reliable and of
lower quality. Therefore, generics interacted with income picks a negative coefficient suggesting that as income grows, patients may value branded drugs more compared to generic drugs.

This heterogeneity is crucial in understanding the substitution patterns and supply side
responses when the government enters the market and hence drives the key intuition behind our counterfactual exercise. This suggests that the poor consumers being highly price
sensitive may self-select into the welfare program and consume the free drug. In contrast,
when the government offers a generic drug for free, a relatively high-income consumer being
less price sensitive and with a distaste for generic drugs, may choose to pay out-of-pocket
and buy branded drugs available in the private market even when she has access to the
free generic drug. Note that, this is purely driven by preference heterogeneity and substi24

tution patterns among branded and generic drugs; in particular, this is independent of any
additional non-pecuniary costs (such as wait time, stock-outs) that may make the freely
available generic drug in the public hospitals even less attractive. Additionally, when the
government entry caters to the poorest section of the market, the remaining individuals with
relatively higher income have comparatively lower sensitivity for price. Given this, firms
may re-optimize their pricing strategy and the new equilibrium prices may be higher than
the pre-government entry prices.18

The result from marginal cost estimation is reported in table 1.5. The marginal cost of
production of Tamoxifen is the lowest while estimated marginal cost of Anastozole is the
highest among the molecules considered. The median markup of the products sold comes
up to around 0.63-0.67 USD while median lerner’s index ((price − mc)/price) is estimated
to be 19-21%.
Next, we use our demand and marginal cost estimates to perform the counterfactual
exercises by allowing the government’s entry to provide free drugs in the market.

1.5

Counterfactual Exercise

We use the estimated model, and simulate the provision of free drug where the government procures one of the available drugs and provides it at zero cost. The Ecuadorian
government spends close to USD 250-350 million worth of annual transactions in the public
drug market. Therefore, to minimize the cost of acquisition, the policy statement encourages
the procurement of low-cost generic medicines. To quote the policy document,
“The State will promote the production, importation, commercialization, dispensing and sale
of generic medicines with emphasis on the essentials. Its use, prescription, dispensation and
18

Finally, it is also worth pointing out that, the heterogeneity of consumer preferences wrt patient age
may also drive the substitution patterns among patients. In the appendix A.3, we run robustness checks and
report results while taking patient age distribution into account, in addition to the income heterogeneity.
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Table 1.5. Marginal Cost Parameter estimates
Variable

OLS
Model-1

Model-2

Dummy Anastrozole

0.94***
(0.03)

0.92***
(0.03)

Dummy Exemestane

0.45
(0.44)

0.40
(0.45)

Dummy Tamoxifen

-0.69*** -0.75***
(0.07)
(0.08)

Dummy Letrozole

0.21
(0.18)

0.21
(0.19)

Brazil Exchange Rate
× Dummy Anastrozole

1.73***
(0.07)

1.79***
(0.09)

Italy Exchange Rate
× Dummy Exemestane

0.50
(0.30)

0.53
(0.33)

Switzerland Exchange Rate -4.8***
× Dummy Tamoxifen
(1.25)

-5.4***
(1.41)

Mexico Exchange Rate
× Dummy Letrozole

1.03***
(0.17)

1.02***
(0.17)

Median markup
Median(p-mc)/p

0.63
0.19

0.67
0.21

No. of Markets
No. of Observations

29
200

29
200

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
dispensing is mandatory in public health institutions.” 19
Consistent with the policy statement, in our counterfactual simulations, we allow the government to procure a generic version of the cancer drug (specificically, generic Tamoxifen)
and offer it for free to the patients. Hence, in our exercise, the free drug offered by the
government has all the characteristics of the cheapest available generic drug (‘Taxus Tablet
19
Reference: Corporate Reverse Drugs Bidding (WHO website) Link: https://www.who.int/phi/
3-DanielLopezSalcedo.pdf
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20 Mg X 30’) with zero price.20

We carry out two counterfactual policy simulations. First, we consider a target-based
distribution mechanism where only the consumers below a certain income threshold qualify
for the free drug. We compare it with a simpler drug distribution mechanism that serves
the patients on first-come-first-serve basis, and evaluate the extent to which the low-income
consumers self-select into the welfare program. In our second counterfactual exercise, we
study the supply side implications of the government program and compute the equilibrium
market prices and overall distribution of consumer welfare in response to the government
entry.
1.5.1

A comparison of the drug distribution mechanisms

Targeted income-based social welfare program has been widely used in less-developed
countries as a means to provide safety-net to the low-income section of the population (32).
Under income-based drug distribution program, the government fixes an income threshold
and the patients whose income fall below the threshold value qualify for the free drugs.
However, implementing such income-based programs can be a challenging task in the lessdeveloped countries, as large sections of the potential recipients typically work in the informal
sector and hence may lack verifiable records of their earnings. Consequently, there is an increased emphasis on targeting strategies that do not rely on directly observing incomes. As
an alternative strategy, the government may choose to procure a stock of low-cost generic
version drugs and provide those to patients on first-come-first-serve basis until the stock is
over.

20

In our robustness checks, we allow generic version of two molecules one from SERM category - generic
Tamoxifen (more frequently used for pre-menopausal women) and second from AI category - generic Anastrozole (more frequently used for postmenopausal women) to be offered for free by the government. Our
results are qualitatively similar to the case of when government offers one free drug and are reported in the
appendix section A.7.
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A simple example would make things clear. Suppose the government sets the income
threshold such that the income of the bottom 30% of the population falls below the threshold. Then under the targeting strategy, those low-income consumers qualify for the free
drug and may choose to avail the benefits of the program. On the other hand, under the
first-come-first-serve mechanism, any patient, irrespective of her income level may opt for
the government drug. However, the government stock is limited and can serve only 30%
of the population (as we have assumed in our example). Therefore the allocation of this
stock is done on first-come-first-serve basis. Note that, the first-come-first-serve mechanism
is easier to implement and does not require any information regarding the consumer income.
This simple strategy will be an effective distribution mechanism to serve the poorest, if the
low-income patients self-select into the welfare program and consume the free generic drug,
while the rich patients choose to consume the branded drugs by buying those from the market.

In order to understand the extent to which the market sorts the patients into the welfare program under the first-come-first-serve system, we simulate the consumer choices in
this counterfactual world and compare it with the choices made by the consumers in the
base case where the targeting mechanism is implemented. In our simulation exercise, the
government provides generic Tamoxifen tablet packs for free. Specifically, in our empirical
implementation the price of the government drug is set at zero, and other non-price product characteristics of the government drug (including the unobserved quality of the product
denoted by ξjm ) are set as identical to the observable characteristics of cheapest available
generic Tamoxifen (i.e. characteristics of ‘Taxus 20 Mg X 30’ tablets observed in the data).21
We fix the stock of procurement (hence, the supply in the public sector) at 30% of the market
21

In a robustness check, we allow the free drug to enter with a lower value of ξjm . We report the results
in the appendix section A.5
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size.22

It is worth pointing out that, since we do not have access to any auction data, and
we do not observe the prices that a firm receives from the government, we abstract away
from modeling the auctions, procurement price, and endogenous participation decisions of
the drug supplying firms.23 We instead assume that the government procures the cheapest
available drug at a given procurement price, and hence, implicitly consider the outcome of
the public auction (the winner and the bid price) as exogenously given for the purpose of
our counterfactual. While we believe that the assumption that government procures the
cheapest available drug is a reasonable one (as documented in the policy statement), our
analysis is a limited analysis, as it does not take into account the possibility that some of
the firms may strategically choose not to participate in the auction.24

Under targeting mechanism, the low-income patients whose income fall in the bottom
30% of the income distribution qualify for the free drug.25 We carry out the following steps
to simulate the consumer choices under targeting. First, we draw a random sample of consumers from the empirical income distribution, where the number of consumers (the sample
size) is equal to the size of the market. In our simulation exercise, the market size is given
22
We choose the stock at 30%, as this is close to the proposed procurement amount by the Ecuadorian
government.
23
We do not have access to data as the successful auctions in the market for breast cancer drugs were
conducted after our sample period was over.
24

To clarify further, for example, for a certain bid price, a firm may internalize possible cannibalization
when the same drug is available in the public sector for free and may choose to not participate in the auction.
Hence, by not modeling the bid price, and the participation of firms, we cannot endogenize the identity of
the winner in the auction process. The identity of the winner in the auction (and hence the characteristics
of the free drug) will affect the substitution patterns in the private market. This is an important channel to
consider for policy makers, and we refer the interested readers to (24) for a more complete analysis of the
procurement auctions and entry patterns.
25

This implies that in our counterfactual exercise, we put the income threshold at 30-th percentile of the
income distribution.
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by 4038 patients (equivalent to 121140 patient-(monthly) dosages). Under targeting mechanism, the patients with income below the 30th percentile choose from among 8 products
offered in the market (7 products are offered in the market at market price, 8th product
is provided by the government) and the outside option. The consumers whose income is
above 30-th percentile do not qualify for the free drug and choose among 7 products sold
in the market and the outside option. For each consumer and for each product available in
her choice set, we draw an i.i.d. random shock from the extreme value type-1 distribution.
Given the estimated utility parameters, product characteristics, level of consumer income
and consumer-product specific random shocks, we can compute the utility that a consumer
derives from each product by following the functional form in (1.1). The consumer then
chooses that product which derives the maximum utility. We draw large number of random
samples26 from the empirical income distribution, repeat each of those steps for every drawn
sample and record the choices made by the consumers.

Next we compute the consumer choices under the first-come-first-serve mechanism. Under this mechanism, each patient is a potential recipient of the benefit of the program. Since
the procurement stock can serve only a subsection of the population (in this case 30%), the
order of arrival of the patients into the market plays an important role in determining access
to the free drug. The patients who arrive early in the sequence will have the option of free
drug in their choice set, while the patients who arrive after the stock is over will not have
the option to choose the free government drug. Given that the size of the market (patientmonthly dosage) is close to 120 thousand, the number of possible arrival sequences of the
patients is extremely large (in the order of magnitude of 10100 ) and hence it is computationally impossible to implement. To address this, we resort to a simulation based exercise and
draw a large number of random sequences for a given sample. In practice, we draw 1000
26

In practice, we draw 1000 random samples in our counterfactual exercise.
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different random arrival sequences for each sample. For a given sample of consumers drawn
from the income distribution, for a given sequence, we compute the utility that a consumer
derives from each product by following the functional form in (1.1). We then allow consumers
to make their choices following the order in the sequence. A consumer chooses the product
that derives the maximum utility in her choice set. The choice set of the first patient in
the sequence includes the 7 products offered in the market, the free government drug and
the outside option. We allow the government free drug to be included in the choice set of
the patients until the stock is over (that is 30% of the population have chosen this option).
The patients in the sequence that arrive after the stock of government drug is over, choose
among 7 choices offered in the market and the outside option.27

While simulating the consumer choices we consider two different situations. In the first
case, we assume that the government drug comes with zero cost to the patients. Implicitly
this assumes that, in addition to zero monetary cost, the drugs available under public health
system are easily accessible, consumers have perfect information about drug availability, and
hence the consumers do not face other non-monetary costs while consuming the drug. Hence,
any self-selection of the low-income patients into the government free drug program will be
purely driven by the preference heterogeneity and substitution patterns. However in developing countries, free drug provision is often associated with various complications such as long
waiting time, lack of healthcare workers and limited access to drugs due to unavailability
((27), (10)). Therefore, often in developing countries, relatively high-income consumers opt
for purchasing drugs from the private market instead of relying on the government sources.28
27

It is important to note here that, while implementing this counterfactual exercise, we have assumed
away any strategic supply side responses, i.e. we have assumed that the firms in the market would keep
charging the pre-government entry drug prices and would not update the equilibrium prices in response to
the government entry. We will consider the supply side implication in the next exercise.
28

Private providers enjoy a high market share in many low-income countries. According to the data from
the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), 50 percent of households seeking pediatric outpatient care in
Africa and 70–80 percent in India visit the private sector with little variation over the 20 years that these
surveys have been collected (See (53), and (33))
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To take this into account, we consider a situation where we assign a negative utility shock
to a consumer when she chooses the free government drug. We allow the the magnitude of
the shock to be positively correlated with the level of income of the consumer, so that the
individuals with higher income derive more negative utility from the free government drug.
In practice, we draw i.i.d. random numbers from log-normal distribution (with mean 0 and
variance 1).

The negative of the random number is denoted as the utility shock for the free government drug. We sort the sample of utility shocks. The consumer with the highest income is
assigned the most negative shock, the consumer with second highest income is assigned the
second most negative shock and so on. The consumer with lowest income gets the smallest
(least negative) shock in our simulation. We compute the utility that a consumer derives
from each of the products in the choice set, and the consumer chooses the product that
derives the maximum utility.

Table 1.6. Results from Counterfactual Exercise
Fraction of consumers under
targeting who would also get free
drug under market allocation
Model-1

Model-2

Zero cost for Govt drugs

34.2%

34.3%

Non-zero cost for Govt drugs

37.8%

38.2%

Notes: This table reports the results from counterfactual exercise and computes the
fraction of consumers who benefit from free drug under targeting who would also get the
drug under market allocation. See the discussion in section 1.5 for detailed explanation.

The results from our counterfactual exercise are reported in table 1.6. As the table suggests, around 34% of the consumers who get the free government drug under targeting policy
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also get the free drug under first-come-first-serve strategy. When we add non-monetary costs
involved in the public provision of the drug, the fraction increases to around 38%. Note that,
under targeting, every consumer in the bottom 30% of the population (by income) benefits
from the public program. According to our calculations, under first-come-first-serve policy,
close to 34-38% of those beneficiaries (from the lowest 30% segment of the income distribution) enjoy the benefits of the free drug.

However, as we increase the dis-utility from the public good (by drawing negative utility
shocks from log-normal distribution with higher mean and unit variance), the free drug
becomes less attractive for the high-income patients. For example, in our counterfactual
exercise, if we draw dis-utility shocks for the free good from a log-normal distribution with
mean 1, then close to 52% of the low-income individuals who would receive the benefit under
targeting would also benefit under first-come-first-serve policy. This fraction increases to 93%
once we draw the dis-utility shocks from a log-normal distribution with mean 2. Our results
corroborate the findings in the study of ‘ordeal mechanisms’ used in designing choice-based
targeting while developing the public aid programs. Ordeal mechanisms impose program
requirements that are differentially costly for the rich and the poor, in order to induce
the poor to participate while dissuading the rich from doing so ((75), (74), (3)).29 Our
results suggest that carefully designing similar mechanism while distributing pharmaceutical
products, may lead low-income individuals to perfectly self-select into the program.

Which sections of the population do benefit from the public welfare program under the
first-come-first-serve mechanism? We report the income distribution of the beneficiaries un29

These “self-selection” or “ordeal” mechanisms are common in less-developed countries, for example, National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) right-to-work scheme in India often requires manual
labor to receive aid. Similarly, unemployment schemes often require individuals to report to the unemployment office weekly during working hours, which is challenging for the employed. Subsidized food schemes
often provide lower quality food so that those who can afford tastier food choose not to purchase the subsidized products.
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Table 1.7. Counterfactual Result - Income Distribution of Beneficiaries of the Free Drug
Deciles in Income
Model-1
Distribution
(No cost) (+ive cost)

Model-2
(No cost) (+ive cost)

Bottom 10%

11.45%

12.82%

11.47%

13.01%

10% - 20%

11.39%

12.58%

11.38%

12.66%

20% - 30%

11.30%

12.28%

11.28%

12.31%

30% - 40%

11.33%

12.10%

11.29%

12.08%

40% - 50%

11.22%

11.73%

11.16%

11.65%

50% - 60%

11.17%

11.35%

11.09%

11.23%

60% - 70%

11.04%

10.78%

10.92%

10.61%

70% - 80%

10.71%

9.67%

10.55%

9.44%

80% - 90%

8.55%

5.92%

8.57%

5.99%

Above 90%

1.85%

0.78%

2.31%

1.02%

Notes: This table records the income distribution of consumers who benefit from the free
drug provision. We record the percentage fraction of consumers who get free drug in a
given decile in the income distribution. Under no-cost, government drugs are available
free of cost, while under +ive cost, consumers incur a non-pecuniary cost while consuming
government drug (see the discussion in section (1.5) for details).
der this scheme and report those in table 1.7. In the column ‘No cost’, we report the case
where we assume zero non-pecuniary cost of government free drug and in the column ‘+ive
cost’, we report the case where the public provision involves a non-monetary cost. Each
row in the table corresponds to the fraction of consumers who benefit under the first-comefirst-serve mechanism and belong to a specific decile in the income distribution. The results
suggest that even without any non-monetary costs (such as wait time and stock-outs), the
market does sort the consumers on the basis of income into the welfare program, and hence
compared to the high-income segment of the population, the low-income consumers benefit
more from the welfare program. Note that, since consumers are drawn randomly, on average,
consumers from each decile have an equal probability of arriving early in the sequence and
getting the free government drug in their choice set.
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This implies if consumer preferences are homogeneous (i.e., each decile of the income
distribution have similar preferences for the free drug), then on an average from each income
segment equal number of consumers will opt to consume the free drug.30 However, as our
results show, consumers with lower income are more likely to self-select and consume the
free drug, while the consumers with higher income would opt for the products offered in
the market even when both have equal probability of having the government product in
their choice set. This is driven by the heterogeneity in consumer preferences, as high income
consumers are less price sensitive and hence derive higher utility from branded drugs even
when the free government drug is available in their choice set. As table 1.7 shows, under the
first-come-first-serve mechanism, out of all the patients who consume the free government
drug, less than 7% have incomes that belong to the top 20 percentile in the income distribution. Similarly, close to 62% of the free drug is consumed by the patients whose incomes
fall in the bottom half of the income distribution. This suggests that although less effective compared to the targeting policy, the first-come-first-serve policy does benefit the poor
section of the population more compared to the relatively rich. Ecudaorian government’s
current policy of drug distribution involves a first-come-first-serve strategy. Our analysis
shows that implementing the targeting policy instead can certainly direct the benefits of
drug allocation for the low-income segment of the population more effectively compared to
the current mechanism.
1.5.2

Supply-side Effects of the Government Entry

Our second counterfactual exercise is aimed at quantifying the price effects as well as
the effects on consumer welfare when the government provides a medicine free of cost to
a set of patients whose household income falls below a certain income threshold. We are
interested in two key aspects while studying the entry of the government. First, we quantify
the heterogeneous price responses of branded and generic products in the market when the
30

Hence, under homogeneous preferences, each of the rows in the table would be close to 10%.
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government provides a generic drug at zero price. Second, we quantify the variations in the
price responses with varying levels of the income threshold as the number of low income
consumers who qualify for free medicine varies in a market.

We fix the threshold level by allowing a specific fraction of households to qualify for free
medicine. For example in our analysis, if threshold is fixed at 30%, then the households
in the bottom 30% of income distribution qualify for free government medicine. Given a
threshold level and conditional on choosing an inside product, the qualifying patients choose
among 8 products: 7 products that are offered in the market at market price and the product
provided by the government (in our analysis, the free government drug has all the characteristics of ‘Taxus Tablet 20 Mg X 30’ with zero price). Consumers who do not qualify for free
medicine (consumers above income threshold), choose among the 7 observed products and
pay the market price (conditional on buying an inside product). In our analysis, we vary the
level of income threshold from 5% to 65%, (specifically, 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, · · · , 65%) and
allow different fractions of low income households to qualify for government provision.

Note that, we do not model the price that the government offers for the free drug to the
supplier in the procurement process, primarily due to lack of access to any auction data.
Therefore, if a firm after winning the procurement auction operates both in public and private markets, the bid price may affect the price setting ability of the firm in the private
market. As (24) points out, a multi-sector firm may choose to charge higher price in private
market if the bid price is higher. This is because when the markup in the public sector is
larger, losing a consumer towards public sector by charging higher price in the private sector
is less costly.31 However, note that in the counterfactual exercise we fix the quantity that
can be supplied in the public market. This is because, our exercise focuses on the case where
31

It is worth pointing out that, this channel does not apply to the firms that do not win the public auction,
and affects the behavior of the winning firm only if that firm operates both in public and private sector.
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only consumers below an income threshold can qualify for the free drug. For example, we
assume that only a specific fraction of the consumers (say 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, ... and so on
of the total market size) below the income threshold qualify for the public option. Hence by
fixing the maximum quantity supplied in the public sector, we fix the maximum profit of the
multi-sector firm from the public sector and focus only on the profit maximization problem
in the private sector. Therefore, although we abstract away from modeling the bid price, by
fixing the profit from public sector, we can capture the key economic trade-offs by focusing
on the profit maximization problem in the private market. Nevertheless, we acknowledge
that our study is a limited analysis, primarily due to lack of access to appropriate data and
caution the reader to interpret the results accordingly.

Given that a fraction of low income consumers have access to the free government drug,
the profit maximization problem of each firm in the private market is defined as follow:

h
i
Πjm = max (pjm − cjm )sjm,nq Mnq + (pjm − cjm )sjm,q Mq
pjm

(1.10)

In the above expression, Mnq represents the number of patients who do not qualify for free
government medicine. On the other hand, Mq represents the number of patients that qualify
for the government provision and hence have the option of choosing the government provided
free drug among other options in their choice set. For example, if the threshold is fixed at
30%, then the bottom 30% households in the income distribution will be included in Mq
while rest 70% of the market is denoted by Mnq . In the expression (1.10), sjm,nq represents
the share of product j in the consumer segment who does not qualify for free government
drug in market m,32 while sjm,q represents j’s share among consumers who qualify for the
government provision. Hence in our counterfactual analysis, we allow the possibility that
32

In other words, sjm,nq represents the probability of a buyer who does not qualify for free government
drug of buying product j in market m
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the low income households (below threshold) can still buy a drug offered in the market. The
corresponding market shares are given by:
Z

exp(δjm + µijm )
P
dPDnq
1 + k∈Jm exp(δjm + µijm )
Z
exp(δjm + µijm )
P
=
dPDq
1 + k∈Jm exp(δjm + µijm ) + exp(δgov + µi,gov )

sjm,nq =
sjm,q

(1.11)

In the expression (1.11), PDnq denotes the conditional income distribution of the households
who are above income threshold (do not qualify for free government drug) while PDq denotes the income distribution of the low income households who qualify for the free drug.
As is clear in the expression, the only difference between the individual probabilities come
from the additional option (free government drug) that the low income consumers face while
making the choices. Following the specification (1.3), δgov is identical to the mean utility a
consumer generates from the product ‘Taxus Tablet 20 Mg X 30’ in a given market, while
zero price implies µi,gov equals to zero for all consumers who qualify for the free drug.

We derive the first order conditions for each product from the firm’s profit maximization
problem and use those to solve for the equilibrium market prices under the government
provision. For a given income threshold, the first order condition for a product j in private
market m is given by

∂sjm,q
∂sjm,nq
Mnq +
Mq + sjm,nq + sjm,q = 0
(pjm − cjm )
∂pjm
∂pjm


In the system of equations (1.12), the partial derivatives,

∂sjm,nq
,
∂pjm

and

∂sjm,q
∂pjm

(1.12)

are obtained

by differentiating the share equations as specified in (1.11) using the demand model. Given
the estimated marginal costs from (1.8), we derive the new equilibrium prices for a given
income threshold. In our empirical implementation, we use the last three quarters of our
sample to derive the results for our counterfactual exercises. For each income threshold level
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(5%, 10%, 15%, · · · , 65%), we draw 1000 random samples from the empirical income distribution and solve equilibrium prices for each sample and report the average equilibrium price.

The price effects of government entry for the products offered in the market at various
income threshold levels are documented in figure 1.3. We document the percentage change
in the equilibrium prices of the products offered in the market as income threshold varies. In
our counterfactual exercises, the government offers the product with characteristics identical
to ‘Taxus Tablet 20 Mg X 30’ with zero price to the low income consumers below a given
income threshold. As the figure 1.3 demonstrates, varying the level of income threshold has
the maximum effect on the equilibrium prices of Taxus tablets (Taxus Tablet 10Mg X 30
and Taxus Tablet 20Mg X 30). In addition to Taxus tablets, we observe some price increases
for Nolvadex tablets. The entry of government has negligible effects on other high priced
products sold in the market. Note that as documented in table 1.1, the Taxus tablets (both
10 Mg and 20Mg) are the cheapest alternatives available in the market followed by Novadex
10Mg Tablet.
Our counterfactual exercise shows that, depending on the level of threshold, Taxus tablet
prices may go up by around 5.5% to 7.4%. In the appendix table A.8, we report the 95%
confidence intervals for the counterfactual price changes at different income threshold levels
where the standard errors computed using bootstrap. Our results indicate that the price
deviations for Taxus tablets are significantly different from zero (for example, confidence
interval for price response of ‘Taxus Tablet 20Mg X 30’ ranges from 7.12 % to 7.18% when
income threshold is set at 30%). Since the low income consumers right above income threshold (those that do not qualify for free medicine), are more likely to purchase the cheaper
alternatives, a price rise may affect their consumer welfare in a negative way. Government
entry has no effect on the high income consumers who are more likely to buy the high priced
branded alternatives.
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Figure 1.3. Counterfactual Result: Price Deviation (in %) with level of Income Threshold
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Notes: This figure plots percentage deviation of equilibrium price for each of the seven
products offered in the market when government enters the market and offers drugs for
free to low income patients below a level of threshold. We plot income threshold in xaxis which varies from 0% to 65%. Corresponding equilibrium price deviation for each
product is plotted in the y-axis.
Why do Taxus prices go up when government provides the generic Tamoxifen with product characteristics similar to Taxus 20Mg tablets for free to low income consumers? Note
that, as our demand estimates suggest, low income consumers are also the most price sensitive consumers in the market. Hence prior to the entry of the government, conditional on
buying, the low income consumers were more likely to buy the Taxus tablets as these were
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the cheap alternatives available in the market. After the government enters and offers Taxus
tablets for free to a fraction of low income patients at the bottom of the income distribution,
the most elastic consumer segment that used to purchase Taxus tablets will substitute to
the free Taxus tablets provided by the government. Given this, the residual demand faced
by Taxus (from the remaining low income patients) is less elastic, as those consumers are
relatively higher income consumers compared to the bottom fraction. Therefore, the reoptimized equilibrium price of Taxus goes up in response to the government’s entry. Our
differentiated random coefficient demand model that captures the flexible substitution patterns across different products offered in the market, along with consumer heterogeneity play
a key role in deriving these price responses in the counterfactual exercise. It is worth pointing
out that, the mechanism that we have highlighted here may not the exclusive mechanism
driving the results and one can certainly think of additional mechanisms as complementary
explanations to the one presented here. For example, one can think of the government as a
new large consumer representing the most elastic consumers. This interpretation would also
lead to a new price equilibrium with higher prices, similar to the results that we report here.

We follow (89), and (83) to compute the surplus for consumer i under government entry
with new equilibrium prices and compare it to the consumer welfare at the observed prices
where no government entry has taken place. The consumer surplus for a low-income patient
that does not qualify for the free government drug is given by

CSim,nq

"
"
##
Jm
X
1
γ + ln 1 +
exp (vijm,nq )
=
αi
k=1

(1.13)

The consumer surplus for a low-income patient that does qualify for the free government
drug is given by

CSim,q

"
"
##
Jm
X
1
=
γ + ln 1 +
exp (vijm,q ) + exp(vgov )
αi
k=1
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(1.14)

In the above expressions, αi stands for the price coefficient for individual i. Similarly, vijm,q ,
and vijm,nq stand for the deterministic component of utility for consumer i when i qualifies
for free drug and does not qualify for free drug respectively, and is equal to utility for consumer i net of the idiosyncratic ε term. We integrate out over consumer heterogeneity to
obtain aggregate consumer surplus.

The variations in the aggregate consumer surplus for different levels of income threshold
are documented in figure 1.4.
The bottom solid line plots total consumer welfare prior to government entry. The dotted
line plots the total consumer welfare after the government enters and a fraction of consumers
qualify for free medicine in the market. We also report the 95% confidence interval in the
figure 1.4. For every level of income threshold, the total consumer surplus exceeds the consumer surplus under no government entry. This suggests that the gain in consumer welfare
due to provision of free drugs exceeds the loss in consumer welfare due to higher prices for
every level of income threshold. Additionally, as more consumers are included in the program
and qualify for free medicine, the consumer welfare monotonically increases.33

The distributional effects of government entry on consumer welfare is documented in
figures 1.5, and 1.6. Figure 1.5 plots the percentage deviation in consumer surplus for the
consumers below the income threshold when the threshold covers bottom 30% consumers
in the income distribution. Similarly, figure 1.6 documents the the distribution of percentage deviation in consumer surplus for the consumers above the income threshold in the
corresponding case.34
33
Note that, this is a partial equilibrium analysis, and we do not consider the general equilibrium effect
which may take into account the negative welfare effects of higher government spending, such as higher tax
rates.
34

For robustness, in the appendix figures A.3 and A.4, we provide corresponding results when the income
threshold is set at 20%.

42

Figure 1.4. Counterfactual Result: Aggregate Consumer Surplus variation with level of
Income Threshold
10 5
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Notes: This figure plots aggregate consumer surplus for different income threshold levels
when government enters the market and offers drugs for free to low income patients below
a level of threshold. We plot income threshold in x-axis which varies from 0% to 65%.
Corresponding aggregate consumer surplus (in USD) is plotted in the y-axis.
As documented in the figure 1.5, low income consumers below the threshold level who
qualify for free medicine register a large gain in consumer surplus. As expected, the gain in
consumer surplus increases monotonically as income of the household goes down, and the
least income consumers receives the highest benefit from this program. This large increase
in consumer welfare from lowest section of income distribution contributes to the overall
increase in the consumer surplus. However, the consumer surplus of all consumers does
not go up unambiguously. In particular, as reflected in figures 1.6, the consumer surplus of
consumers right above the income cutoff are the most negatively affected.
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Figure 1.5. Counterfactual Result: Distribution of Consumer Surplus wrt Income
Distribution of Deviation in Consumer Surplus for Consumers Below Threshold, Income Threshold = 30%
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Notes: This figure plots the percentage deviation in consumer surplus in y-axis and log
income in x-axis for consumers below income threshold where income threshold is set at
30% (bottom 30% patients in the income distribution). The horizontal green line shows
the line of zero deviation, hence, any point to the north of this line is positive deviation.
The vertical red line shows the income threshold line.
Due to the rise in the equilibrium prices in response to government entry, the generic products (Taxus tablets) also raise their prices. Since low income consumers close to the income
threshold who do not qualify for free drugs are also more likely to buy the low priced generic
products, higher prices for those drugs have a negative consumer welfare effect on those
consumers. As income increases, and the price sensitivity goes down, the consumer welfare
loss also decreases. So, high income consumers are not affected by the government entry.
The heterogeneity among consumers indicates that although the overall benefit of the policy
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Figure 1.6. Counterfactual Result: Distribution of Consumer Surplus wrt Income
Distribution of Deviation in Consumer Surplus for Consumers Above Threshold, Income Threshold = 30%
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Notes: This figure plots the percentage deviation in consumer surplus in y-axis and log
income in x-axis for consumers above income threshold where income threshold is set at
30% (top 70% patients in the income distribution). The horizontal green line shows the
line of zero deviation, hence, any point to the south of this line is negative deviation.
The vertical red line shows the income threshold line.
is positive, the unintended consequence of the policy negatively affects the consumers at the
bottom segment of the income distribution right above the income threshold.

Public welfare programs in various developing countries link the benefits provided to a
consumer to its observable characteristics such as the level of income. As argued in (2), this
‘tagging’ mechanism may improve the efficiency of public spending by providing the benefits
to the most needy recipients. As we infer from our analysis, the government’s policy to
provide free drugs to low income consumers does achieve its goal by providing significant
consumer surplus gain for low income consumers. However, our analysis also present an
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interesting aspect that as an unintended consequence of the policy, the near-poor will end
up paying more for the drugs compared to the case where government does not enter.

1.6

Conclusion

This article studies the welfare effects of a public medicine procurement program in the
context of a developing country like Ecuador using a structural model. We consider a targeted
drug distribution strategy based on income that provides free drugs to the consumers who
earn below a given income threshold. We compare this mechanism with a first-come-firstserve strategy, where any patient irrespective of her income, may choose the free government
drug until the stock of free drug is available. The former (Income-based targeting) requires
detailed information on consumer incomes, and hence may be difficult to implement in the
informal developing country setting, while the latter (first-come-first-serve mechanism) is
simple and is easy to implement. Our analysis reveals that the low income consumers do
self-select into the welfare program, and hence the first-come-first-serve policy does benefit
the low-income section of the society more compared to the relatively rich, even though
the targeting policy directs the benefits of the welfare program more effectively among the
poorest.

Our welfare analysis shows that the provision of free medicine to the poor consumers leads
to an increase in the aggregate consumer welfare. As the procurement level increases, the
overall aggregate consumer welfare unambiguously increases. The consumers below poverty
line who receive the drugs for free enjoy significant increases in consumer surplus. However,
the welfare change is heterogeneous across consumers. In particular, consumer surplus for
low-income consumers right above the income threshold (the near-poor consumers) may
decrease due to the supply side responses. This is because the market prices of low-cost drugs
may increase by about 7%, while the prices of high cost drugs remain mostly unaffected.
Our results show that supply side incentives may distort the goals of the program and may
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lead to unintended consequences by hurting the consumers right above the income threshold.
Therefore, the policy designer needs to take this account while implementing the program.
One proposed solution can be to regulate the prices of the generic drugs that cater mostly
to poor consumers. Other solutions like providing income specific subsidies or direct benefit
transfers may lead to better outcomes which we propose for further research.
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CHAPTER 2
WELFARE AND ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS OF ELECTRIC
VEHICLE TAX POLICIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
EVIDENCE FROM COLOMBIA1

2.1

Introduction

Electric vehicles and a clean electricity sector offer a promising path to reduce greenhouse
gas (GHG) and local air pollution from light-duty vehicles. Passenger cars account for 11 percent of global GHG emissions and 45 percent of global GHG emissions from transportation2
and are one of the main factors causing poor air quality in major cities (57). Although GHG
emissions from light-duty vehicles are declining gradually in some developed economies, most
countries struggle to dramatically reduce these vehicles’ emissions and achieve international
climate objectives.

Designing cost effective vehicle policy is particularly important in low and middle-income
countries, which will account for most if not all growth in the energy and transportation demand in the near decades (90). Non-OECD emissions are expected to increase steadily over
coming decades, absent major technological, market, or policy changes (14). Apart from
China, electric vehicle markets in developing countries are nascent, lagging those in Europe
and the United States (throughout the paper, electric vehicles refer to all-electric such as the
Tesla Model 3 and plug-in hybrids such as the Chevrolet Volt). Developing countries have a
1

With Joshua Linn, and Jevgenijs Steinbuks

2

Authors’
calculations
based
on
https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/
transport-sector-co2-emissions-by-mode-in-the-sustainable-development-scenario-2000-2030
[last accessed: February 2022].
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variety of policies from which to choose, including fuel and vehicle taxes and subsidies, trade
policy instruments, and regulatory policies, such as e.g., emissions standards. Yet, despite
a growing literature on electric vehicle policy in high-income countries (e.g., (85)), there is
little research evaluating these policy options for low and middle-income countries.

For several reasons, electric vehicle policies are likely to have different welfare effects in
low and middle-income countries than in high-income economies. First, typical new vehicle
consumers in low and middle-income countries have lower disposable incomes. As a result,
they may be more responsive to price incentives and fuel cost savings of electric vehicles (11)
while having a lower willingness to pay for the relatively more expensive electric cars, making
incentives less effective. Second, these countries often have limited charging infrastructure,
and electricity may be expensive and unreliable, which may reduce the demand for electric
vehicles (9). Finally, many new vehicle markets in low and middle-income countries have
large pre-existing distortions caused by protective regulations, high import tariffs, and market power (12). These distortions can influence the welfare effects of environmental policy;
for example, a carbon tax could have higher welfare costs than other policies such as vehicle
subsidies ((49); (62)).

This paper is among the first to assess the efficacy and welfare effects of tax policies
that support hybrid and electric vehicles in a middle-income country, using Colombia as a
case study. Several studies have examined China, which has achieved unique electric vehicle
market shares, charging station networks, and domestic electric vehicle production among
low and middle-income countries ((60); (68); (82)). As we show below, Colombia is a more
representative middle-income economy. Its case is particularly interesting given its sizeable
new vehicle market, the recent growth in hybrid and electric vehicles, and its use of both
vehicle and import tax policy supporting hybrid and electric vehicles.
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In 2017, Colombia substantially reduced consumption taxes for all hybrid and electric
vehicles. It also nearly eliminated import tariffs on these vehicles; tariff reductions were
substantially larger than the purchase tax reductions. Absent market imperfections, a consumer and manufacturer subsidy should have the same welfare costs per ton of emissions
reduction. However, this equivalence breaks down in the presence of market imperfections,
such as liquidity constraints, price rigidity, or imperfect competition (8). As noted above,
these imperfections are particularly pertinent in the developing country contexts with highly
concentrated markets. We find that pre-existing distortions contribute to relatively high
welfare costs of actual and proposed electric vehicle policies.

We estimate a new equilibrium model of Colombia’s new vehicle market to evaluate the
policies by comparing simulated counterfactual equilibriums. As we explain in Section 2,
unfortunately, the structure of the tax policies does not yield sufficient variation to econometrically evaluate their effects, which motivates the use of the equilibrium model for policy
analysis. Moreover, the model allows us to compare fiscal cost-effectiveness and welfare effects (including carbon benefits) of actual policies with other policies that policy makers may
consider.

The equilibrium model builds on the empirical industrial organization literature such as
(15). On the demand side of the market, consumers maximize utility by choosing a vehicle
among available options, where utility is linear in product attributes and a random error
term. Because the policies we consider either directly or indirectly affect vehicle prices, the
baseline specification of the model allows for a random coefficient on vehicle price to generate
more plausible consumer responses to the policies. On the supply side, vehicle manufacturers
choose vehicle prices to maximize profits given government policies and consumer demand.
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Demand and supply parameters are estimated from observed vehicle market shares,
prices, and other attributes using a novel and rich dataset of new registrations and vehicle
attributes, fuel prices, and relevant government policies between 2015 and 2020. This level
of detail is comparable to recent studies of automobiles markets in high-income economies
and typically is not available for developing countries. Marginal costs of each vehicle are estimated from the first-order condition for vehicle prices to firms’ profit maximization problems.

Based on estimated parameters, policy simulations evaluate the effects of Colombia’s tax
policies on hybrid and electric vehicle sales, GHG emissions, and consumer and manufacturer welfare. Simulations focus on outcomes in 2019 (before the COVID-19 pandemic) and
2020 (when hybrid and electric vehicle market shares increased dramatically). Compared
with the 2019 and 2020 equilibriums that include both favorable purchase and import taxes,
we simulate counterfactual equilibriums that eliminate one or both policies. In 2019, the
two policies jointly caused the market share of electric vehicles to increase from 0.1 to 0.6
percent, with the tariff reduction having a larger incremental effect on sales than the sales
tax exemption. In 2020, the policies raised the market share of electric vehicles from 0.5 to
2.6 percent.

Although the policies are effective at increasing sales, their costs are high because much
of the subsidy is claimed by hybrid vehicles, which are less environmentally beneficial than
electric vehicles, and because of pre-existing distortions due to market power. The average
fiscal cost was $350-510 per ton of carbon dioxide, and the average welfare cost was $40-48
per ton of carbon dioxide. This is comparable to recent estimates of the global social value
of the emissions reductions ((87); our welfare results do not include the benefits of local air
quality improvements).
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The positive welfare cost is perhaps surprising, given that the policies reduced distortionary sales taxes and import tariffs. This is because consumers purchasing hybrid and
electric vehicles tend to be more sensitive to vehicle prices than other consumers, which
causes relatively low equilibrium markups for hybrid and electric vehicles. Consequently,
the marginal private welfare loss of reducing gasoline vehicle sales exceeds the marginal private welfare gain of increasing hybrid or electric vehicle sales. Thus, by causing consumers to
shift from gasoline to hybrid and electric vehicles, private welfare decreases, and this effect
outweighs welfare gains from reducing distortionary taxes. The importance of pre-existing
distortions caused by market power is confirmed by comparing our main results, in which we
assume Bertrand competition, with an alternative version of the model that assumes perfect
competition.

Distortions caused by market power also explain a second surprising result: a carbon
dioxide emissions rate tax has higher welfare costs than reducing sales taxes or import tariffs. Such a tax has been proposed recently in Colombia. We refer to the policy as a carbon
tax for consistency with public discussion of the policy; it is more accurately described as
an emissions rate tax. We expect the carbon tax to be more effective at reducing emissions
because it encourages consumer substitution within and across fuel types to lower-emitting
vehicles. In contrast, the other policies only encourage substitution across fuel types. The
carbon tax is indeed 7.5-25 times more effective at reducing emissions than either of the
other policies. However, the carbon tax imposes higher welfare costs than the other policies
because of consumer substitution for lower-emitting gasoline vehicles. These vehicles have
lower estimated markups than higher-emitting gasoline vehicles. Therefore, causing market
shares of lower-emitting gasoline vehicles to increase partially at the expense of higheremitting vehicles decreases total private welfare. Because gasoline vehicles account for 97-98
percent of the market in 2019 and 2020, these welfare consequences are large and cause the
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carbon tax to have higher welfare costs per ton of emissions reduction than the other policies.

This paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, as noted above, the paper
is the first to evaluate electric vehicle policies in a middle-income country other than China.
A growing literature examines electric vehicle demand and policy in high-income countries
and China, such as (67), (66), (68), (82), (92), and (85). Colombia is unusual among these
countries in using import tariffs to promote hybrid and electric vehicles. Our estimated fiscal
and welfare costs appear to be broadly similar to estimates in this literature.

Second, the paper contributes to the literature on vehicle environmental taxation. Many
countries, particularly in Europe, tax vehicle purchase or ownership in accordance with the
vehicle’s emissions rate. (34) find that such taxation schemes effectively reduced average
emissions rates of new vehicles in France, Germany, and Sweden. (6) conclude that Switzerland’s vehicle taxation scheme, which links a vehicle’s annual registration fee to its emissions
rate, reduced emissions by increasing retirements of high-emissions vehicles. Several papers,
such as (54), show that taxing fuels rather than vehicles is more efficient at reducing emissions, particularly when consumer purchase and driving decisions respond strongly to fuel
prices. Our paper shows that sales and import tariffs can increase hybrid and electric vehicles sales. Most of the literature on environmental taxation is reduced form, whereas we
estimate welfare costs of the policies.

Third, the paper builds on recent work evaluating environmental policy in the presence of
pre-existing distortions caused by market power. (49)) show that an emissions rate standard
may have lower welfare costs than a carbon tax when producers restrict output because of
market power, particularly after accounting for dynamic entry decisions. Whereas they analyze a homogeneous product, we consider a differentiated product for which markups vary
both across firms and within the vehicles sold by a firm. Though other studies that model
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imperfectly competitive markets also include these distortions (e.g., (92), they have not been
emphasized in the literature on environmental policy for passenger vehicles).

Finally, this paper adds to the literature on trade policy, vehicle demand, and consumer
welfare. (46) and (31) find sizeable consumer gains (2000−2,500 per consumer) resulting
from the removal of non-tariff restrictions in automobile markets in Israel and Cyprus respectively. (23) and (86) assess the effects of a reduction in import tariffs and non-tariff
barriers stemming from the establishment of the Mercosur customs union in Argentina and
Brazil and government economic liberalization reforms in Colombia. Like ours, both papers
find limited consumer gains due to import tariff reduction. (23) policy simulations suggest
that after equalizing tariffs between the two countries, Argentine consumers gained 393 dollars per vehicle sold, whereas their Brazilian peers lost 204 per vehicle. (86) finds sizeable the
welfare gains of $3,000 per vehicle from trade liberalization but concludes that 95 percent
of these welfare gains for consumers came from expanded product variety, not from price
changes. Unlike our study, none of these papers account for the environmental costs and
benefits of a trade policy.

2.2

Data and Policy Context

This section describes the data sources, provides key characteristics of Colombia’s new
vehicle market, and outlines the major policy changes affecting hybrid and electric vehicles
during the data period.
2.2.1

Data

The primary data set used to estimate the model parameters and conduct counterfactual
simulations consists of quarterly observations of new vehicles in Colombia between 2015 and
2020. For each vehicle, we observe new registrations, prices, and attributes. This subsection
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describes the construction of the data set.

Data on vehicle registrations and attributes from IHSMarkit are the primary data source.
A vehicle is defined by a unique model name, trim, engine size, and fuel type. Each quarter, there are typically about 30.000 vehicles with positive registrations. The definition of
a vehicle is highly specific and distinguishes between vehicles sold under the same model’s
name, but which have different fuel types (such as gasoline or hybrid), engine size (such as
4-cylinder or 6-cylinder), or trim level (such as the “standard” or “sport” trim). For example,
a gasoline-powered Mazda 3 Standard trim with a 1.6-liter engine is a unique vehicle. This
level of detail is comparable to some recent papers on Europe (54) or the United States (e.g.,
(63)), and it is unusual for papers on low- or middle-income countries. As Section 4 explains
in more detail, disaggregation helps identify preference parameters.

Although the IHS data provide extensive detail about the vehicles, unfortunately, the
data are incomplete for vehicle prices and certain other attributes. We use El Motor Magazine3 to impute vehicle prices. We use Carfolio.com to impute fuel economy, GHG emissions
rates, and other attributes.

To assess the quality of the imputation, we compare imputed values with non-missing
data. For vehicle attributes with continuous values, such as horsepower and price, the absolute mean difference between the observed and the imputed data was 5%, with a standard
deviation of 0.8%. We obtain gasoline and electricity prices from Colombia’s Ministry of
Energy.

3

https://www.motor.com.co/precios [last accessed: February 2022].
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Data for charging stations come from different sources, including OpenChargeMap4 , Electromaps5 , and PlugShare6 . Because our registration data are at the national level, we compute the total number of public charging stations by quarter.
2.2.2

Characteristics of Colombia’s New Vehicle Market

Colombia is Latin America’s fourth largest market for both automobiles sales and production (after Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina).7 There are two large light-duty vehicle manufacturers in Colombia (Colmotores/GM and Sofasa/Renault).8 These two firms assemble
cars from imported materials that represent around 70 percent of a fully assembled car.
These imported materials are subject to import tariffs of a similar magnitude (currently 35
percent) as imported cars. Since Colombia liberalized trade in light-duty vehicles in 1991,
the incumbent advantage of the domestic assembly plants has gradually dissipated, and previously nonexistent imports of other cars have grown significantly (86). Currently, two-thirds
of new vehicle sales are imports.9

Table 2.1 shows key characteristics of Colombia’s new vehicle market based on the data
set used for demand estimation and policy simulations.

4

https://openchargemap.org/site [last accessed: February 2022].

5

https://www.electromaps.com/en [last accessed: February 2022]

6

https://www.plugshare.com/ [last accessed: February 2022].

7

See
https://www.globalfleet.com/en/manufacturers/latin-america/analysis/
latam-vehicle-sales-down-2020-commercial-fleet-solidandhttps://investincolombia.com.
co/en/sectors/manufacturing-industries/automotive [last accessed: February 2022].
8

The third large manufacturer, Compañía Colombiana Automotriz, has closed its operations in Colombia
in 2014.
9

See
https://www.industryweek.com/the-economy/competitiveness/article/22018055/
growing-opportunities-in-colombias-automotive-market [last accessed: February 2022].
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Table 2.1. Descriptive statistics for vehicle characteristics
Variable

Mean

Retail price
36,341.5
(including taxes, $)
Fuel cost
10.5
($/100 miles)
Fuel consumption
28.3
rate (miles/gallon)
Engine power
131.9
(kilowatts)
Engine displacement
1,822.0
(cubic centimeters)
Weight
1,683.9
(kilograms)
Battery capacity
28.9
(kWh)
Range
138.7
(miles)
Number of
18.8
chargers
Variable
Automatic transmission
Electric
Hybrid

Standard

10th

deviation percentile

90th

Within model
standard
percentile
deviation

Across model
standard
deviation

28,275.7

12,312.1

73,699.6

2,887.2

23,542.9

4.8

6.6

14.1

1.1

4.8

9.5

19.7

40.0

1.9

66.8

67.6

66.0

230.0

1.4

9.7

846.5

1,197.0

2,488.0

107.1

845.4

346.2

1,301.0

2,150.0

72.8

347.3

19.9

7.6

61.0

0.1

21.5

100.5

25.5

251.7

0.5

98.6

31.4

0

82.0

NA

NA

Market share
15.7%
0.23%
0.38%

Note: The table reports summary statistics for the data set used for estimation and policy simulations,
which includes 9,999 observations. Electric vehicles include plug-in hybrid electric vehicles and all-electric
vehicles.

Prices and fuel costs are in current dollars, and the table indicates a substantial variation
of the attributes across vehicles. For gasoline and hybrid vehicles, fuel costs are the price
of gasoline (dollars per liter) multiplied by the fuel consumption rate (liters per 100 miles).
For electric vehicles, fuel costs are the price of electricity (dollars per kilowatt-hour, kWh)
multiplied by electricity consumption (kWh) per 100 miles.

The table includes two measures of engine performance: power (measured in kilowatts),
which is directly proportional to horsepower, and displacement (in cubic centimeters), which
is the volume of the engine cylinders. Like most of the recent vehicle demand literature
(e.g., (92)), we use power as a proxy for performance because it is highly correlated with
other potential performance measures such as acceleration and towing capacity, which are
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not observed.

The table also reports the battery capacity and electric range of electric vehicles. The
range is the number of miles that can be driven in all-electric mode, and the electric range
is typically substantially lower for plug-in hybrids than for electrics. However, because plugin hybrids have a gasoline engine, their total range is usually higher than all-electric vehicles.

The bottom of Table 2.1 shows that about half of the vehicles have a manual transmission. The market shares of electric and hybrid vehicles are small, with each less than 1
percent over the entire sample. However, there is a growing importance of these vehicles
over time (Figures 2.1-2.2). The market shares of hybrid and electric vehicles have increased
rapidly, particularly after 2017 (Figure 2.1, upper panel).

Figure 2.1. Market Shares of Electric and Hybrid Vehicles and Shares of Available Electric
and Hybrid Vehicles in Total Vehicles

Note: The top panel of this figure plots market share evolution for electric and hybrid vehicles. The
bottom panel shows the evolution in the share of units sold for electric and hybrid vehicles.
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By 2020, the combined market share of these vehicles was about 5 percent. The sales
growth coincides with an increase in the number of hybrid and electric vehicle options; by
2020, these vehicles account for about 3 percent of the vehicles in our data (Figure 2.1,
lower panel). Moreover, Figure 2.2 shows that the average price of electric vehicles declined
somewhat but the average remains substantially higher than prices of gasoline and hybrid
vehicles, which were relatively stable over the same time span.

Figure 2.2. Average Vehicle Prices by Fuel Type

Note: MSRP is the manufacturer’s suggested retail price. The vertical axis plots the combined MSRP
and tax, in thousands of dollars.

For additional context about Colombia’s market, Table 2.2 reports the 5 top-selling models by fuel type. BMW and Renault sell the top-five most popular electric vehicle models
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(Mini is a brand sold by BMW). The most popular electric models tend to be in the small or
mini segments, whereas the most popular hybrid models tend to be only slightly larger. The
most popular gasoline models have market shares that are two orders of magnitude larger
than the most popular electric and hybrid vehicles. Moreover, the top-five gasoline models
account for almost half of all sales. These gasoline vehicles have multiple trims and engine
configurations, whereas the electric vehicles typically have just a few available trims.

Table 2.2. Descriptive statistics for vehicle characteristics
Fuel
Type
BMW I3
Electric
RENAULT TWIZY
Electric
RENAULT ZOE
Electric
BMW 3-SERIES
Electric
MINI COUNTRYMAN Electric
TOYOTA COROLLA
Hybrid
HYUNDAI IONIQ
Hybrid
FORD FUSION
Hybrid
AUDI A6
Hybrid
BYD QIN
Hybrid
RENAULT SANDERO Gasoline
CHEVROLET SPARK Gasoline
CHEVROLET SAIL
Gasoline
KIA PICANTO
Gasoline
MAZDA 3
Gasoline
Model

Market
share (USD)
0.09%
0.04%
0.04%
0.04%
0.03%
0.33%
0.03%
0.01%
0.00%
0.00%
14.25%
8.66%
5.91%
5.95%
6.19%

Market
sahre (Q)
0.09%
0.04%
0.04%
0.04%
0.03%
0.33%
0.03%
0.01%
0.00%
0.00%
15.16%
10.90%
8.27%
8.06%
5.19%

Mean
Market
MSRP
Segment
48,129
Small
31,602
Mini
31,954
Small
52,465
Medium
44,849
Off-Road
20,836 Lower Medium
24,682 Lower Medium
30,603
Medium
51,043 Upper Medium
17,586 Lower Medium
12,493 Lower Medium
8,555
Mini
10,534
Small
9,805
Mini
16,509 Lower Medium

Note: The table reports the average market share for the top 5 most popular models on each fuel type.

2.2.3

Policy Context

Colombia is the third most populous country in Latin America and the fourth largest
economy. Table 2.3 provides background information about Colombia’s economy, electricity
sector, and CO2 emissions for 2019. It also compares these indicators with other middleincome countries to motivate our choice of Colombia as a representative case study. Compared to other middle-income economies, Colombia is a richer country that grows at a slower
rate. However, these differences are not substantial, and we can consider Columbia a repre-
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sentative middle-income economy.

Colombia’s emissions are half as large as the average middle-income country (on a percapita basis), which is partly explained by the extensive use of hydroelectricity in Colombia.
Electricity access is also high and comes close to 100 percent. Low carbon intensity and
good availability of electricity make a strong case for electric vehicles to help decarbonize
the economy.

The Colombian government has set an ambitious goal to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 20% by 2030 under the Paris Agreement commitments (Law 1844, 2017). To help
achieve this commitment, the government intends to have 600,000 electric vehicles on the
road by 2030.10
Table 2.3. Descriptive statistics for vehicle characteristics
Variable
GDP per capita
(current US$)
GDP growth
(annual %)
CO2 emissions
(metric tons per capita)
Access to electricity
(% of population)
Renewable energy consumption
(% of total final energy consumption)

Colombia

Middle Income
Country

6425.0

5480.3

3.3

4.6

1.6*

3.7*

99.8

93.5

30.7*

20.4**

Note: Calculations are based on the World Bank Open Data. Middle-income countries are defined
based on the World Bank country classification for 2021. * Latest data available for 2018. ** Latest
data available for 2015.

The government has recently adopted and proposed several tax policies to promote the
uptake of hybrid and electric vehicles. First, starting in 2017, the sales tax on new vehicles
10

See https://www.worldenergy.org/news-views/entry/electric-mobility-is-a-reality-in-colombia
[last accessed: February 2022]
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was reduced from 19 percent to 5 percent for hybrid and electric vehicles; the sales tax for
gasoline vehicles remains at 19 percent. In 2017, Colombia also reduced import tariffs from
35 percent to 0 for electrics and 5 percent for hybrids; tariffs for gasoline vehicles remain at
35 percent. Initially, the tariff reduction applied only to the first 1,500 units each year, but
starting in December 2019, the caps were eliminated.11

Both tax policies affect vehicles according to their fuel type (gasoline, hybrid, or electric), but there is no policy variation within a fuel type. Moreover, as Figure 2.1 shows,
the increase in market share coincided with the entry of new vehicle options. Since entry
is a long-term decision that probably did not respond immediately to the policy changes,
it is difficult to disentangle the effects of the policies and vehicle entry on market shares.
The limited tax variation and coinciding entry prevent an econometric policy evaluation.
This motivates our strategy of specifying an equilibrium model of the new vehicle market,
estimating parameters, and simulating policies to evaluate these policy interventions.

The second policy development is that the Colombian government has proposed a carbon
tax as part of its climate change agenda (draft law 439 of 2021 presented by the executive
branch but later withdrawn). This carbon tax for new vehicles was calculated based on
their sales price and estimated carbon emissions rates. Electric cars and hybrids were exempted from the sales price component of the tax. All other vehicles were grouped into three
price bands with an increasing marginal tax rate for higher price bands.12 The emissions
component of the proposed carbon tax allocated all vehicles into 50 bins (or "contamination
factors") based on their estimated emission rate levels. The value of the emissions component
11

This import tax exemption quota was not binding and thus had no effect on our study’s findings. The
highest number of an electric vehicle brand sold in the market in 2019 was 827 units, or 55 percent of the
quota.
12

Specifically, vehicles with a price below $13,221 would have subjected to a 1.5% tariff. Vehicles with
price range of $13,221 to $29,740 would have subjected to a 2.5% tariff. Vehicles with a price above $29,740
would have subjected to a 3.5% tariff.

62

is determined by multiplying the value of the contamination factor (e.g., 1 for the first bin
and 50 for the last bin) by $14.55. The total proposed tax is the sum of these two components.

Finally, in 2018 Colombia reduced taxes for charging station investment. It also implemented several non-tax policies to improve the uptake of electric vehicles.13 Unfortunately,
we cannot assess the effects of these policies because of limited data on charging stations
and sub-national vehicle registrations.

2.3

Equilibrium model

This section describes the equilibrium model of the new vehicle market. Each consumer
chooses the vehicle that maximizes subjective utility, and each vehicle manufacturer maximizes profits.
2.3.1

Demand

The demand side of the model is similar to other random coefficients logit models of the
market, such as Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes ((15) and (16) (66)). Markets are indexed by
t, which correspond to a year-quarter. Each market includes a fixed number of households
that consider buying a used vehicle or one among the J available new vehicle types.

The subjective utility uijt that consumer i receives from purchasing vehicle j in market
t is:

Uijm = αi (pjt + τjts )

X

Xjkt βk + ξjt + ϵijt

(2.1)

k

13

For example, the government gave plug-in vehicle owners some exemptions from the Pico y Placa — a
national measure to mitigate the traffic congestion and pollution problems by restricting the presence of cars
on the roads based on their plate numbers on each day of the week.

63

where pjt is the vehicle’s purchase price excluding the sales tax, τjts is the sales tax, αi is
the individual’s sensitivity of utility to price (that is, the marginal utility of income), Xjkt
is the value of observed vehicle attribute k with coefficient βk , ξjt is the mean combined
utility of all unobserved vehicle attributes, and ϵijt is the individual’s idiosyncratic utility
from purchasing the vehicle net of the utility from price, observed attributes, and unobserved
attributes. Observed attributes include engine power (measured in kilowatts), per-mile fuel
costs, a dummy variable for an automatic transmission, a dummy variable for an electric
vehicle, the interaction of the electric vehicle dummy with the number of charging stations,
battery size, and a dummy variable for a turbocharger.14 The set of attributes contains
variables that consumers use to distinguish vehicles from one another, including traits related to fuel consumption, engine performance, and fuel type. Battery size is a proxy for
(unobserved) range in all-electric mode, and preferences for battery size may reflect range
anxiety.

In the benchmark specification of demand in equation 2.1, consumer heterogeneity enters
the price sensitivity and error term. The coefficient on the tax-exclusive purchase price is
the same as the coefficient on the sales tax, meaning that consumers care only about the taxinclusive sales price. In principle, the utility could depend differently on the tax-exclusive
price and sales tax, but the policy variation discussed in Section 2.2 prevents us from estimating a different sensitivity parameter for tax-exclusive prices and taxes.

Equation 2.1 makes the standard distinction between vehicle attributes that are observed
in the data and those that are unobserved; below, we discuss the implications of the unobserved attributes for parameter estimation. We assume that αi has a normal distribution
14

It is more common in the literature to use horsepower than engine power. We use engine power because of
data availability, but this likely has little effect on the results because the two variables are highly correlated
with one another.
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with mean α and standard deviation σ. We use F to denote the joint distribution of the
preference parameters α, σ, and βk .

If ϵijt has a Type 1 extreme value distribution and the utility of the outside option is
normalized to zero, the market share of vehicle j in market t, djt , is:
Z
sjt =


P
exp αi (pjt + τjts ) k Xjkt βk + ξjt
 dPD
P
P
s
1 + g∈Jm exp αi (pgt + τgt
) k Xgkt βk + ξgt

(2.2)

Equation 2.2 links the vehicle’s market share to its price and attributes and the preference
parameters.
2.3.2

Supply

The supply side is static and similar to (15), among others. Each firm f maximizes
the profits of selling its j ∈ Jf vehicles, taking tax policies and consumer preferences as
exogenous:

max

{pjt }j∈Jf


pjt − cjt − τjtm qjt

(2.3)

where cjt is the vehicle’s marginal cost of production, τjtm is the import tariff, and qjt is
the vehicle’s sales, which depend implicitly on the vehicle’s price according to equation 2.2.
Thus, the costs contain two components: the marginal cost of producing the physical vehicle
and the import tariff. Marginal costs are a linear function of engine power, fuel consumption
rate, transmission type, and battery size.

The first-order condition for the price pjt is:
X ∂q

kt
pjt − cjt − τjtm + qjt = 0
∂pjt
kinJ

(2.4)

f

The profit-maximizing price depends on the own- and cross-price elasticities of demand,
marginal costs, and the import tariffs.
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2.3.3
2.3.3.1

Estimation
Identification

For each market t, equations 2.2 and 2.4 characterize the equilibrium prices and market
shares. To calculate counterfactual prices and market shares, we need to estimate the preference parameters α, σ, and βk , the unobserved vehicle utilities, ξjt , and marginal costs, cjt .

The highly disaggregated vehicle definition aids identification of the parameters α, σ, and
βk . For many models in the data, we observe multiple versions with different engine sizes
or transmission types but are otherwise similar to one another. In contrast, as we see from
Table 2.1, if the data were aggregated to the model level, there would be less variation to
identify the coefficients.

Recall that equation 2.2 includes the unobserved utility of the vehicle. We decompose
this utility into three components plus a random error term:

ξjt = ηm + ρt + λs + νjt

(2.5)

which includes the make fixed effects (ηm ), year-quarter fixed effects (ρt ), and market segment fixed effects (λs ). The make fixed effects distinguish the luxury and base brands that
some firms offer, such as Nissan and Infiniti, which are both sold by Nissan.15 The yearmonth fixed effects control for any unobserved demand shocks that affect the utility of all
vehicles proportionately. The segment fixed effects control for preferences for vehicle size
since the segment variable is based largely on the vehicle’s size.

15

It would be feasible to include model rather than make fixed effects. Unfortunately, there is insufficient
variation in attributes and prices to identify the preference coefficients if we include model fixed effects.
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Complicating the estimation is that the equilibrium price of each vehicle is correlated
with the random error term, νjt , via equation 2.4. Following standard practice since (15),
we use instruments based on attributes of other vehicles in the market. The rationale is that
the vehicle’s price depends implicitly on attributes of other vehicles according to equation
2.4. The exclusion restriction is that attributes of other vehicles are exogenous to νjt . Since
vehicle manufacturers typically adjust vehicle attributes every several years rather than annually, this may be a valid assumption in the short run. Unfortunately, data are not available
to partially relax this assumption, as in (61).

We use three sets of instruments. The first set includes the sums and deviation from
averages of competing firms’ engine displacement, power, emissions rate, weight, and the
number of transmission speeds. The second set includes similar attributes and is based on
deviations from the firm’s averages. The third set the number of vehicles within the same
segment that has the same drive type, turbocharger, and transmission type. Taken together,
the instruments approximate the degree of competition from similar vehicles sold by other
firms or sold by the same firm, which affects equilibrium prices according to equation 2.4.
2.3.3.2

Estimation Results

Table 2.4 shows the estimated preference parameters. Column 1 shows estimates of a
nested logit model compared to the random coefficients logit in column 2. In the random
coefficients specification, the price coefficients are statistically significant at the 1 percent
level, and they imply mean own-price elasticities of about -5. This magnitude appears
reasonable given the disaggregate level of the data (66). The magnitude is also substantially
larger than the nested logit coefficient, which implies an implausibly small degree of price
responsiveness.
The coefficient on the interaction of electric vehicles with the number of charging stations
is positive—which we would expect since public charging stations can reduce range anxiety.

67

Table 2.4. Demand estimation results
Variable

Nested
Logit

Random Coeff.
Logit

Non-Linear Parameters
Mean Price Sensitivity

-0.016***
(0.004)

Price random coefficient

-0.342***
(0.015)
0.112***
(0.006)

Linear Parameters
Constant

0.726***
(0.389)

-0.713**
(0.280)

Power (Engine Kw)

0.004***
(0.001)

0.012***
(0.001)

Consumption (USD/ 100 miles)

-0.084*** -0.005*
(0.006)
(0.003)

Transmission (Automatic =1)

-0.096*
(0.040)

0.072**
(0.031)

Electric dummy

7.650***
(0.642)

-2.937***
(0.434)

Electric X charging stations

0.029***
(0.003)

0.018***
(0.002)

Battery size (kWh)

-0.066
(0.004)

0.012***
(0.002)

Turbo

-0.192
(0.042)

0.032
(0.037)

Sigma lower nest (Standard seg)

0.856***
(0.040)
0.920***
(0.043)

Sigma upper nest (fuel type)
Maker fixed effects
Year - month fixed effects
Standard segment fixed effects
***

p < 0.01,

**

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

p < 0.05, * p < 0.1

However, because the number of charging stations increases steadily through the sample and
the variable does not vary across electric vehicles, the positive coefficient may (at least par-
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tially) reflect an omitted time trend of electric vehicle demand. That is, we cannot identify
the charging station interaction if we include market fixed effects interacted with the electric
vehicle dummy variable.

The turbocharger coefficient is positive, but it is not precisely estimated. Turbochargers
affect fuel costs and performance, but we control separately for fuel costs and performance,
which may explain the lack of statistical significance. In other words, consumers may value
the additional performance that a turbocharger enables rather than the turbocharger per se.
Table 2.5. Supply estimation results (random coefficients logit model)
Variable

Coefficient
Linear Parameters

Constant

3.440***
(0.195)

Power (log (HP)/ weight)

0.295***
(0.042)

Consumption (USD/ 100 miles)

-0.002
(0.003)

Transmission (Automatic =1)

0.092***
(0.029)

Battery size (kWh)

0.011***
(0.002)

Maker fixed effects
Year - month fixed effects
Standard segment fixed effects

Yes
Yes
Yes

Median markup
Median(p-mc)/p

2,254
0.08

***

p < 0.01,

**

p < 0.05, * p < 0.1

Table 2.5 shows the estimates of the supply-side parameters. Increasing a vehicle’s horsepower, replacing a manual with an automatic transmission, and increasing the battery size
have the expected signs, and the coefficients are precisely estimated. The automatic transmission coefficient is larger than expected, which may reflect a correlation between trans69

mission type and unobserved attributes offered in premium vehicles. Note that such a correlation would likely have small effects on the counterfactual analysis in Section 2.4 since
vehicle attributes are exogenous in that analysis. The coefficient on fuel consumption has
the expected negative sign, meaning that reducing fuel consumption (that is, increasing fuel
economy) while holding fixed other attributes causes the marginal costs to increase.

Table 2.6 reports mean own-price elasticity of demand, profit margin, and markup by fuel
type. Consumers are more price-sensitive for electric and hybrid than for gasoline vehicles.
This difference is intuitive because it indicates that consumers consider the prices of the
alternative technologies more carefully. The profit margin and markup are consistent with
the differences in price elasticity of demand; the more price-elastic is demand, the lower the
profit margin and markup. The lower markups for electric and hybrid vehicles preview the
high welfare costs of the policies that increase the market shares of these vehicles. That is,
reducing sales taxes or import tariffs for electric and hybrid vehicles increases their market
shares, which on the margin reduces manufacturer profits because of the lower markups.
Table 2.6. Own-price elasticity, profit margin, and markup by vehicle’s fuel type
Fuel Type
Electric
Hybrid
Gasoline

Mean own-price Mean profit Mean markup
elasticity
margin
(USD)
-5.6
4.7%
2,031
-5.4
7.3%
2,055
-4.7
10.9%
2,304

Note: This table presents mean price elasticities, mean profit margins, and mean markups by vehicle
fuel type. Averages are taken over all vehicles belonging to a fuel type. Mean own-price elasticity is the
percent change of a vehicle’s market share caused by a one-percent increase in the price of the vehicle.

In Table 2.7, the cross-price elasticities of demand indicate that hybrid vehicles are closer
substitutes for electric vehicles than are gasoline vehicles. Intuitively, consumers regard
electric vehicles as closer substitutes for hybrid vehicles than for gasoline vehicles. The
reasonableness of the consumer substitution patterns helps validate the demand model.
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Table 2.7. Own- and cross-price elasticity of demand by fuel type
Fuel Type
Electric
Hybrid
Gasoline

Electric
-4.0
0.1
0.0

Hybrid
0.0
-3.9
0.0

Gasoline
2.6
2.5
-2.1

Note: This table shows the own- and cross-price elasticities by fuel type. Elasticities are the percent
change in market share of the fuel type caused by a 1 percent increase of the prices of all vehicles belonging
to the fuel type in the column heading.

2.4
2.4.1

Policy simulations
Scenarios

We compare a baseline no-policy scenario that removes the preferential sales and import taxes against scenarios that include one or both of the preferential taxes. We use data
from 2019 and 2020 for the simulations and report results separately for each year. Simulating outcomes for 2019 allows us to characterize the equilibrium before the COVID-19
pandemic, which likely disrupted Colombia’s new vehicle market as the economy contracted.
The market shares of hybrids and electrics increased threefold between 2019 and 2020 (see
Figure 2.1), and it is interesting to consider the effects of the tax policies when market shares
reached historical highs. The baseline or ‘no-policy’ scenario includes the pre-reform status
quo of 19 percent sales tax and a 30 percent import tariff for all vehicles. In the first policy
scenario, we reduce the sales tax to 5 percent for hybrid and electric vehicles. In the second
policy scenario, we reduce the import tariff to 5 percent for hybrids and 0 for electrics; we
maintain the 30 percent import tariff for gasoline vehicles and the sales tax at 19 percent
for all vehicles. The second scenario is the actual policy, which includes both the lower sales
tax and the lower import tariffs for hybrids and electrics. The third scenario considers the
effects of the carbon tax proposed by the Colombian government (see Section 2.2).

The algorithm for finding the equilibrium begins by making a guess on vehicle market
shares and prices. For the baseline scenario, the initial guesses include the observed prices
and market shares predicted by equation 2.2. For each firm, we use equation 2.4 to compute
the profit-maximizing vector of prices for its vehicles, conditional on the prices of other
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firms’ vehicles. We iterate through the firms in the market until the price vector converges
to within a specified tolerance. The equilibriums for the three policy scenarios are found
similarly, using the observed prices and predicted market shares as initial guesses.
2.4.2

Effects of Existing Policies on Market Shares and Welfare

Table 2.8 shows the results of simulations of the no-policy scenario, which includes a
19 percent sales tax and 30 percent tariff for all vehicles. The second column shows the
current policy, which includes both the lower sales tax and lower import tariffs for hybrids
and electrics. The third and fourth columns show the effects of only changing the sales tax
or importing tariff. The fifth column shows the effects of the proposed carbon tax. Note
that the first column reports levels for the outcomes indicated in the row headings, and all
other columns report changes relative to the ‘no-policy’ baseline.

Panel A reports results for 2019, and the first two columns show that the lower sales
taxes and import tariffs increased market shares from 0.06 to 0.57 (= 0.06 + 0.51) percent
for electric vehicles and 0.08 to 0.5 (= 0.08 + 0.42) percent for hybrids. The lower sales tax
and import tariff slightly increased consumer surplus and reduced profits. Government revenue declined by about $6.4 million, which is about 1 percent of the revenue in the baseline
scenario. For simplicity, we assume that the tax decrease is financed by a lump-sum tax on
all households.16 Total welfare is reported at the bottom of the panel, and the change in
welfare in the second column is the sum of the total consumer surplus change, total profit
change, and fiscal cost. The fiscal cost more than offsets the consumer surplus increase from
reducing taxes, and the total welfare change is negative.

16

That is, following the literature, we assume that the fiscal cost of a policy can be financed without
creating any further distortions.
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Table 2.8. Welfare comparison of baseline with status quo and alternative scenarios
No
Current Sale tax
Policy Policy
reduction
(level)
(diff)
only (diff)
Panel A: Year 2019
Electric vehicle market share
0.06% 0.51%
0.06%
Hybrid vehicle market share
0.08% 0.42%
0.08%
Average consumer surplus (USD per consumer) 9380.7
30.5
5.2
Average profit (USD per vehicle)
2287.5
-3.7
-0.5
Total Consumers Surplus (millions USD)
1150.7
5.9
0.6
Total profit (millions USD per market)
343.1
-0.2
-0.1
Fiscal cost (million USD)
0.0
6.4
0.4
Total Welfare (million USD per market)
1493.8
-0.7
0.1
Panel B: Year 2020
Electric vehicle market share
0.08% 0.51%
0.07%
Hybrid vehicle market share
0.45% 2.18%
0.41%
Average consumer surplus (USD per consumer) 7004.9
48.6
9.6
Average profit (USD per vehicle)
2164.7
-10.3
-2.1
Total Consumers Surplus (millions USD)
552.4
9.1
0.7
Total profit (millions USD per market)
208.4
-0.6
-0.2
Fiscal cost (million USD)
0.0
9.3
1.0
Total Welfare (million USD per market)
760.8
-0.9
-0.4
Variable

Tariff
Carbon
reduction
tax
only (diff) (diff)
0.22%
0.19%
14.4
-1.5
1.7
-0.2
2.2
-0.7

0.56%
0.46%
-202.9
-40.3
-24.0
-4.7
-58.3
29.7

0.24%
1.01%
23.8
-5.2
2.0
-0.4
4.1
-2.4

0.57%
2.75%
-101.4
-42.4
-7.3
-3.1
-30.1
19.7

Note: This table shows the results of the counterfactual analysis for market shares for electric and
hybrid vehicles and welfare measures for five scenarios. For the "No Policy" scenario, the calculations
are presented in levels. For all other scenarios, calculations are the increments from the "No Policy"
scenario. "Average consumer surplus" and the "Average profit per vehicle" are the annual averages
weighted by the number of vehicle units sold. "Total consumer surplus," "Total producer surplus," and
"Fiscal Cost" are calculated annually. ’Total Welfare" is the sum of "Total consumers surplus" and
"Total producer surplus" minus the "Fiscal cost."

The negative welfare change may at first appear to be surprising. The sales tax and
import tariff in the no-policy scenario are distortionary, and one might expect that reducing
these taxes should increase private welfare. However, that intuition does not take account
of the pre-existing distortion caused by market power. Specifically, because demand curves
for hybrid and electric vehicles tend to be flatter than demand curves for gasoline vehicles,
equilibrium markups tend to be higher for gasoline vehicles than for hybrid and electric
vehicles. In the no-policy scenario, for example, the average markup for gasoline vehicles
is about 30 percent higher than for other vehicles. Consequently, because the status quo
policy increases market shares of hybrid and electric vehicles, which have lower markups
than gasoline vehicles, manufacturer profits decrease. In other words, the policy exacerbates
pre-existing distortions caused by market power and differential average markups across fuel
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types.

The next two columns after the status quo show the results for the sales tax and tariff
reductions in isolation. The third column uses the same sales tax as the status quo and the
same (higher) tariff in the no-policy baseline. Abstracting for the moment from pre-existing
market distortions caused by market power, we expect the two policies in isolation to have
qualitatively similar results to one another: by reducing distortionary taxes, the policies
should increase welfare and reduce emissions. However, although both policies increase consumer welfare, they reduce profits. Profits decrease for the same reason as the status quo
scenario discussed above: lower taxes or tariffs encourage consumers to purchase electric and
hybrid vehicles, which tend to have lower markups than gasoline vehicles. The total welfare
changes are slightly positive for the sales tax reduction and negative for the tariff reduction.

The rightmost column in Table 2.8 reports results from simulating the proposed carbon
tax. This policy increases overall taxes on consumers and manufacturers relative to the
no-policy scenario. The higher taxes create deadweight loss, thus reducing consumer and
manufacturer welfare before the tax revenues are reimbursed to the consumers. However, as
fiscal revenues increase, the total welfare change is positive.

Table 2.9 reports the emissions and cost-effectiveness of the policies, with the columns
organized in the same order as in Table 2.8. We define the fiscal cost-effectiveness of a policy
as the decrease in government revenue divided by the emissions reduction, compared to the
baseline scenario in the first column. Emissions reductions were achieved at a fiscal cost of
$353 per ton of carbon dioxide reduction. This appears to be the same order of magnitude
as(82) estimate for China.
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The welfare cost per ton of carbon dioxide abated is the reduction in consumer and producer welfare divided by the emissions change, comparing the policies with lower taxes or
tariffs against the baseline. The welfare cost per ton of carbon dioxide of the status quo
policies is $40. Because this value measures the private cost to consumers and producers in
the market, it should be compared to the social benefit of the lower emissions. (55) provides
a preliminary estimate of social benefits equal to about $47 per ton of carbon dioxide. (87)
report higher estimates after adjusting for climate and economic risk, although their estimate
is generally lower than our estimated welfare costs.

Table 2.9. Emissions and cost-effectiveness
No
Current
Policy Policy
(level)
(diff)
Panel A: Year 2019
Lifetime CO2 emissions (thousand tons) 3416.8
-18.2
Fiscal cost (USD) per ton of CO2
0.0
353.3
Welfare cost (USD) per ton of CO2
0.0
39.6
Panel B: Year 2020
Lifetime CO2 emissions (thousand tons) 2126.0
-18.4
Fiscal cost (USD) per ton of CO2
0.0
509.2
Welfare cost (USD) per ton of CO2
0.0
47.8
Variable

Sale tax
reduction
only (diff)

Tariff
Carbon
reduction
tax
only (diff) (diff)

-3.0
140.9
-30.8

-9.0
247.3
76.1

-59.6
-106.7
-497.9

-3.3
307.9
135.8

-9.1
449.3
265.7

-40.6
-740.6
-486.1

Note: This table shows the counterfactual simulations of emissions and cost-effectiveness for the five
scenarios in 2019 and 2020. The "No Policy" scenario’s calculations are in levels. All other scenarios’
calculations are increments from the "No Policy" scenario. The Lifetime CO2 emissions are computed
by multiplying the emissions produced per vehicle times the average mileage driven per year in Colombia
times the expected lifetime of a vehicle. We assume that the average mileage driven in Colombia is 12
thousand miles, while a vehicle’s lifetime is ten years. The "Fiscal cost per ton of CO2 " is computed by
dividing the fiscal cost by the difference in lifetime emissions in each scenario. The "Welfare cost per
ton of CO2 " results from dividing the difference in total welfare by the difference in lifetime emissions
in each scenario.

Panel B in Tables 2.8 and 2.9 report results using the 2020 market for the simulations.
Qualitatively, the results are similar to the 2019 results: the status quo has high fiscal costs
and welfare costs that are comparable to global climate benefits, the sales tax reduction has
lower average fiscal and welfare costs, and the carbon tax proposal has lower welfare costs
than the sales tax or tariff policies. An important difference between the 2019 and 2020
results is that the average costs of the policies tend to be larger in 2020. Much of that
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difference is explained by the fact that hybrids in 2020 have higher sales-weighted average
emissions than in 2019, causing the policies that favor hybrids over gasoline vehicles to be
less effective at reducing emissions in 2020 than in 2019. In other words, replacing a gasoline
vehicle with a hybrid vehicle causes a smaller emissions reduction in 2020 than in 2019. The
upshot is that the fiscal costs per ton of emissions reduction are roughly twice as high in 2020
than in 2019. This result demonstrates the inefficiency of setting tax policy based on fuel
type rather than emissions, which we demonstrate more extensively in the next subsection.

Finally, we are interested in assessing the distributional effects of the three policy scenarios. We compute quintiles of the retail price distribution in 2019 or 2020 and assign each
vehicle to the corresponding quintile as a proxy for the unobserved consumers’ disposable
income. Table 2.10 shows how changes in consumer surplus vary by policy and vehicle price.
The first column reports the level of consumer surplus by quintile and year, and the remaining columns report changes in consumer surplus relative to the no-policy case. Reducing the
sales tax and tariff for hybrid and electric vehicles increases consumer surplus in the upper
quintiles more than the lower quintiles, indicating that the policies are regressive. This is
because hybrid and electric vehicles are typically more expensive than gasoline cars, and a
large share of these vehicles belong to upper-price quintiles.

Moreover, consumers who purchase gasoline vehicles despite the policy incentives benefit from the resulting lower prices of the gasoline vehicles. The policies reduce demand
for gasoline vehicles, causing manufacturers to reduce the prices of those vehicles. Because
vehicles belonging to the same quintile are closer substitutes to one another than are vehicles belonging to different quintiles, the policies reduce demand for gasoline vehicles in the
upper quintiles more than in the lower quintiles, where competition from hybrid and electric
vehicles is almost nonexistent. Consequently, wealthier consumers buying gasoline vehicles
in the upper quintiles benefit more than consumers buying gasoline vehicles in the lower
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Table 2.10. Consumer surplus changes by vehicle price quintiles
Variable
Quintile
Quintile
Quintile
Quintile
Quintile

1
2
3
4
5

Quintile
Quintile
Quintile
Quintile
Quintile

1
2
3
4
5

No
Current Sale tax
Tariff
Carbon
Policy Policy
reduction reduction
tax
(level)
(diff)
only (diff) only (diff) (diff)
Panel A: Year 2019
2601
-0.1
0.0
0.0
-13.0
2573
3.0
0.9
1.7
-13.0
2569
6.9
1.8
4.2
-1.5
3284
23.7
5.9
14.2
6.3
3939
11.1
3.3
6.8
-5.3
Panel B: Year 2020
2417
0.0
0.0
0.0
-7.4
2503
0.1
0.0
0.1
-11.8
2459
10.3
2.9
6.0
4.2
2887
18.3
4.9
11.3
9.2
3354
5.9
1.9
3.9
-4.5

Note: This table shows results from the counterfactual simulations of consumer surplus from different
policies sorted by vehicles price quintiles. Column 1 shows consumer surplus in levels for the no policy
scenario. Columns 2-5 show the difference in consumer surplus from alternative policies to the no policy
scenario.

quintiles.

The carbon tax raises prices of gasoline vehicles, lowering consumer surplus in the lower
quintiles but moderately increasing consumer surplus in the upper quintiles because those
consumers benefit more from the decrease in relative prices of hybrid and electric cars.
2.4.3

Comparison of Policies While Controlling for Fiscal Costs

The baseline and four policy scenarios reported in Tables 2.8 and 2.9 are useful for comparing the effects that the sales tax and import tax have had on hybrid and electric vehicle
sales and welfare. However, the fiscal costs of the policies differ from one another, making it
difficult to compare their efficiency against one another. Such a comparison is important for
policymakers considering whether to make further changes to the sales and import taxes.
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To facilitate this comparison, we compare sales tax and tariff scenarios that have the
same fiscal costs as one another. Column 1 of Tables 2.11-2.14 repeats the scenario from
Table 2.8 with the lower sales tax compared with column 2, which shows the scenario with
the same fiscal cost as column 1 except that it includes a lower import tariff rather than
a lower sales tax. Setting the import tariff to 22 percent yields the same fiscal cost as the
sales tax scenario in column 1 (recall that the actual tariff for these vehicles is zero). A
comparison of these two scenarios shows that in 2019, the sales tax causes greater increases
in electric and hybrid market shares.

Although the tariff reduction is less effective in achieving higher electric and hybrid vehicles uptake, it reaches higher total welfare than sales tax reduction. This result comes from
two opposing effects: the lower import tariffs reduce consumer surplus and increase profits
more than the sales tax (see Table 2.11). Because the second effect is larger, overall, reducing tariffs causes private welfare to increase. The second effect is more significant mainly
because the tariff increases the average markup of gasoline vehicles. In other words, the
import tariff causes relatively more substitution of consumers away from gasoline vehicles
with low markups, which increases the average markup of the remaining gasoline vehicles.

The third column in Tables 2.11-2.14 reports results for a carbon tax calibrated to have
the same fiscal costs as the first two policies in the tables. To ensure that fiscal costs are
constant across three scenarios, in this simulation, we analyze the portion of the carbon tax
that depends on the vehicle’s emissions rate.17 This scenario includes a reduced sale tax and
import tariffs for electric and hybrid vehicles.

17

As we explain in section 2.2, the proposed carbon tax has two components, one related to vehicle purchase
price and another one related to vehicle emissions. To avoid multiple solutions, the simulation that holds
the fiscal cost constant across the scenarios needs to hold one of these components fixed.

78

Table 2.11. Welfare results for policies controlling for fiscal costs
Sale tax
Variable
reduction
only (diff)
Panel A: Year 2019
Electric vehicle market share
0.06%
Hybrid vehicle market share
0.08%
Average consumer surplus (USD per consumer)
5.2
Average profit (USD per vehicle)
-0.5
Total Consumers Surplus (millions USD)
0.6
Total profit (millions USD per market)
-0.1
Fiscal cost (million USD)
0.4
Total Welfare (million USD per market)
0.1
Panel B: Year 2020
Electric vehicle market share
0.07%
Hybrid vehicle market share
0.41%
Average consumer surplus (USD per consumer)
9.6
Average profit (USD per vehicle)
-2.1
Total Consumers Surplus (millions USD)
0.7
Total profit (millions USD per market)
-0.2
Fiscal cost (million USD)
1.0
Total Welfare (million USD per market)
-0.4

Tariff
reduction
only (diff)

Carbon
tax
(diff)

0.05%
0.02%
-8.9
21.5
-1.2
2.6
0.4
1.0

0.51%
0.40%
0.0
-32.2
0.7
-3.7
0.4
-3.5

0.07%
0.23%
-2.5
23.1
-0.1
1.9
1.0
0.8

0.56%
2.26%
-1.2
-85.1
0.4
-6.5
1.0
-7.2

Note: This table shows the results of the counterfactual simulations of market shares for electric and
hybrid vehicles and welfare measures across scenarios, keeping the fiscal cost in all three scenarios at
the level of the "Sales tax reduction only" scenario. All calculations are shown as increments from the
"No Policy" scenario. "Average consumer surplus" and the "Average profit per vehicle" are the annual
averages weighted by the number of vehicle units sold. "Total consumer surplus," "Total producer
surplus," and "Fiscal Cost" are calculated annually. ’Total Welfare" is the sum of "Total consumers
surplus" and "Total producer surplus" minus the "Fiscal cost."

The carbon tax causes much larger increases in market shares of electric vehicles and
hybrids than either the sales tax or import tariff reduction. Surprisingly, the carbon tax
results in much lower welfare than the other policies. As Table 2.11 shows, the lower profits
are the main reason the carbon tax reduces private welfare. The primary explanation for
this result is similar to the welfare comparisons in the previous subsection: the carbon tax
causes a relatively large amount of substitution away from gasoline vehicles. Because these
vehicles have high markups, manufacturer profits decrease.
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Table 2.12. Welfare results for policies controlling for fiscal costs assuming perfect competition
Sale tax
Variable
reduction
only (diff)
Panel A: Year 2019
Electric vehicle market share
0.06%
Hybrid vehicle market share
0.08%
Average consumer surplus (USD per consumer
5.3
Average profit (USD per vehicle)
0
Total Consumers Surplus (millions USD)
0.7
Total profit (millions USD per market)
0
Fiscal cost (million USD)
0.1
Total Welfare (million USD per market)
0.6
Panel B: Year 2020
Electric vehicle market share
0.07%
Hybrid vehicle market share
0.41%
Average consumer surplus (USD per consumer
10.4
Average profit (USD per vehicle)
0
Total Consumers Surplus (millions USD)
0.9
Total profit (millions USD per market)
0
Fiscal cost (million USD)
0.7
Total Welfare (million USD per market)
0.2

Tariff
reduction
only (diff)

Carbon
tax
(diff)

0.06%
0.07%
5.1
0
0.6
0
0.1
0.5

0.52%
0.40%
-49.1
0
-1.4
0
0.1
-1.5

0.1%
0.4%
10.1
0
0.8
0
0.7
0.1

0.54%
2.20%
-70.6
0
-1.9
0
0.7
-2.6

Note: This table shows the results of the counterfactual simulations of market shares for electric and
hybrid vehicles and welfare measures across scenarios, keeping the fiscal cost in all three scenarios at
the level of the "Sales tax reduction only" scenario. All calculations are shown as increments from the
"No Policy" scenario. "Average consumer surplus" and the "Average profit per vehicle" are the annual
averages weighted by the number of vehicle units sold. "Total consumer surplus," "Total producer
surplus," and "Fiscal Cost" are calculated annually. ’Total Welfare" is the sum of "Total consumers
surplus" and "Total producer surplus" minus the "Fiscal cost."

To illustrate the role of market power more clearly, Table 2.12 reports results analogous to
those in Table 2.11, except that we assume the market is perfectly competitive. To simulate
the perfectly competitive market equilibrium, we re-estimate consumer demand parameters assuming that all vehicles are priced at marginal costs. We simulate the equilibriums
under the same policy assumptions and report cost-effectiveness and emissions in Table 2.11.

Comparing Tables 2.11 and 2.12 demonstrates three results. First, reducing the sales tax
and tariff increases welfare in both 2019 and 2020. This is because reducing distortionary tax
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unambiguously increases consumer surplus in a competitive market by reducing deadweight
loss caused by the taxation. Second, reducing the sales tax and tariff has identical welfare
effects (accounting for optimization errors of simulations), illustrating the equivalence of taxing producers or consumers in a competitive market. Third, the welfare loss of the carbon
tax is greatly diminished after market power distortions are eliminated.

Table 2.13. Consumer surplus changes by vehicle price quintiles
Variable
Quintile
Quintile
Quintile
Quintile
Quintile

1
2
3
4
5

Quintile
Quintile
Quintile
Quintile
Quintile

1
2
3
4
5

Sale tax
Tariff
reduction reduction
only (diff) only (diff)
Panel A: Year 2019
0.0
-1.20
0.9
-0.80
1.8
0.90
5.9
4.20
3.3
3.20
Panel B: Year 2020
0.0
-0.90
0.0
-0.50
2.9
1.10
4.9
3.00
1.9
1.80

Carbon
tax
(diff)
-2.00
0.50
5.60
22.50
10.00
-2.50
-3.80
7.10
16.70
4.10

Note: This table shows results from the counterfactual simulations of consumer surplus from different
policies sorted by vehicles price quintiles. Columns 2 to 4 show the difference in consumer surplus from
alternative policies to the no policy scenario.

Table 2.13 shows consumer surplus changes by vehicle price quintile, similarly to Table
2.10. The patterns in the two tables are similar to one another. Even when controlling for
fiscal costs, policies benefit consumers in the upper quintiles more than consumers in the
lower quintiles.

Table 2.14 reports the emissions and cost-effectiveness of the policies, holding fiscal costs
constant. To achieve fiscal cost equivalence, we have to lower the multiplier of the emissions
rate of the proposed carbon tax by 50 percent relative to the original proposal: from $14.55
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to $9.7.

Table 2.14. Emissions and cost-effectiveness for policies controlling for fiscal costs
Sale tax
reduction
only (diff)
Panel A: Year 2019
Lifetime CO2 emissions (thousand tons)
-3.0
Fiscal cost (USD) per ton of CO2
140.9
Welfare cost (USD) per ton of CO2
-30.8
Average emissions electric vehicle
27.0
Average emissions hybrid vehicle
93.2
Average emissions gasoline vehicle
139.4
Panel B: Year 2020
Lifetime CO2 emissions (thousand tons)
-3.3
Fiscal cost (USD) per ton of CO2
307.9
Welfare cost (USD) per ton of CO2
135.8
Average emissions electric vehicle (level)
34.6
Average emissions hybrid vehicle (level)
101.0
Average emissions gasoline vehicle (level)
135.0
Variable

Tariff
reduction
only (diff)

Carbon
tax
(diff)

-3.9
106.7
-265.3
28.2
82.3
139.3

-29.6
14.2
118.5
22.6
91.1
138.9

-1.6
642.6
-477.4
32.0
100.0
135.1

-40.3
25.1
177.6
28.5
99.6
133.6

Note: Note: This table shows the emission and cost-effectiveness calculations, keeping the fiscal cost in
all three scenarios at the level of the "Sales tax reduction only" scenario. All calculations are shown as
increments from the "No Policy" scenario. The Lifetime CO2 emissions are computed by multiplying the
emissions produced per vehicle times the average mileage driven per year in Colombia times the expected
lifetime of a vehicle. We assume that the average mileage driven in Colombia is 12 thousand miles, while
a vehicle’s lifetime is ten years. The "Fiscal cost per ton of CO2 " is computed by dividing the fiscal cost
by the difference in lifetime emissions in each scenario. The "Welfare cost per ton of CO2 " results from
dividing the difference in total welfare by the difference in lifetime emissions in each scenario.

The purchase and import tax policies are less efficient than the carbon tax in lowering
total emissions. Although they distinguish vehicles according to fuel type, they do not
differentiate vehicles within a fuel type according to GHG emissions. For example, a Toyota
Corolla and an Audi A6 Hybrid face the same differential sales tax relative to gasoline
vehicles, even though the Toyota Corolla has 30 percent lower emissions than the Audi A6.
The emissions reduction caused by the carbon tax is 7.5-25 times greater than the emissions

82

reductions caused by the sales tax or import tariff policies.18 The carbon tax also has a
significantly smaller fiscal cost per ton of CO2.

2.5

Conclusion

Passenger vehicle markets in developing countries differ from markets in high-income
countries, but there is little evidence on the effects of electric vehicle policies in developing
countries. This paper is among the first to estimate welfare effects and emissions reductions
of electric vehicle policies in a developing country. To our knowledge, it is the first study to
consider a developing country other than China. We focus on Colombia because the country has been using the sales tax and import tariffs to promote hybrid and electric vehicles.
Colombia is reasonably representative of other middle-income economies in its levels of economic development, market concentration, and availability of charging infrastructure. We
provide the first evidence for a middle-income country (excluding China) using high-quality
data and an empirically estimated model of the new vehicle market.

We examine existing policies in Colombia, including sales tax and import tariff reductions for hybrid and electric vehicles, and a recently proposed policy that combines a carbon
dioxide emissions rate tax and preferential sales taxes and import tariffs (for convenience, we
refer to this policy as a carbon tax). Each of these policies is effective at reducing average
carbon emissions rates of new vehicles by encouraging consumer substitution to low-emitting
vehicles. Among the current policies, reducing the import tariff has a larger effect on electric
vehicle market shares and emissions than reducing the sales tax, but also higher average
fiscal and welfare costs. The private welfare costs of both policies are comparable to the
18

There are two additional inefficiencies of the sales and import taxes relative to a true carbon emissions
tax. First, they affect new but not existing vehicles, which could delay scrappage of older gasoline-powered
vehicles, similarly to the Gruenspecht effect (56) and (59). Second, because the policies reduce average
per-mile fuel costs of new vehicles by increasing market shares of hybrids and plug-ins, the policies could
cause consumers to drive more, increasing fuel consumption and emissions (i.e., the rebound effect, see (51)).
Unfortunately, we lack sufficient data to investigate either of these inefficiencies.
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social value of the carbon emissions reductions.

The proposed carbon tax causes a larger emissions reduction than existing policies, but
it does so at higher welfare costs. Such costs may dampen political support for this policy.

We conduct simulations that recalibrate the policies to hold their fiscal costs constant,
ensuring comparability across the policies. The proposed carbon tax causes larger increases
in hybrid and electric vehicle market shares and larger emissions reductions than the other
policies. However, the carbon tax also has a higher welfare cost because it causes a greater
reduction of oligopolists’ profits. Reducing import tariffs is the only policy that does not
adversely affect profits and has positive private welfare effects.

All three policies disproportionately benefit arguably wealthier consumers of more expensive cars, where the competition between gasoline and electric vehicles is stronger, and
price reductions are steeper.

This paper highlights the role of pre-existing distortions caused by market power in explaining the welfare effects of the policies. For example, the carbon tax would likely be the
most efficient policy in the absence of these distortions because it taxes vehicles according to
emissions rates rather than fuel type, thus encouraging greater within fuel type substitution.
The market distortions are sufficiently large to outweigh this effect and cause the carbon
tax to have higher welfare costs than the other policies. In contrast, if we assume perfect
competition rather than Bertrand competition, existing policies increase private welfare by
reducing distortionary taxes on imports or vehicle purchases.

An important implication of these results is that policies aimed at increasing electric
vehicle market shares should be combined with policies aimed at reducing other market dis-
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tortions. (13) reach a similar conclusion about gasoline cars in China.

We note that this analysis comprises the short run and does not include consumer demand and vehicle supply dynamics. For example, if greater short-run electric vehicle sales
increase future demand, long-run welfare costs could be lower. Future research could include
consumer dynamics and other policies not considered in this paper, such as investments in
public charging infrastructure.
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CHAPTER 3
DOMESTIC INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND CONSUMER
SURPLUS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

3.1

Introduction

Global supply chain disruptions have become a prominent concern in the past few years,
most notably in the electronics industry that depends on sophisticated components primarily produced in East Asian countries like China, South Korea, and Taiwan. In an effort to
reduce foreign dependency, countries around the globe have introduced policies aiming to
improve the domestic supply chain, mainly in the form of taxes targeting imported inputs.
However, these policies may adversely impact consumer welfare in the short run, as the tariffs may induce less favorable cost structures that may increase prices and reduce the variety
of products offered in the market.

Assessing the welfare effects of such a domestic industrial policy that aims to alleviate
the supply chain bottleneck is particularly important for developing countries. A policy in
the form of a tax on imported supplies demands fewer resources than a fiscal policy based on
tax breaks and subsidies. As such, countries are likely to “default” to taxes over other policy
instruments. Therefore, evaluating the cost-effectiveness of a tax-based domestic industrial
policy will require the assessment of the potential harm to consumers. Also, as mentioned
above, introducing a domestic industrial policy may harm consumers because of products
exiting the market due to low profitability, leaving fewer options in the market from where
consumers can choose to maximize their utility. In the context in which digitalization is
thriving around the globe and accessing the internet may have important repercussions on
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people’s wellbeing, analyzing how consumers’ access to technological goods is affected by a
domestic industrial policy is crucial, since unintended consequences could deny vulnerable
consumers access to digital-based markets and government services.

In this article, I study a domestic industrial policy introduced by the Indian government
that seeks to encourage investment in the mobile phone industry supply chain. Specifically,
the policy analyzed is the “Phased Manufacturing Program” (PMP) - introduced in 2017.
Under PMP, a manufacturer has to pay an additional tax while importing specific components for mobile handset production. Since most handset firms operating in India either
import the entire handset or some components of handsets from outside of India, this policy
was designed to encourage firms to switch away from importing and towards investing more
in domestic production of handset components.

The four-year policy initially targeted simple components like chargers, adapters, and
battery packs leading to a wave of investments in India. The policy then targeted advanced
components like microphones, keypads, camera modules, and handset displays. Due to manufacturers’ inability to produce these advanced components within India, the government
ended up deferring the policy in 2019 1 . In this context, this paper seeks to answer the
following questions: How does the design of PMP affect a firm’s decision to produce in India versus to produce abroad, and how does this policy affect consumer and producer welfare?

Analysis of the domestic industrial policy requires modeling the economic mechanisms
governing firms’ supply chain decisions. The welfare analysis requires comparing firm conduct with and without the tariff. Firms could react to an increase in the cost of production
1

To read a detailed discussion of the deployment of the Phased Manufacturing Program, please refer to
the document titled ”Make in India 2.0: Revisiting Mobile Manufacturing” published by The Internet and
Mobile Association of India available in the following url: https://www.iamai.in/KnowledgeCentre
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stemming from the tariff by stopping offering the now higher cost product, offering the product at a higher price, or switching to a ready-to-use product. Embedded in these options are
firms’ decisions regarding production location, product offering, and pricing. To capture this
behavior, I develop a tractable three-stage structural model that estimates the sunk cost of
production allocation decisions and the fixed cost of product entry and exit decisions.

Demand and marginal cost of India’s mobile phone market are estimated following (15)
and (73), with demand modeled using a discrete-choice random coefficient framework and
supply modeled using Bertrand-Nash competition. Here, I compute firms’ variable profits,
which allows me to determine how costly it is to produce in India versus to produce abroad.
The demand model allows the marginal cost to vary by firm origin, production location, and
time. This modeling decision helps me capture the effect of tariffs on ready-to-use phones
and phone components on the firms’ marginal cost of producing in India or abroad. Then,
using the estimations for the variable profit, I compute the sunk cost related to switching
production locations and the fixed cost associated with introducing or removing a new product, respectively. Here, I use the approach proposed by (76), and (45). With the estimation
at hand, I compute a counterfactual, which consists of a scenario where the last stage of the
PMP is not deferred. The data used in the estimation comes from Counterpoint Research
and consists of detailed information about prices, quantities, specifications, manufacturer
origin, and production location of mobile phones sold in India from January 2015 to May
2018.

Estimation results suggest that consumers are elastic and have a high willingness to
pay for phone characteristics related to sophisticated components like camera modules and
screen size. The estimated own-price elasticities are close to -6 for smartphones and to -4 for
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feature phones which is in line with the elasticities reported in the literature2 . My supply
results suggest that the marginal cost of producing a phone outside India was smaller during
the first period of the sample than that of producing a phone in India. However, after the
introduction of tariffs on ready-to-use phones in 2017, my estimates suggest that assembling
in India represented a smaller marginal cost than producing outside India. Results from
the counterfactual exercise suggest that introducing a tariff on phone components generates
an increase in marginal cost, which is translated to the consumer almost entirely through
a rise in prices. The change in the cost structure of products manufactured in India would
push firms to choose to import ready-to-use phones or drop some products that are no longer
profitable. Chinese and global firms would use both alternatives dropping products and relocating production outside India, while Indian firms would relocate most of their production
outside India and drop only a handful of products from their product set. In this sense,
the results suggest that Indian production would have dropped significantly if the policy
had been implemented as scheduled instead of halting the program. Additionally, product
exit and the price increase of the remaining products would have decreased consumer surplus.

Results from the demand estimation suggest that consumers are elastic and have a high
willingness to pay for phone characteristics related to sophisticated components like camera
modules and screen size. The estimated own-price elasticities are close to −6 for smartphones and to −4 for feature phones which is in line with the elasticities reported in the
literature.3 . My supply results suggest that the marginal cost of producing a phone outside
India was smaller during the first period of the sample than that of producing a phone inside
India. However, after introducing tariffs over ready-to-use phones in 2017, my estimates
suggest that assembling in India represented a smaller marginal cost than producing outside India. Results from the counterfactual exercise suggest that introducing a tariff over
2

The own-price elasticities reported by (45) for the United States market are close to −6.5

3

The own-price elasticities reported by (45) for the United States market are close to −6.5
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phone components generates an increase in marginal cost, which is translated to the consumer almost on its entirely through a rise in prices. The change in the cost structure of
products manufactured in India pushes firms to choose to import ready-to-use phones or
drop some products that are no longer profitable. Chinese and Global firms would use both
alternatives, dropping products and relocating production outside India, while Indian firms
would relocate most of their production outside India and drop only a handful of products
from their product set. In this sense, the results suggest that Indian production would have
dropped significantly if the policy had been implemented as scheduled instead of halting the
program. Additionally, product exit and the price increase of the remaining products would
have decreased the consumer surplus.

This article broadly relates to three pieces of literature. The first one looks into the
telecommunication market similar to the work of (45), (88), (43) and (22). Fan and Yang
analyze how product offering affects welfare in the U.S. mobile phone industry using a static
game entry model based on the revealed preference argument to define the profit-maximizing
equilibrium. Wang studies the effect of government industrial policy on product offering
decisions in the Chinese mobile phone industry using a static game entry model and the
revealed preference argument complemented by business cycles to estimate entry sunk costs.
This paper differs from the cited articles because it uses the revealed preference argument
not only to assess the bounds of the fixed cost associated with product entry and exit but
also to estimate the bounds of the sunk cost associated with switching production allocation.

The second area of literature is the industrial policy literature such as by (91), (70), (65),
(23), (48), (47), (66), (77), and (13). Specifically, this article is informed by literature that
analyzes the impact of public policy on product offering like (66), which studies how policy
choice regarding charging standards for electric vehicles affects consumers surplus. Here, the
model analyzes how the introduced public policy affects consumers’ decisions to opt for an
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electric car as more charging stations are deployed in the market. My model allows us to
quantify the welfare effect of public policy by estimating changes in consumption patterns
and by endogenizing a firm’s decision to introduce or remove certain products as the best
response to the analyzed policy. Other significant contributions to this literature are (91)
which studies how the government bailout of the automobile industry following the 2008 financial crisis prevented the exit of various models of trucks from the market and (70) which
analyzes price control policies and their effect on drugs availability. These papers show that
allowing for endogenous product can be critical when evaluating a public policy. The model
presented here follows this literature and, in my model, firms select production locations,
which is central to answering my research question of how local manufacturing policy affects
welfare.

This article also relates to the literature on entry, exit and endogenous product choices,
such as by (17), (69), (35), (79), (64), (44), (42), among others.

The rest of the article is organized as follows: Section 3.2 provides a brief background of
the mobile phone industry in India. Section 3.3 presents the data and provides comments
regarding identification. Section 3.4 lays out the analysis framework as well as the results
from the estimation. Section 3.5 describes the counterfactual exercises and presents the
results from the analysis. Section 3.6 concludes.

3.2
3.2.1

Industry Background
Context

India presents an attractive market for mobile phone manufacture firms. According to
GSMA Intelligence, the number of unique mobile service subscribers in India increased from
203 million in 2008 to 778 million in 2019 and is estimated will approach 1 billion by 2025.
In 2019, more than 300 million mobile phones were sold in India of which 150 million were
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smartphones. This situation makes India the second largest and the fastest-growing market
for mobile handsets in the world. The massive size and growth rate of this market combined
with India’s cheap labor costs motivated the establishment of local manufacturing facilities
by pioneers in the industry like Nokia, Motorola, LG, and Samsung between 2005 and 2010.

Even though India’s mobile handset industry which includes firms from different origins
is well established and has been active for almost 15 years, the local added value contribution has not surpassed 7%. In 2014 there were only two manufacturing units in India whose
activities consisted mainly of assembly and testing, with most of the principal components
being imported. However, the Indian government recognized the industries’ potential to incorporate manufacturing of low-end electronics components and accessories into the domestic
supply chain in years following 2014. This factor, plus Nokia exiting local manufacturing
and Chinese firms increasing popularity, motivated the inclusion of the mobile phone manufacturing industry in the “Make in India” initiative. This set of policies aimed to increase
the industries’ local added value, which was intended to translate to job creation and lower
dependency on imports4 .
3.2.2

The Make in India Initiative and the Phased Manufacturing Program

Launched in September of 2014 by the Indian government, the “Make in India” initiative
(MII) had three objectives: increasing the manufacturing sector’s growth rate, creating jobs,
and enhancing the manufacturing sector’s contribution to the county’s GDP. According to its
deployment chronology, the sets of policies stipulated in the MII initiative targeting the mobile phone industry comprised two groups. The first group of policies consisted of supply-side
tax incentives for new investments in the mobile phone manufacturing industry. The state
4

An extensive discussion on the evolution of India’s mobile phone industry can be found in the document
titled: “Competition Issues in India’s Mobile Handset Industry” published by the Indian Council for Research
on International Economic Relations, which is accessible in the following url: https://icrier.org/pdf/
Competition-Issues-in-India-Mobile-Handset-Industry.pdf
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government offered investors property tax breaks, electricity subsidies, subsidies in CAPEX
investment, and local tax exemptions. These first sets of policies encouraged investment in
manufacturing units across India by different Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM).

The second set of policies was launched in 2017. It aimed to increase the industry’s
local added value and to improve the domestic supply chain by promoting the manufacture
of mobile phones, their parts and sub parts, through the implementation of import tariffs
on ready-to-use phones. In its initial stage, this program sought to decrease the number of
handsets imported as Completely Built Units (CBU)5 or as Semi Knocked Down (SKD)6 by
introducing import tariffs on these goods. The tariffs were first implemented in July 2017
and consisted of a 10% custom duty on imported ready-to-use handsets. In December 2017,
this tariff increased to 15% and finally to 20% in January 2018.

Later, the Indian government introduced a new policy named the Phased Manufacturing
Program (PMP), which mandated a tariff schedule for different mobile phone components
from 2017 to 2020. The program was designed to establish a tariff each year for another
part or component, hoping to encourage local production. The Ministry of Electronics and
Information Technology notified firms of the PMP roadmap on April 28th, 2017. For the fiscal year 2016 - 2017, the PMP contemplated a 15% Basic Custom Duty (BCD) on chargers,
battery packs, and wired headsets. The following fiscal year, components charged with a 15%
BCD included mechanics, die-cut parts, microphones, keypads, and USB cables. Next, in the
fiscal year 2018-2019, the policy noted implementing a 10% BCD for printed circuit board
assemblies (PCBA), camera modules, and connectors. Finally, for the fiscal year 2019-2020,
the program set a 10% BCD for display assemblies, touch panels, cover glass assemblies,
5

A product is said to be imported as a Completely Build Unit when no additional labor is needed in order
to reach its sale shape
6

A product is said to be imported as a Semi Knocked Down when it needs a manor amount of labor to
reach its sale shape
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vibrator motors, and ringers 7 .

The results of this policy have been decidedly mixed in terms of improving the industries’
domestic supply chain. According to the Internet and Mobile Association of India (IAMAI),
the assembly programming testing and packaging operations were successfully integrated
into the local production process in 2015. In 2016, the Indian mobile phone manufacturing
industry incorporated the production of chargers, adapters and battery packs. During this
year, the industry failed to fully integrate the production of wired headsets into its production process given that doing so requires a large investment. By 2017, the PMP policies
aimed to incorporate some low value components. In this case, the investment required from
the manufacturers to incorporate these components to the local production process exceeded
the uptick in costs represented by the tariffs. The same situation replayed in 2018, when
local industry managed only to incorporate the production of PCBA. Camera modules and
connectors were still imported. The shortcomings of the policy in 2017 and 2018 signaled
a low probability of reaching the 2019 goals. As a result, the PMP was halted and later
redesigned in 20208 .

3.2.3

Firms

As previously mentioned, the Indian mobile phone industry categorizes firms with different backgrounds. Depending on their origin, firms are classified as global brands, Indian
brands, or Chinese brands. For the most part, global firms are big players with a presence in
all major markets worldwide. Their operations, as well as their supply chain, are distributed
across different countries. Firms in this group include Samsung and Apple. Firms character7

The PMP notification can be found here: https://www.meity.gov.in/writereaddata/files/
Notification_PMP_Cellular%20Mobile%20Handsets_28.04.2017.pdf
8

Reference: https://pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1563771
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ized as Chinese firms concentrate most or all of their operations in China and most of their
supply chain is located in China. Frequently, these firms have direct access to the Shenzhenbased manufacturing ecosystem, allowing them to offer a range of affordable smartphones
with stand-out features. Leading Chinese firms are Xiaomi, Huawei, and Oppo. Indian firms
are located primarily in Uttar Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, and Uttarakhand in northern India; Karnatak, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, and Telangana in southern India; and West
Bengal in eastern India. Their primary businesses focus on catering to the local market.
India’s flagship firms are Micromax, Intex, Lava, and Kabonn.

The Indian mobile phone market is composed of leading firms facing competitive fringe.
Between 2015 and 2018, around 200 firms were present in the Indian mobile market with 20
players comprising more than 80% of the total units sold in the market. Currently, Samsung
leads the market and has faced fierce competition from young Chinese firms like Xiaomi,
Vivo, and Oppo, and new local firms like LYF, which entered the market in 2017. The
remaining firms in the market offer products like mid-range smartphones with characteristics similar to those offered by the leading firms, with differences in quality and distribution
channels. Also, a range of small firms offers low-end feature phones with a small degree of
vertical differentiation. This kind of product has become a commodity in the industry with
low technological requirements and standard production process.

All the leading players in the market have some portion of their products produced in
India through firm- owned facilities or third-party manufacturers. As already mentioned,
most of these facilities perform ensemble and testing procedures, and some may produce
essential electronic components like batteries, microphones, cables, and chargers. Most of
the investments made by mobile phone manufacturers and third-party firms took place after introducing the “Phased Manufacturing Program”. Such investments only marginally
increased the average local value-added and failed to incorporate sophisticated components
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like microphones and receivers, camera module LCD modules, and touch modules into the
production process.

3.3

Data

Counterpoint Technology Market Research collected the primary data for this study. The
data includes sales, prices, and characteristics at the version level of different mobile phone
models between January 2015 and May 2018. The uniqueness of these data sets relies on
identifying firm origin: local, Chinese or global; and product origin: locally manufactured or
imported. The temporal market is defined as a single month; a geographical market consists
of the entire Republic of India. A product is defined as a single combination of brand,
model, and versions. Data for income and the outside option (i.e., not buying a mobile
phone) came from the India Human Development Survey 2011 - 2012 conducted by Data
Sharing for Demographic Research. Based on my definition of the market, the sample poses
22,286 product-month observations.
3.3.1

Market Characteristics

In the original data set, 581 firms were observed across the analysis period. On average,
118 firms were active each month, where 44 firms accounted for about 95% of the total sales
in the market. For tractability reasons related to my model, this work considered only the
44 firms with the highest sales across all markets. Across the observed period, there were ten
firms whose market share lay above 5%. This group included major worldwide players like
Samsung, whose average market share were close to 24%; Xiaomi, with an average market
share of 11%; and some local firms like Micromax and LYF Lava and Intex whose market
shares lay below 10%. This market was not concentrated in general terms with a Herfindahl
Hirschman index close to 0.1 and a C4 index below 64%. Table 3.1 presents the main features
of the market structure by year.
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Table 3.1. India’s Mobile Phone Market Structure
Year
2015
2016
2017
2018

LYF
0.0%
3.1%
7.1%
27.8%

INTEX
12.1%
10.2%
4.3%
1.5%

Main firms
LAVA MICROMAX
11.3% 15.7%
9.0%
11.9%
5.4%
8.2%
4.8%
2.7%

SAMSUNG
23.1%
25.1%
24.5%
17.5%

C4

HHI

62.2% 0.10
56.2% 0.10
50.5% 0.08
64.1% 0.11

Note:This table reports the market share for the four firms with the most sales across all analyzed
periods; the C4 index, which is the sum of the market shares of the top 4 firms in the market on each
year; and the Herfindahl Hirschman Index for each year that is bounded between 1 and 0.

The number of available models in the market diminished since 2016 when 564 different
models were observed on average each month. In 2017 and 2018, the number of available
products fell to 421 and 339, respectively. Noteworthy is that the decline in the number of
models available in the market occurred when the PMP was introduced. The proportion of
smartphones models in the market being around 50% remained relatively constant in the
analyzed period. The mean price of feature phones experienced a slight decrease; meanwhile,
the mean price for smartphones increased rapidly, especially after 2017. Table 3.2 presents
the mentioned information in detail.
Table 3.2. India’s Mobile Phone Market Products
Year
2015
2016
2017
2018

Avg. num. of
product per
market
574
576
421
339

Avg. proportion
of
smartphones
51.1%
48.1%
48.7%
50.7%

Avg. price of
smartphones
(USD)
173.1
190.4
231.4
258.8

Avg. price of
feature phones
(USD)
18.8
16.4
16.0
15.0

Note:This table displays the average number of products present in each market for each year, the
average proportion of products that are smartphones, the average price of smartphones, and the average
price of feature phones in each market.

On average, each of the top 44 firms in the market offered 16 different products. Samsung, the leading firm in the market, offered on average 36 products between smartphones
and feature phones. Prices varied quite significantly among products, even within phone categories. It is usual to observe firms offering feature phones with prices ranging from USD 14
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to USD 61. For smartphones, the average price is USD 200 and can go as high as USD 1,500.
It is common for the top firms in the market to offer top-tier smartphones defined as flagship
products. These products possess cutting-edge technology and high-end characteristics that
differentiate them from the rest of a firm’s product portfolio.
3.3.2

Firms’ Characteristics

Mobile phones in my sample are categorized as either imported (ready-to-use) or produced
in India (assembled in India). To be labeled as imported, a product needs to be nationalized
as CBU, meaning no additional labor is required to reach its final sale condition. In contrast, produced in India products are nationalized as CKU. In this state, the product needs
some additional labor to reach its final sale form. The intensity of work required is lower in
SKU products and greater for products in CKU form. Firms, independently of their origin
categorization, offer both produced in India or imported products. Table 3.3 shows that
production in India experienced a rapid increase across categories after the application of
the first policies of the “Make in India” initiative in 2016 and kept growing by 2017 and 2018
when part of the PMP was deployed. The evolution in the proportion of Indian production
is especially significant for global and Chinese firms, reaching 97% and 86%, respectively, by
2018. On the other hand, Indian firms increased the proportion of Indian production after
2015 reaching a maximum of 64% in 2016. However, after that, this group of firms has failed
to increase its local production.

Table 3.3. Evolution of the Proportion of Indian and Abroad Production by Firm Type
Year
2015
2016
2017
2018

Chinese
Indian Abroad
8%
92%
66%
34%
78%
22%
86%
14%

Global
Indian Abroad
69%
31%
82%
18%
91%
9%
97%
3%

Indian
Indian Abroad
22%
78%
64%
36%
57%
43%
53%
47%

Note:This table shows the shows the change in the total quantity of mobile phones produced in India
and abroad.
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The evolution of the proportion of Indian produced products between 2015 and 2016
suggests that after 2015, firms gradually migrated some of their production to India. This
phenomenon is not only visible at the aggregated level, it is also present at the firm level.
Figure 3.1 shows the evolution of the proportion of India produced products in 2015 and
again in 2018 for the 11 firms with the most sales in the sample. It can be seen that the
increase in the proportion of Indian production is significant for all the selected firms except
for the Indian firm Micromax. I aim to exploit the variation in production allocation by firm
type to identify the marginal cost associated with local and abroad production.

Figure 3.1. Change of the Proportion of Local Production - Main firms

Note: This figure plots the percentage of total production which took place in India. The left side panel
shows the percentage of the total output that took place locally in 2015. The right side panel shows the
same metric for 2018.

3.3.3

Product Characteristics

In the sample, 51.5% of products were smartphones; 48.1%, feature phones; and the remaining 0.4%, hybrid phones9 . The significant participation of feature phones suggests that
9

A hybrid mobile phone is defined as an intermediate phone between a feature phone and a smartphone.
Most of the time, a hybrid phone allows users to access the internet, lacks a tactile screen, and possesses a
basic operative system.
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some consumers in India have a strong preference for cheap and simple phones. Concerning
network technology, 29.1% of the mobile phones in the sample were compatible with 4G
networks; 17.1% with 3G networks; and the other 53.8%, with 2G networks.

There is significant variation regarding product characteristics, both between and within
phone categories. Typically, feature phones have lower features when compared to smartphones. The same is true when comparing non-flagship smartphones and flagship products.
Table 3.4 presents the dispersion of the four main phone characteristics across categories.
Most firms offer 2G technology in their feature phones and 4G technology (LTE) in their
smartphones. 3G technology is not popular among either of these categories.

For smartphones, an essential source of differentiation is the operating system (OS). Most
firms in the sample incorporate different versions of Android as their operating system. On
the other hand, leading firms like Apple and LYF have their own operating system. Most of
the interaction between user and phone happens through the OS, meaning that consumers
invest time learning how to manage it. This situation creates a switching cost for consumers
who may want to acquire a phone with a different OS. Also, the applications developed
for smartphones are OS-specific. As a result, some applications may be available on some
phones but not on others. In this case, the OS can drive the consumer’s decision on which
phone to purchase.

Camera modules are another essential feature of mobile phones. In the sample, 96% of
feature phones had a back camera while only 7% had a front camera. In contrast, 99% of
the smartphones in the sample had a back camera, and only 3% did not have a front camera.
The technology of the back camera modules of smartphones evolved with basic components
in 2015 with an average of 4 megapixels to sophisticated ones in 2018 with 10 megapixels.
This evolution is also visible in the different capabilities of the camera like optical and digital
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zoom, filters, autofocus, among others. In feature phones, the back camera module has a
low to medium resolution quality ranging from 0.3 to 3.1 megapixels with minor variations
over time.

With the introduction of internet capabilities on mobile phones, screen size, especially
of smartphones, has gained special attention from consumers. In the sample, screen size
in smartphones varied from 2.8 inches to 6.95 inches. In feature phones, the screen size
spanned from 1.3 inches to 5 inches. Other important features in mobile phones are battery
size and RAM. Of note, given the type of use of smartphones, consumers value both these
characteristics on these devices. In the sample, battery capacity varied from 300 mAH to
8000 mAH on feature phones and 406 mAH to 6050 mAH for smartphones. RAM is another
feature that has evolved significantly across time. In 2015, the most powerful phone had a
RAM of 4 GB. By 2018 the RAM of the most powerful phone had doubled to 8 GB. Table
3.4 presents descriptive statistics of phone characteristics in the sample.

Table 3.4. Descriptive Statistics Mobile Phone Characteristics
Feature Phone
Min Mean Median
Back Camera (Megapixels) 0.1 0.6
0.3
Front Camera (Megapixels) 0.1 0.6
0.3
Screen Size (Inches)
1.3 2.30
2.4
Battery Capacity (mAH)
300 1,509 1,400
RAM (GB)
0.0 0.2
0.0

Max
8.1
2.0
5.0
8,000
1.0

SmartPhone
Min Mean Median
Back Camera (Megapixels) 0.3 8.6
8.0
Front Camera (Megapixels) 0.3 4.2
5.0
Screen Size (Inches)
2.8 4.8
5.0
Battery Capacity (mAH)
406 2,465 2,400
RAM (GB)
0.1 1.7
1.0

Max
40
25
7.0
6,020
8.0

Note: This table presents summary statistics for the main characteristics of the products from the
sample. The data used to compute these metrics belong to all years from 2015 to 2018.
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3.4

The Model

Answering my research question requires a model that represents how firms in the Indian mobile phone manufacturing industry decide between different supply chain alternatives
when a tax is applied on imported phone components. For example, if a firm is producing
in India, introducing a tariff on imported components implies an increase in marginal cost.
Then, the firm would have to decide between keeping the production in India and facing the
increase in marginal cost, which could translate to a higher price and con- sequentially to
a lower market share or importing the product as a ready-to-use phone. Additionally, the
change in the relative costs of the supply chain due to the tariff could alter the profitability of
some products, which could modify the product set offered by each firm in the market. This
means that the firm has a third option - stop offering the affected product. Subsequently,
the indirect consequence of the policy can, in turn, affect production location decisions.

In this context, the proposed framework should model how firms evaluate their expected
variable profit, the sunk cost of switching production locations, and the fixed cost related
to product entry and exit. I propose a model that consists of a three-stage game where
firms endogenously decide production location and the set of products they offer, given the
observed market conditions. At the beginning of each period, demand and the last period’s
product set are public information. Firms observe a set of sunk costs and decide each product’s production location and which products to offer in the market. Then, after demand
and marginal cost disturbances are realized, firms set prices for their products. Firms solve
the problem by backward induction from the third stage, calculating profits for different
combinations of production location, and choosing the location setup that maximizes their
profit. Once the location is decided, firms define the set of products that will maximize their
profits given the selected location and the demand realization. On what follows, each of
these stages will be illustrated in reverse order.
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3.4.1

Demand

I use a random utility discrete choice model to estimate the demand for mobile phones
in India. This model incorporates consumer heterogeneity in the valuation of products
characteristics observed in the market. A similar approach to estimate the demand for
mobile phones can found in (45) and (58). Each month is defined as a market. There are
Nm consumers, i = 1, . . . , Nm in each market m. Each consumer chooses a mobile phone
from a set of differentiated products available in market m denoted by j = 0, . . . , Jm . If the
consumer chooses good j = 0, then no mobile phone is purchased. Consumers i in market
m will choose a mobile phone j if it maximizes its indirect utility function, represented by:

Uijm = Xjm β + ξjm + [− exp (α + σp Incomeim )] pjm +

X

Xjmk σk vi k + ϵijm

(3.1)

k

where Xjm is a K-vector of observed product characteristics excluding price and contains
a constant term, a dummy for smartphone, and a time trend intended to capture the valuation over time of the outside option. Additionally, I included a firm fixed effect and an
interaction between the firm fixed effect and the time trend to capture the fluctuation in the
valuation of a brand over time. The term ξjm captures product characteristics unobserved to
the econometrician. σk is the coefficient for the interaction of consumer attributes and product characteristics and is meant to capture consumers’ heterogeneous tastes for the product
specifications.

Price is represented by pjm . Consumer specific variables include income denoted by
Incomeim and consumers’ attributes vi . Consumers’ income is drawn from an empirical
income distribution in India. Consumer attributes vi are drawn from a standard normal
distribution. ϵijm denotes the I.I.D. (across consumers and products) consumers i’s idiosyncratic taste for good j, and is assumed to follow a Type-I extreme value distribution. My
specification allows for that consumer’s price sensitivity to vary with income levels. Prince
sensitivity follows a log-normal distribution with parameters (α, σp ). This means that α
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captures the mean price sensitivity, and σp captures the variation of price sensitivity across
consumers depending on income levels. A negative value for σp implies that a lower-income
consumer will have higher price sensitivity. The utility of the outside option is denoted by:

(3.2)

Ui0m = ϵi0m

As stated in (15), and (73) the indirect utility can be divided into two terms:

δjm = Xjm β + ξjm

µijm = [− exp (α + σp Incomeim )] pjm +

X

Xjmk σk vi k + ϵijm

k

This specification resembles the logit choice probabilities. By integrating over the total
number of simulated consumers, it is possible to get products j’s market shares in market
m.
Z
sijm =

exp(δjm + µijm )
P
dPD
1 + z∈Jm exp(δzm + µijm )

(3.3)

where dPD represents the joint distribution of income and attributes among consumers.

Using a random coefficient discrete choice model allows me to exploit the rich substitution patterns between products resulting from this methodology. This feature of the model
facilitates evaluating how changes in the cost structure of a subset of products which are
assessed a tax on imported components affects prices of all products in the market, which
ultimately affects consumers’ purchase decisions. Based o consumers behavior, firms can
evaluate their expected profit using different supply chain alternatives.

In the model, demand is modeled as static and supply as a three-stage static game. In
the case of the demand, unit demand closely approximates consumers’ actual purchasing
behavior in the market. Most often, consumers buy one cell phone at a time. Even though
104

some consumers may use wireless services from different providers, most phones in the sample allowed for two chipsets. This situation eliminates the need to own more than one phone.

Regarding the nature of the purchasing decision, following (45), I assume that consumers
do not make strategic decisions at the time of purchasing a cell phone. Industry reports10
suggest that 72% of consumers replace their cell phone within 24 months, with 40% doing
so before 12 months. Given the nature of the demand and the fact that most of the products offered in the Indian market are not flagship products, it seems reasonable to assume
that Indian consumers do not make inter-temporal decisions when purchasing a cellphone.
This allows using a static demand model to represent the consumer behavior of the Indian
population.
3.4.2

Supply

As stated previously, the supply side consists of a three-stage static game, where firms
choose the set of products to be offered in the market Jf m . In the second stage, firms define
the production location scheme represented by Lf m . Finally, in the third stage, firms choose
retail prices for the product in Jf m . In what follows, the three stages will be described in
reverse order.
3.4.2.1

Pricing decision

In the last stage of the model, firms choose retail prices after observing all firms’ product
set Jm and production location scheme Lm . Each firm f owns a set of products Jf m ⊂ Jm
where Jm denotes the set of all the products offered in market m by all firms. For each
product in Jf m , firm f has defined a production location represented by production scheme
10

Please, refer to the following report for more
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vector Lf m . The firm’s f total variable profit represented by the sum of each product’s profit
given its production location Lm and the set of products being offered in the market Jm .

Πf m (⃗p, Lm , Jm ) =

X

(pkm − ckm )skm (⃗p, Lm , Jm )M

(3.4)

k∈Jf m

In the previous expression, ckm represents product k’s marginal cost which depends on
the product’s components and production location. skm is product k’s corresponding market
share which is a function of the J x 1 price vector, the J x 1 production location vector
Lm , and the set of products available in market m, Jm . Market m size is represented by M .
Assuming an oligopoly competition, the profit-maximizing price or each product j ∈ Jf m
should satisfy the following first-order condition:

sjm (⃗p, Lm , Jm ) +

X

(pkm − ckm )

k∈Jf m

∂skm (⃗p, Lm , Jm )
=0
∂pjm

(3.5)

Let the J x J matrix θF be the firm’s product ownership matrix, where a one on the ij
entry of the matrix denotes that the same firm produces both products j and k. Additionally,
let ⃗s be the endogenous vector of market shares and let ∆(⃗p, Jm , Lm ) = ∂skm (⃗p, Lm , Jm )/∂pjm
be the J x J Jacobean matrix of first derivatives. Finally, let the marginal cost be represented
by the J x1 vector ⃗c. By using the operator ⊙ to represent element-wise multiplication, it
is possible to represent the firm’s first order condition as follows:

⃗s + (θF ⊙ ∆(⃗p, Jm , Lm ))(⃗p − ⃗c) = 0

(3.6)

After rearranging some terms, I obtain the following expression:

⃗c = p⃗ − (θF ⊙ ∆(⃗p, Jm , Lm ))−1⃗s
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(3.7)

The logarithm of the marginal cost of product j is modeled as a linear function of observed
cost shifters wj m and a supply shock which is I.I.D across products and markets, ωjm .

log(cjm ) = wj mγ + ωjm

(3.8)

Cost shifters include product characteristics, and production location fixed effects. Additionally, an interaction between the trade policy and the production location is included
in the marginal cost specification to capture the effect of the trade policy on the location
decision. The specification also includes the logarithmic of the number of units produced to
capture the existence of scale economies. An interaction between the trade policy dummy
and the quantity produced is included to address how the trade policy may affect quantity
production. Finally, I use time-fixed effects to capture the impact of the production technology across time and brand-fixed effects to capture any cost shifter particular to each firm.

Allowing marginal cost to vary with respect to phone characteristics and production
location is essential to identifying how different supply chain alternatives may affect expected
profit, which is key to identifying the sunk cost of switching production locations to outside
India.
3.4.2.2

Production allocation decision

In the second stage of the model, firms simultaneously choose production locations, knowing that their actions will affect competitors’ pricing and product offering decisions. Here,
firms can either import phone components and assemble each product in India or import
the phone as ready-to-use (Production takes place outside of India). The decision about the
supply chain affects the firm’s profit via the marginal and fixed costs that occur every period.
Firms are incentivized to allocate production in the country with the lowest marginal cost.
Doing this will allow firms to lower prices, gain market share, and obtain higher variable
profit. However, moving production location may imply incurring additional fixed costs that
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affect the firm’s total profit. If a specific location offers both lower marginal costs and fixed
costs, the firm’s production location decision is trivial. Here, the location having a lower
cost structure is preferred. If this were not the case, the firm’s decision regarding production
location could be seen as an investment towards reducing marginal cost. If the reduction
in the marginal cost generates an increase in variable profit sufficiently large to offset the
upfront sunk cost of switching production location, the firm will make the change.

The model assumes that the outcome observed in the data is a Nash equilibrium. This
implies that given the competitor’s production allocation, no deviation from the observed
firm’s equilibrium production allocation should bring a higher expected profit. In this case, a
deviation implies switching the observed location to the remaining alternative. Specifically,
if a firm produces a mobile phone in India, a deviation means changing production to outside
of India. The opposite is true if the observed production takes place outside India. Let Lf m
represent the observed vector of production allocation for firm f in market m, and Lm the
production allocation vector for all products in market m. Let us assume that firm f decides
to switch the production location for product j. Let Lm|j represent the firm’s production
allocation vector where production location for product j ∈ Jf m has been switched. In this
case, the expected profit for firm f should not increase once the production location for
product j has been switched.

E(ξm , ωm )[πf m (Lm , ξm , ωm )] > E(ξm|j , ωm|j )[πf m (Lm|j , ξm|j , ωm|j )] − SC(Lm|j )

(3.9)

In the previous inequality, expectations are taken over demand and marginal cost shocks.
πf m (Lm , ξm , ωm ) is the equilibrium variable profit for firm f in market m, and πf m (Lm|j , ξm|j , ωm|j )
is the variable profit if firm f switches production location for product j ∈ Jf m . finally,
SC(Lm|j ) represents the sunk cost of switching product j production location. By rearranging the previous inequality,I arrive at the following expression:
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E(ξm , ωm )[πf m (Lm , ξm , ωm )] − E(ξm|j , ωm|j )[πf m (Lm|j , ξm|j , ωm|j )] > SC(Lm|j )

(3.10)

The term SC(Lm|j )is a vector with zeros in all entries except for the j th entry. The reason
is that production locations for all products in Jm except for j remained unchanged. Inequality 3.10 can be used to bound the sunk cost of switching product j’s production location.

Whether this expression provides an upper or a lower bound for the switching location
sunk cost for product j depends on the nature of the marginal cost. For instance, if marginal
cost is non-decreasing with respect to the quantity produced and lower in observed production location compared to alternative locations, then inequality 3.10 provides an upper bound
for switching location sunk cost. On the contrary, if the observed locations present a higher
marginal cost than the alternative location, then the left side of inequality 3.10 will yield a
negative value. In this case, the sign of inequality will switch, providing a lower bound for
the switching location sunk cost.

In any case, the lower or upper bound of the sunk cost related to switching production
location is identified as inequality 3.10. When the estimation results are presented, I will
describe under which circumstances this partial identification is sufficient to form my counterfactual.

It is important to note that the existence of sunk costs can spur strategic behavior.
More precisely, it is reasonable to conclude that firms may make current decisions regarding
production location by evaluating expected profits originating from different future configurations of the supply chain. However, this option implies computing a significantly large
number of expected profits that depend on different states, creating a computational burden
that makes this option non-viable.
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To address this situation, my model proposes using a repeated static game that converges
to the optimal strategy. This modeling decision is based on the assumption that agents do
not explicitly compute optimal strategies but instead use a rule of thumb to make decisions
regarding production location. Although strong, the behavior in the market suggests that
this assumption in accordance with reality. Industry reports11 have suggested that mobile
firms’ production location behaviors tend to be conjectural, with managers deciding production location in the short run and employing third-party tolling services to produce in
India. Moreover, in the data, it can be observed that firms switch production locations after
changes in the legal framework of the market, which further corroborates my assumption.
3.4.2.3

Product set decision

The decision over alternative supply chains may create changes in a firm’s cost structure,
further altering the profitability of some products offered by firms in the market. In particular, introducing the tax on import components will affect the marginal cost of a product
assembled in India. A higher cost may result in a higher price and a lower market share for
such a product. Consequently, the firm may realize that the profit resulting from offering
this product may not cover its entry fixed cost.

In this sense, the third stage of the model works as a participation compatibility constrain.
Firms simultaneously define the product set to be offered in the market after observing
realizations of demand and marginal cost shocks and the production allocation scheme of all
players. In this case, the Nash equilibrium implies that the firm has no incentives to deviate
from the observed product set given its competitors’ product set. A deviation here consists of
eliminating or adding a product observed in the data. Let J be the set of products observed
across all markets, such that Jm ⊂ J ∀m. Now, Let Jf m ⊂ Jm be the set of products offered
11
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by firm f in market m. Also, let Jm−j ⊂ Jm be the same set of products offered by all firms
in the market m excluding product j. At equilibrium, no deviation from the equilibrium
set of products Jf m ⊂ Jm should yield a larger profit. This situation can be represented as
follows.

E(ξm , ωm )[πf m (Jm , Lm , ξm , ωm )] − Fjf m (Lm ) > E(ξm , ωm )[πf m (Jm−j , Lm , ξm , ωm )]

(3.11)

Here, expectations are taken over the demand and marginal cost shocks. πf m (Jm , Lm , ξm , ωm )
represents the variable profit for firm f in market m when its product set includes product j
given the production allocation scheme Lm . Fjf m (Lm ) represents firm’s f fixed cost of producing product j, given production allocation. πf m (Jm−j , Lm , ξm , ωm ) is firms f ’s marginal
profit in market m once product j is removed from the product set. Rearranging some terms,
inequality 3.11 gives the upper bound of firm’s f fixed cost of producing good j, given by
Fjf m (Lm ).

Now, let Jm∪k be a set of products such that k ∈
/ Jm but k ∈ J. For tractability reasons,
I restrict product k to be observed in the firm’s f product set at any market in the data
except for m. Specifically, for each product k ∈ J, I look for the last market where that
product was offered, market m̂ such that m̂ ̸= m. Now by construction, product k ∈ Jm̂ but
k∈
/ Jm . To estimate the product’s k fixed cost lower bound, I add product k to firms f ’s
product set for market m and calculate the expected variable profit. In equilibrium, firm f
adding product k should yield the following result:

E(ξm , ωm )[πf m (Jm , Lm , ξm , ωm )] > E(ξm , ωm )[πf m (Jm∪k , Lm , ξm , ωm )] − Fkf m (Lm ) (3.12)

where πf m (Jm∪k , Lm , ξm , ωm ) is firm’s f variable profit after including product k in its
product set. Fkf m (Lm ) represents product k’s fixed cost given production allocation Lm .
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Inequality 3.12 gives a lower bound for product’s k fixed cost Fkf m (Lm ).

Here again, the existence of a fixed cost for product entry and exit can suggest a strategic
behavior of the firms in the market. However, accounting for the dynamic nature of firms
will require evaluating the expected profits from a significantly large span of possible states
generated by all the possible combinations of products offered by all firms in the market at
different points in time and, will make the estimation computationally infeasible.

If one considers that most firms in the data operate at a global scale and that most of
the products offered in India are not particular to this country but are models being offered
in other markets, one can readily see how a product entry or exit decision may be reduced to
a firm’s decision whether to offer a product in India. In other words, firms are not deciding
on whether they should invest in developing a new product, one which may not be currently
in production elsewhere. Instead, firms are deciding only if a product currently in their
product portfolio should be offered in India. With this in mind, the fixed cost of introducing
a product may have more to do with commercialization and logistics matters than with
design and development matters. It is worth noticing that similar assumptions are made in
(45) and (91).
3.4.3
3.4.3.1

Estimation
Demand Estimation Results

The estimation of demand and marginal cost follows (15). Moments are constructed using equations 3.3 and 3.8, and estimated using the Generalized Method of Moments. I use a
set of instrumental variables to address the price endogeneity problem. In accordance with
the literature, I use competitors’ product characteristics as instrumental variables, specifically the sum of competitors’ characteristics. Also, following (58), I use the deviation from
the average of the characteristics for all products in the market and products within firms.
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Instrumental variables also include the number of competitors with similar characteristics.
The identification strategy relies on the assumption that firms decide their product characteristics before observing demand and marginal cost shocks. Other instruments are the
entry of the JIO Reliance carrier into the Indian Market. This carrier entered the market
with its own set of products that compete directly with mobile phone manufacturers. The
entry affects prices while remaining uncorrelated with ξjm .

Along with the results from the BLP model, I present the demand estimates from the
logit model. The first column of Table 3.5 reports estimates from OLS estimations, where
I estimate the demand model while ignoring endogeneity. The second column reports 2SLS
estimations, where I consider endogeneity and instruments for the price. The last column
documents the results from estimation of the full demand model.

In the first two specifications, OLS and 2SLS, the price coefficient is negative and significant, although its magnitude is small compared to the full model. Note that in the full
model, the price coefficient takes the form [−exp(α + σp ∗ income)], where α is the mean
price sensitivity, and σp captures the heterogeneity in price sensitivity. The estimated mean
price coefficient is positive and significant, while the coefficient of income is negative and significant. This result suggests that price sensitivity decreases as consumers’ income increases.
The estimated own and cross-price elasticities are reported in table 3.5.

The model suggests that the own-price elasticity for smartphones is significantly larger
compared to feature phones. Furthermore, the cross-price elasticity between feature phones
and smartphones is lower when compared to the cross-price elasticity within groups. Thus,
consumers that prefer feature phones are less sensitive to change in prices. The results also
suggest that consumers are sensitive to prices, which suggests that a change in the cost structure of a phone if translated to the price, will result in a significant drop in the product’s
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Table 3.5. Demand Estimates
OLS
2SLS
Random Coefficients
Price X Income

-2.31∗∗
(0.05)
3.81∗∗
(0.60)
0.05∗∗
(0.02)
0
(0.02)

Constant
Main Camera
Front Camera X Smartphone
Mean Coefficients
-0.00∗∗
(0.00)
Constant
-3.13∗∗
(0.24)
Main Camera
-0.03∗∗
(0.01)
Front Camera X Smartphone
0.04∗∗
(0.01)
Screen Size
-0.25∗∗
(0.03)
Internal Memory X Smartphone -0.00∗∗
(0.00)
RAM X Smartphone
-0.12∗∗
(0.03)
Battery Size X Smartphone
0.24∗∗
(0.07)
Age of Operating System
-0.03∗∗
(0.00)
Smartphone Dummy
-4.26∗∗
(0.51)
Android F.E.
1.36∗∗
(0.14)
Three G F.E.
-0.16∗∗
(0.07)
Four G F.E.
0.21∗∗
(0.08)
No. of Markets
41
No. of Observations
22,318
Objective function
Price Sensitivity

BLP

-0.00∗∗
(0.00)
-3.01∗∗
(0.29)
-0.03∗∗
(0.01)
0.04∗∗
(0.01)
-0.24∗∗
(0.03)
-0.00
(0.00)
-0.11∗∗
(0.03)
0.24∗∗
(0.07)
-0.03∗∗
(0.00)
-4.29∗∗
(0.52)
1.36∗∗
(0.14)
-0.17∗∗
(0.07)
0.21∗∗
(0.08)
41
22,318

11.27∗∗
(0.36)
7.68∗∗
(1.06)
0.13∗∗
(0.02)
0.06∗∗
(0.02)
0.98∗∗
(0.13)
-0.01∗∗
(0.00)
0.55∗∗
(0.07)
0.33∗∗
(0.13)
-0.02∗∗
(0.00)
-3.56∗∗
(1.02)
1.81∗∗
(0.25)
0.65∗∗
(0.11)
1.77∗∗
(0.18)
41
22,318
434

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
market share.

Most feature phones in the sample have basic main cameras, no front camera, a small
screen, small internal memory, and no RAM. Also, given how consumers use their smartphones, they may have a different perception of the battery size if the observed product is a
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Table 3.6. Estimated demand elasticities for top 10 products
LF 2403∗
Own Price Elasticity -4.41

F90∗
-4.43

F120∗
-4.73

Y71 5A
-6.78 -7.03

105DS NOTE A83∗
-5.10
-4.77
-6.41

J6
LF 240∗
-4.86 -5.01

Note: All elasticities correspond to the last month in the data, May 2018. Product shown correspond
to the top 10 most sold products
∗
represents feature phones

smartphone. For this reason, hoping to better capture consumers’ taste for these characteristics, the proposed specifications include an interaction term between a smartphone dummy
and front camera megapixels, RAM, battery size, and internal memory. The results suggest
that all these characteristics are positively valued on smartphones.

Consumers’ mean taste for main camera megapixels is positive and significant suggesting
heterogeneity in taste among consumers. Regarding the front camera, the random coefficient is positive but not significant. The mean coefficient for the smartphone dummy is
negative and significant, but smartphones’ mean utility is larger overall once interaction of
the smartphone dummy and phone characteristics are accounted for. The random coefficient
of the constant measures the correlation among inside goods. The estimation indicates that
consumers positively value the quality of both cameras’ modules.

In terms of network technology, consumers value 4G ready phones more than 2G and 3G
ready phones. The coefficient on the 3G technology dummy is positive but not significant.
This suggest that consumers strongly prefer 4G phones over all other phones and prefer
3G phones over 2G phones. Regarding Operative Systems (OS), the results suggest that
consumers prefer Android OS over other OS. The coefficient on the time since the release of
the OS suggests that consumers prefer phones with newer versions on their OS.
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3.4.3.2

Marginal Cost Estimation Results

Using equation 3.8, I estimate the marginal cost of each product. I use instrumental
variables to deal with endogeneity. The set of instruments includes competitors’ characteristics similar to those used in the demand estimation. Also, I include a year - product origin
and firm’s origin - product origin fixed effects hoping to capture the effect of the PMP on
products of different origins.

The marginal cost specification includes product characteristics, phone network technology, a flagship models dummy, and a time trend variable. In addition, the logarithm of the
quantity produced is included to capture possible returns to scale. The specification also has
a firm origin - product origin fixed effect and a year -product origin fixed effect. These last
variables are set to catch the variation in marginal cost coming from the production allocation decision of firms with different origins and coming from the variation of trade policies
applied differentially to local and imported goods across time. Results of the marginal cost
estimation are presented in Table 3.7 .

The result suggests that all things being equal, the marginal cost of producing abroad
is slightly smaller for firms in all origin categories. Looking at the year-production location
fixed effect, marginal cost decreased for all years in the sample from 2016 to 2018. Moreover, this reduction in marginal cost is accentuated if the product is produced in India. In
some way, the results suggest that introducing the “Make in India” initiative reduced the
marginal cost for all products in the industry. In contrast, the introduction of tariffs on
ready-to-use phones and imported phone components slowed the decrease in marginal cost
for both imported and Indian produced phones, but its impact was more substantial on the
imported products. Table 3.8 presents the combination of the firm origin - production location fixed effect and the year - production location fixed effect. Here is shown that in 2015
the marginal cost for products manufactured in India was higher compared to the marginal
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Table 3.7. Supply Estimates
Variable
Log Front Camera

Coefficients Variable
0.05∗∗
Log Quantity
(0.01)
Log Main Camera
0.09∗∗
Chinese firm - abroad
(0.01)
Log Screen Size
0.83∗∗
Chinese firm - India
(0.02)
Log Battery
0.06∗∗
Indian firm - abroad
(0.01)
Log Ram X Smartphone 0.39∗∗
Indian firm - India
(0.02)
Log Internal Memory
0.11∗∗
Global firm - abroad
(0.01)
Age of Operating System 0.00∗∗
Global firm - India
(0.00)
3G tech
0.12∗∗
Indian product - 2016
(0.01)
4G tech
0.22∗∗
Indian product - 2017
(0.02)
Feature phone Dummy
-0.33∗∗
Indian product - 2018
(0.02)
Hybrid phone Dummy
-0.24∗∗
Imported product - 2016
(0.04)
Flagship Model
0.17∗∗
Imported product - 2017
(0.01)
Time Trend
-0.01∗∗
Imported product - 2018
(0.00)
No. of Markets
41
No. of Observations
22,318
Objective function
434

Coefficients
-0.04∗∗
(0.01)
2.99∗∗
(0.08)
3.00∗∗
(0.08)
3.19∗∗
(0.13)
3.22∗∗
(0.13)
3.02∗∗
(0.07)
3.03∗∗
(0.07)
-1.19∗∗
(0.10)
-1.04∗∗
(0.10)
-1.01∗∗
(0.11)
-1.16∗∗
(0.10)
-1.00∗∗
(0.10)
-0.96∗∗
(0.11)

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
cost of production abroad while the contrary is true for years 2016 onward.

These results suggest that after 2015, assembling a phone in India represented a smaller
marginal cost than importing the prone as ready-to-use regardless of the firm’s origin. Notably, this means that firms that opt for an Indian sourced supply chain are trading off a
smaller marginal cost which yields a higher variable profit that allows them to cover the
upfront sunk cost of moving production to India. Furthermore, this implies that for a firm
assembling products in India to move production abroad, the introduction of a tariff on
imported components must affect variable profit so that the advantage in the marginal cost
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Table 3.8. Variation of marginal cost explained by firm and product origin by year.
Firm origin
Chinese
Global
Indian

Production location 2015 2016 2017 2018
India
3.00 1.80 1.96 1.99
Imported
2.99 1.82 1.99 2.03
India
3.03 1.83 1.99 2.01
Imported
3.02 1.86 2.02 2.06
India
3.22 2.03 2.19 2.21
Imported
3.19 2.03 2.19 2.23

Note: This table presents the summation of the firm origin - production location fixed effects and the
production location - year fixed effects. Note that 2015 is omitted in the production location - year fixed
effects; therefore, the first column shows only the coefficients for firm origin - product origin fixed effects.

of producing in India fails to cover the sunk cost using this supply chain.

Regarding phone characteristics, all the coefficients are positive and significant. This
means that higher quality is associated with higher marginal costs. Regarding phone network technology, marginal cost is higher in 4G phones when compared with 3G and 2G
phones. The coefficient for the logarithm of the quantity produced is negative and significant which implies the existence of positive returns to scale. As expected, marginal cost
increases in the case of flagship phones and smart phones.

The median Lerner Index is 30% in the case of smartphones and 21% for feature phones,
while the median markup is 90.71 USD for smartphones and 3.57 USD for feature phones.
These values are consistent with industry reports.
3.4.3.3

Estimation of the Sunk Cost Related to Switching Production

Based on the demand and marginal cost estimates, I obtain the bounds for the sunk
cost of switching locations. The estimation considers two possible production locations: India and abroad. As previously mentioned, the direction of inequality 3.10 is given by the
nature of the marginal cost function. Estimates of the marginal cost suggest that after introducing the import tariffs on ready-to-use phones and phone components, marginal cost
is higher when production takes place abroad. Also, the results from the estimation suggest
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that marginal cost decreases with the quantity produced, which indicates the existence of
economies of scale. In light of these results, if local production is observed for product j,
inequality 3.10 provides an upper bound for the sunk cost related to switching production
location. On the contrary, I production abroad is observed for product j, inequality 3.10
provides a lower bound for this sunk cost.

I observe either only the upper or lower bound of the sunk cost of switching production
locations. I need to introduce an additional assumption to estimate this sunk cost. One
can assume that the actual sunk cost for switching locations is equal to 80% of the upper
bond or 120% of the lower bound estimated in 3.10. To identify how results may respond
to changes stemming from these assumptions, I run a set of robustness checks where I vary
the percentage of the sunk cost related to switching production location that is represented
by the upper and lower bounds estimated in 3.10. These robustness checks suggest that
the results are not significantly sensitive to changes to these percentages. Introducing this
assumption allows us to estimate the sunk cost of switching production location using a
partial identification model.

Table 3.9 reports some central tendency statistics for the lower and upper bounds for
the sunk cost of switching production location before and after the introduction of local
production policies. The statistics are computed across all phone types / month combinations. For feature phones, the median lower and upper bounds for the sunk cost of switching
production location were 3, 988 USD and 35, 376 USD, respectively. The same dynamic
can be observed for smart phones. The mean lower and upper bounds for the sunk cost of
switching production locations were 5, 092 USD and 90, 710 USD, respectively.

119

Table 3.9. Estimated bounds for switching production location sunk cost (Thousands of
USD)
LB Feature Phones
UB Feature Phones
LB Smartphones
UB Smartphones

Min Median
0.55
3.99
0.12
35.38
0.58
5.10
397.86
90.71

Mean
Max Std. Dev.
13.12
257.37
35.17
92.86 2,785.22
190.34
32.61
684.49
95.04
252.36 3,874.84
356.12

Note: This table shows the summary statistics for the sunk cost of switching production locations’ upper
and lower bounds. It considers all the observations after March 2017 when the PMP was introduced.

3.4.3.4

Fixed Cost Estimation

Using the demand and marginal cost estimation results, and the production location
decision, I obtain firm’s participation incentive constraint represented by the bounds of the
entry fixed cost for each phone - month combination observed in the data. After choosing
the production location, firms will choose the set of products that maximizes their expected
profit given demand and marginal cost shocks, the production location scheme, and competitors’ product set.

To calculate the upper bound of product’s j ∈ Jf m fixed cost, I remove this item from
the product set for firm f in market m and recalculate the expected profit, then compare the
result with the firm’s observed expected profit in the market m. Similarly, to estimate the
lower bound for the product’s entry fixed cost, I first record the last period when product
j ∈ Jf g was observed in the data and name it g. Then product j gets reintroduced in the
firm f following period product set, Jf g+1 and I calculate the firm’s expected profit. Finally,
I compare the difference between the expected profit after the reintroduction of product j
into Jf g+1 and the observed expected profit in market g + 1. This procedure allows us to
bound product j’s entry fixed cost. Table 3.10 reports the average fixed cost bounds across
all phone-types / month combinations after the introduction of the PMP.

Note that all the estimated bounds are higher for the alternative location when compared
with the observed location. These results are consistent with the logic that firms will seek
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Table 3.10. Bounds for fixed cost in different locations
Observed production location (Millions of USD)
Mean
Median
Lower Bound
0.64
0.24
Feature Phone
Upper Bound
1.07
0.32
Lower Bound
2.89
0.29
Smart Phone
Upper Bound
2,90
0.60
Alternative production location
Mean
Lower Bound
0.64
Feature Phone
Upper Bound
1.05
Lower Bound
3.30
Smart Phone
Upper Bound
2.81

Median
0.35
0.31
0.67
0.60

Note: This table presents the upper and the lower bound of the fixed cost related to introducing a new
product into the market. Observed and Alternative locations can refer to India and production abroad,
depending on where production is observed in the data.

to allocate production where fixed costs are the lowest. The results suggest that the median
fixed cost of introducing a product in the observed production location after introducing
the PMP was between 236, 586 USD and 323, 364 USD in the case of feature phones and
between 290, 079 USD and 596, 067 USD for smartphones.

3.5

Counterfactual Analysis

In this section, I run counterfactual simulations to address the research questions. In
particular, I simulate the introduction of a tariff on phone components and evaluate how
this policy affects consumer, producer, as well as total welfare. My results highlight how
the introduction of this policy affects firms of different origins differentially. Next, I discuss
the exercise and my key findings. All details of the counterfactual estimation exercise are
provided in Appendix B.1.

The counterfactual policy simulates the deferred phase of the PMP and consists of a 10%
add-valorem im- port tariff on the display module. I intend to analyze how an increase in
the cost structure of producing in India due to the counterfactual policy would determine
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firms’ supply chain decisions and how those decisions would affect total welfare.

As mentioned before, introducing a tax on imported display modules would increase the
cost of assembling a phone in India. Due to this increase in production cost, firms could
choose to continue offering the affected product at a higher price, switch the production
location outside of India to a country with lower production costs, or drop the product from
their product set12 . Modeling this decision-making process requires computing the post-tariff
production location and product choice equilibrium. Doing so can be challenging since firms
can decide to add or remove any subset of products, either observed or not, in the data set.
Also, firms would have to decide the production location of any subset of the product offered
in the market. This situation leads to a vast set of possible actions that the firm can take.

In my sample, between 2017 and 2018, there were 665 different models, on average, available in the market. Plus, the top 10 firms offered an average of 21 different products each
month. This means that there are 221 possible combinations of product sets for each of
the ten leading firms. Additionally, each product can be produced either inside or outside
India, extending the number of possible states observed in the market. Considering all the
potential outcomes of the market is not computationally viable.

For this reason, to have a tractable model, I introduce two assumptions regarding how
the firm’s equilibrium product set and production location are computed. First, firms can
add only products that have been observed in their product set between June 2017 and
July 2018. Introducing this assumption means that the model rules out the possibility that
12

Since 2016 when the PMP was first introduced, the indigenous industry production process has included
only components like chargers, adapters, wired handsets, and some die-cut parts in its production process.
Initiatives to produce more complicated elements like mics and receivers, keypads, USB cables, and some
internal mechanisms have failed, resulting in local firms importing the whole part and paying the tariff
applied to such elements. Therefore, local manufacturing of sophisticated products may not be viable in the
short run, leaving firms with the mentioned alternatives
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firms introduce new models not observed in the sample. Second, firms can decide production
location and add or remove one product at a time following a best-response-based heuristic
algorithm, similar to the one proposed by (45) and (64). This procedure simulates the firm’s
decision-making process by allowing each firm to decide production location and the set of
products offered to the market while considering its competitors’ actions. The algorithm
runs until no deviation from the last attained state implies an increase in the profit of any
firm in the market.

The counterfactual policy could have a first-order effect on consumer surplus through an
increase in the prices of products affected by the policy that results from either an increase
in the production cost of Indian-produced products, an increase in production cost associated with switching production locations, or by the removal of products from the market. A
second-order effect of the counterfactual policy involving consumer surplus happens through
the increase in prices of products not affected by the policy, which results from the decay of
competitive pressure due to either a removal of substitute products from the market or an
increase in prices of substitute products affected by the policy. This means that assessing
firms production decisions is key to understanding how the counterfactual policy may affect
consumer surplus.

The results suggest that firms opt to relocate production of Indian-produced products
outside of India, which implies a marked decrease in the proportion of products that are
manufactured in India. If the ad-valorem tariff applies to the import of display modules, the
proportion of products assembled in India falls from 62.2% to 15.1%. Firms would also opt
to remove products that are no longer profitable due to the introduction of the import tariff
on the display module. If the counterfactual policy were introduced, 139 feature phones
models and 111 smartphone models would exit the market in the twelve months analyzed in
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the counterfactual.

In response to the policy, the firms would also decide whether to keep the production
in India or switch production to locations outside India. My results suggest that the average marginal cost of products affected by the policy would increase by 1.7%. The increase
in marginal cost for products that would switch production location from India to another
country would be 1.9% while the increase for products for which production locatio would
remain in India would be 1.1%. The marginal cost of imported ready-to-use phones would
remain unchanged since the counterfactual policy does not affect these products.

As a consequence of the increase in marginal costs, the average price for all products in
the sample in the mentioned period would increase on average by 0.91% and the number of
phones sold in the market would decrease by 0.94%. As a consequence of the increase in
prices and the exit of some products from the market, total consumer surplus would decrease
by 54.2 million USD while producer surplus would increase by 2.8 million USD, which suggests that the counterfactual policy would decrease total welfare by 51.4 million USD. Table
3.11 presents the results from the counterfactual exercise in terms of total welfare.
Table 3.11. Welfare effect of a 10% tax on imported display modules
Percentage change
Marginal Price
Cost
0.96%
0.91%

Quantity Indian Produced Ready-to-use
Proportion
Proportion
−0.94%
−47.1%
47.0%

Level change
Millions of USD
Total Consumer Total Producer
Surplus
Surplus
−54.2
2.8

Note: This table shows the average variation in marginal cost, prices, proportion of products produced
in Indian and ready- to-use phone imports. Also shown is the level increase in total consumer surplus
and total producer surplus. The simulation considers a 10% ad-valorem import tariff on the display
module. The counterfactual scenario assumes a sunk cost of switching locations equal to 1.2 times its
lower bound and 0.8 times its upper bound. All simulations correspond to the last 12 months of the
data.

Since the counterfactual policy aims to incentivize investment in the Indian phone manufacturing industry, assessing how firms from different origins react to the policy is of great
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value. In the observed data, 72% of Indian firms’ products were assembled in India, with the
remaining 28% imported as ready-to-use, which is the largest proportion of Indian-produced
products across all firms’ origin categories. Global firms followed, with 66% of their products
being assembled in India. Finally, China assembled 52% of the products in India and imported the rest. The simulation results suggest that due to the introduction of the tariff on
imported display modules, most firms in the market decided to change production location
from India to outside India. Figure 3.2 shows the comparison between the observed and
counterfactual proportion of Indian produced phones for each firm.

Figure 3.2. Change in the proportion of products produced in India. Observed versus
Counterfactual Scenario.

Note:This figure plots the observed and simulated mean proportion of Indian produced products for all
firms in the sample.
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This strategy is especially salient in the case of Indian firms, where the proportion of
Indian-produced phones dropped to almost 0%. In the case of global firms, the proportion
of products produced in India dropped from 66% to 32%, and for Chinese firms, from 52%
to 20%. Figure 3.3 depicts that for Chinese and global firms, there is a positive correlation
between the proportion of Indian produced phones that were dropped and changes in profits. Specifically, firms in these two groups that significantly switched production locations
from India to abroad experienced a drop in their profit. This correlation is not present in
the case of Indian firms, which suggests that these firms were less affected by the change in
production location.

Specifically, firms in these two groups that significantly switched production locations
from India to abroad experienced a drop in their profit. This correlation is not present in
the case of Indian firms, which suggests that these firms were less affected by the change in
production location.

Figure 3.3 also suggests that, although profits across firms remain mostly unchanged,
Chinese and global firms would have been at a disadvantage if the last stage of the PMP
had not been postponed. With this postponement, the profit for these firms would have
remained unchanged. In contrast, the policy would have benefited Indian firms whose profit
would have increased by 8%. It is important to mention that the effect of the policy seems
not to be correlated with a firm’s size. Figure 3.4 presents the relationship between firms’
origins, firms’ variation in profits, and firms’ market shares.

These results are consequential with the cost structure coming to form the supply estimation. On the one hand, the difference in the marginal cost of producing a phone in India
or abroad is slim for firms of all origins. On the other hand, the median upper bound for
the sunk cost of switching production locations is less than one hundred thousand dollars
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Figure 3.3. Comparison of firm’s drop in the proportion of products produced in India
versus firm’s mean market share and firm’s origin.

Note:This figure plots the mean variation on firm’s profit against the drop on the firm’s proportion of
Indian produced products. Different types of markers and colors represents different firms’ origins.

for smartphones and forty thousand dollars for feature phones. This situation implies that
switching locations will not mean a considerable increase in the cost structure for the firms in
the market. This reality led firms to mostly change production location to avoid the harmful
effects of the import tariff imputed to phone components without this implying significant
changes in the market.

Another option available to firms facing the import tariff on display modules is to stop
producing phones whose cost increased due to the tariff and would be no longer profitable.
The results from the counterfactual exercise suggest that out of the 250 products that would
exit the market in the 12 months analyzed, Chinese firms would contribute 133 products;
global, 111 products; and Indian firms only six. It is worth mentioning that the mean char127

Figure 3.4. Comparison of Firm’s Mean Variation in Profit versus Firm’s Mean Market
Share and Firm’s Origin.

Note:This figure plots the mean variation on firm’s profit against the firm’s market share. Different
types of markers and color represents different firm’s origins.

acteristics of the products that would exit the market as a consequence of the domestic
industrial policy have different characteristics from the mean characteristics of products observed in the sample. For instance, the mean price of the group of smartphones that would
leave the market is 50 USD lower than the mean price for smartphones observed in the
sample. However, smartphones leaving the market have better features that the sample’s
average smartphone. In the case of feature phones, the results are different. The feature
phones that would exit the market are 2 USD cheaper and present lower characteristics than
the average feature phone. This situation suggests that the products that would leave the
market are high-quality cheap smartphones and low-quality cheap feature phones.
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That cheap and high-quality smartphones would exit the market could further affect consumer surplus since it may make access to smartphones difficult for low-income consumers.
Table 3.12 presents a comparison between the characteristics of the average smartphone and
feature phone and the average smartphone and feature phone that would exit the market
due to the taxation of imported display modules.
Table 3.12. Comparison of the Mean Characteristics Between Observed Products and
Discontinued Products
Price
USD
Observed Products 230.5
Removed Products 170.3
Observed Products
Removed Products

15.4
13.1

Front Camera Main Camera Screen Size
Battery Size
Ram
Megapixels
Megapixels
Inches
Thousand mAh GB
Smartphone
6.2
9.7
5.1
2.8
2.4
7.5
11.1
5.2
3.2
2.6
0.1
0.0

Feature Phones
0.5
0.3

2.2
2.0

1.6
1.3

NA
NA

Note: This table shows the comparison of the mean characteristics of observed products and products
that exited the market due to the domestic industrial policy. The top panel makes the comparison among
smartphones, while the bottom panel compares feature phones.

Firms could use a third strategy to continue offering the affected product at a higher price.
Chinese firms use this strategy in the 43% of the products affected by the policy; global firms
in 58% of the affected products; and Indian firms in less than 1% of its affected products.
These results suggest that the increase in prices of Indian firms’ products originated in a
cost increase due to a change of production location. In contrast, the increase in prices of
products offered by Chinese and global firms has its origins in the cost increase of producing
in India due to the import tariff and the cost increase due to switching production location.

3.6

Conclusion

Boosting local production of manufactured goods has recently become a popular policy
for both developed and developing countries. Policymakers have justified instituting these
policies by arguing that relying on a foreign supply chain may distort local markets. Also,
domestic industrial policies can potentially generate high-paying local jobs, improve local
added value, increase exports, and increase domestic capital investment. While these posi129

tive effects of a domestic manufacturing policy are easily identifiable and measurable, their
application can lead to short-run costs, especially if considering introducing import tariffs.
This document seeks to quantify the costs associated with the loss in total welfare resulting from implementing a domestic industry that aims to improve the local supply chain.
Specifically, the paper analyzes a natural experiment in the Indian Mobile Phone Industry
where import tariffs were applied to ready-to-use phones in a first instance and to phone
components in a second instance. This last policy, named the Phased Manufacturing Program, seeks to incentivize the development of the domestic supply. To this end, I propose a
three-stage static demand and supply model that aims to represent firms’ decision-making
process regarding alternative supply chains. Mainly, the proposed framework allows firms to
endogenously choose their product set, production location, and prices.

After estimating the model, I conducted counterfactual simulations that aimed to mimic
the deterred phase of the PMP that was supposed to come into effect in 2018 and 2019.
Here, the display module of locally manufactured products will include an ad-valorem tariff
of 10%. My counterfactual shows that if the last phase of the PMP had not been halted,
production in India would have fallen significantly, prices of mobile phones would have increased slightly, the number of available products would have decreased, and consumers’
surplus would have dropped. It is essential to mention that the model assumes that, in the
short run, local firms may not be able to invest in developing their production process to
incorporate the production of sophisticated parts like camera modules and displays.

The results of the counterfactual exercise suggest that, in the context of a rigid short-run
production process, a domestic industrial policy based on imposing import tariffs on phone
components not only fails to contribute to the local supply chain but, to the contrary, will
undermine local production. This unintended consequence occurs because the increase in
production costs due to the introduction of the tax on imported components causes that
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importing ready-to-use phones becomes profitable to firms compared to assembling them
in India. Consequently, the policy will decrease manufacturing jobs in the local industry
resulting in a decrease in total welfare.

In addition, the costs of introducing the domestic industrial policy described in the PMP
would imply a decrease in the number of products available in the market and an increase
in the prices faced by consumers. However, given the high degree of substitutability among
products and the competitiveness in the market, the cost associated with the reduction
in consumer welfare is not significantly high. Finally, noteworthy is that the smartphone
products exiting the market would present higher quality than the average smartphone in
the sample, further affecting consumer surplus.
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APPENDIX A
SUPPLEMENTARY APPENDIX CHAPTER 1

A.1

Allowing for linear functional form Specification in price coefficient

In the baseline specification, the functional form specification of the price coefficient is
given by [− exp(α + σp incomeim )]. To make sure that our results are not primarily driven
by this assumption, in this robustness check, we have re-estimated the BLP model with the
linear specification αi = [(α + σp incomeim )]. We report the results in table A.1 as well as
corresponding distribution of price coefficients in figure A.1. The estimates suggest that the
results are robust to the choice of functional form specification.
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Table A.1. Demand Estimation - Robustness Check 1
Variable

Baseline-Model

Alternative-Model

αi = [− exp(α + σp incomeim )]

αi = [(α + σp incomeim )]

Mean Price Sensitivity (α)

5.33***
(0.74)

-15.33***
(1.39)

Price × Income (σp )

-5.44***
(0.84)

16.41***
(1.48)

Constant

1.96
(1.80)

1.94***
(0.91)

Dummy Exemestane

0.47
(0.42)

0.86***
(0.38)

Dummy Letrozole

2.36***
(0.37)

2.42***
(0.33)

Dummy Tamoxifen

1.06
(0.88)

0.42
(0.56)

Product-Specific Ceiling

1.23***
(0.11)

0.80***
(0.06)

TimeTrend×Medicamenta Dummy

0.37***
(0.18)

0.34***
(0.15)

-0.05
(0.11)

-0.12
(0.09)

-0.50***
(0.11)

-0.38***
(0.08)

-0.04
(0.12)

-0.03
(0.10)

Yes
29
200

Yes
29
200

TimeTrend×Novartis Dummy
TimeTrend×Pfizer Dummy
TimeTrend
Year Dummy
No. of Markets
No. of Observations

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Figure A.1. Robustness Check 1 : Histogram of Price Coefficients
Robustness Check - Histogram of Estimated Price Coefficients

150

Baseline Specification
Alternative Specification

100

50

0
-14

-12

-10

-8

-6

-4

-2

0

Notes: This graph plots the histograms of estimated price coefficients for the baseline
specification and alternative specification as specified in table (A.1).
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A.2

Accounting for unobserved random consumer heterogeneity

In this robustness check, we estimated the BLP model allowing for unobserved random
consumer heterogeneity, where the random component is drawn from the standard normal
distribution (similar to proposed in (72)). The estimated value of the random coefficient
is very close to zero in magnitude and statistically not significant. This suggests that the
heterogeneity of price sensitivity among consumers are primarily captured by the differences
in income.
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Table A.2. Robustness Check - Results from Alternative Demand Specifications
Variable

AltModel-1

Mean Price Sensitivity

5.33***
(1.07)

Price × Income

-5.44***
(1.34)

Price × Normal Draw

7e-6
(1.10)

Constant

1.96
(1.87)

Dummy Exemestane

0.47
(0.48)

Dummy Letrozole

2.36***
(0.44)

Dummy Tamoxifen

1.06
(0.92)

Product-Specific Ceiling

1.23***
(0.15)

TimeTrend×Medicamenta Dummy

0.37***
(0.18)

TimeTrend×Novartis Dummy
TimeTrend×Pfizer Dummy
TimeTrend

-0.05
(0.11)
-0.50***
(0.11)
-0.04
(0.12)

Year Dummy Included
No. of Markets
No. of Observations

Yes
29
200

(Standard errors in parentheses)
(***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1)

Notes: This table presents results from a robustness check where we add a random
coefficient accounting for unobserved random consumer heterogeneity.
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A.3

Accounting for heterogeneity of preferences wrt patient age

To address the heterogeneity of preferences wrt age, we collect patient age information
from empirical age distribution, and conduct robustness checks by estimating BLP models
while allowing for a random coefficient for SERM dummy interacted with patient age, and
random coefficient for AI dummy interacted with patient age. We report the results from
demand estimation in the table A.3. As expected, the AI-dummy interacted with patient
age picks a positive (random) coefficient (though not statistically significant), suggesting
that older patients derive higher utility from products that belong to AI class. Similarly, in
line with intuition, the SERM-dummy interacted with patient age picks a negative (random)
coefficient (though not statistically significant), suggesting that the older patients indeed
prefer AI products compared to the SERM products. Compared to the baseline model
(where we consider only income and do not include age), the coefficients of other variables
are pretty similar in magnitude, suggesting that our estimates are robust to different model
specifications.
We also use the estimated demand model with the additional age-specific random coefficients (SERM x age, and AI x age), and conduct counterfactual analysis comparing the
first-come-first-serve mechanism (FCFS) and the targeting mechanism. The purpose of this
exercise is to understand the substitution patterns of the patients when we consider patient
age information in addition to income information, in order to understand the self-selection
of poor patients into the government program. The results from our counterfactual analysis
is reported in table A.4 and in table A.5. Our results are very similar to the baseline case
(where we only consider the income information) suggesting that, while age is certainly a
determinant of substitution patterns, for poorer patients, income heterogeneity is the key
driver of substitution patterns among products. In other words, in our simulation exercise,
when Tamoxifen (a SERM molecule) is available for free to the low-income patients, they
opt for the public option even when their age is higher, as the disutility from acquiring a
molecule in the SERM-class is dominated by the utility gain from zero price of the drug.
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Table A.3. Robustness Check - Allowing both age and income specific random coefficients
Variable

AltModel-2

AltModel-3

Mean Price Sensitivity

5.33***
(1.23)

5.37***
(1.32)

Price × Income

-5.43***
(1.42)

-5.48***
(1.57)

AI Dummy × Log(Age)

0.75
(4.29)

SERM Dummy × Log(Age)

-1.08
(16.22)

Constant

-1.21
(18.19)

2.04
(2.67)

Dummy Exemestane

0.47
(0.43)

0.46
(0.43)

Dummy Letrozole

2.36***
(0.42)

2.36***
(0.42)

Dummy Tamoxifen

4.22
(18.08)

5.55
(68.94)

Product-Specific Ceiling

1.23***
(0.17)

1.23***
(0.17)

TimeTrend×Medicamenta Dummy

0.37***
(0.18)

0.37***
(0.18)

-0.05
(0.13)

-0.05
(0.12)

-0.50***
(0.11)

-0.50***
(0.12)

-0.04
(0.12)

-0.04
(0.12)

Yes
29
200

Yes
29
200

TimeTrend×Novartis Dummy
TimeTrend×Pfizer Dummy
TimeTrend
Year Dummy Included
No. of Markets
No. of Observations

(Standard errors in parentheses, ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1)

Notes: AI dummy stands for AI (Aromatase Inhibitors) class and includes molecules
Anastrozole, Letrozole, Exemestane. Molecule Tamoxifen belongs to SERM class.
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Table A.4. Robustness Checks - Counterfactual Exercise when both age and income random
coefficients are added
Fraction of consumers under targeting who would also get free
drug under market allocation
AltModel-2

AltModel-3

Zero cost for Govt drugs

34.2%

34.3%

Non-zero cost for Govt drugs

37.8%

37.8%

Notes: This table reports the results from counterfactual exercise and computes the
fraction of consumers who benefit from free drug under targeting who would also get the
drug under market allocation. See the discussion in section (1.5) for detailed explanation.

Table A.5. Robustness Checks - Income Distribution of Beneficiaries of the Free Drug with
both age and income specific random coefficients
Deciles in Income
AltModel-2
Distribution
(No cost) (+ive cost)

AltModel-3
(No cost) (+ive cost)

Bottom 10%

11.45%

12.82%

11.45%

12.82%

10% - 20%

11.39%

12.58%

11.41%

12.59%

20% - 30%

11.30%

12.28%

11.30%

12.29%

30% - 40%

11.32%

12.10%

11.33%

12.11%

40% - 50%

11.21%

11.73%

11.23%

11.75%

50% - 60%

11.17%

11.34%

11.19%

11.36%

60% - 70%

11.04%

10.78%

11.05%

10.78%

70% - 80%

10.70%

9.66%

10.71%

9.66%

80% - 90%

8.54%

5.92%

8.50%

5.87%

Above 90%

1.88%

0.79%

1.83%

0.77%

Notes: This table records the income distribution of consumers who benefit from the free
drug provision. We record the percentage fraction of consumers who get free drug in a
given decile in the income distribution. Under no-cost, government drugs are available
free of cost, while under +ive cost, consumers incur a cost while consuming government
drug (see the discussion in section (1.5) for details).
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A.4

First Stage Results
Table A.6. First Stage Results in the Logit 2SLS Demand Estimation
Variable

Price

One period lagged exchange rate

0.36***
(0.12)

Firm-specific Revenue share
in other related cancer drugs

19.13***
(6.40)

Firm-specific weighted avg price
in other related cancer drugs

-0.02**
(0.01)

Exchange Rate in the same period

0.20
(0.48)

First Stage F-stat
Other Characteristics
Year Dummy Included
No. of Markets
No. of Observations

20.82
Yes
Yes
29
200

(Standard errors in parentheses)
(***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1)
Notes: This table reports the first-stage results from regression of price (endogenous
variable) on the set of instruments used in the estimation.

A.5

Allowing for a lower quality (ξ) for the free drug

In this section, we conduct a robustness check where we allow the free drug to enter with
a lower quality (lower ξjm ). Note that, while it is widely accepted in the literature that due
to non-pecuniary costs, high income consumers may choose not to use free public drugs,
our implementation in the counterfactual exercise is mostly ad-hoc. This is because, we do
not have access to any information about wait-time or other such non-pecuniary costs, and
therefore we assume that the costs are drawn from a log-normal distribution. Alternatively,
since ξjm is a measure of quality, here we allow the free drug to have lower value of ξjm (in
particular in this exercise, we consider quality to reduce by half). Note that, this would
lower the utility of the free drug and may work as a proxy for the unobserved non-pecuniary
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costs. The results are reported in the appendix table A.7. As expected, lower number of
high-income patients would now choose the low-quality free drug compared to the previous
case, although the broad takeaways are similar in both cases.
Table A.7. Robustness Checks - Income Distribution of Beneficiaries of the Free Drug with
lower quality
Deciles in Income

Lower Quality Public Drug

Distribution

(No cost)

(+ive cost)

Bottom 10%

11.55%

13.00%

10% - 20%

11.49%

12.74%

20% - 30%

11.39%

12.41%

30% - 40%

11.41%

12.20%

40% - 50%

11.28%

11.81%

50% - 60%

11.23%

11.37%

60% - 70%

11.07%

10.74%

70% - 80%

10.69%

9.51%

80% - 90%

8.28%

5.57%

Above 90%

1.61%

0.65%

Notes: This table records the income distribution of consumers who benefit from the free
drug provision when we allow a lower quality for the free drug. We record the percentage
fraction of consumers who get free drug in a given decile in the income distribution. Under
no-cost, government drugs are available free of cost, while under +ive cost, consumers
incur a cost while consuming government drug (see the discussion in section (1.5) for
details).

A.6

Confidence Interval for Counterfactual Exercise

We computed the 95% confidence intervals for the counterfactual price deviations reported in 1.3. The confidence intervals are reported in Table A.8. The standard errors are
computed using bootstrap.
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[4.24, 4.35]
[0.10, 0.13]

Taxus Tab 20Mg X 30

Trozolet Tab 1Mg X 28

[0.14, 0.16]

[5.54, 5.64]

[5.00, 5.09]

[0.39, 0.43]

[-0.11, -0.04]

[-0.07, -0.02]

[-0.16, 0.02]

20%

[0.17, 0.19]

[6.49, 6.57]

[5.88, 5.95]

[0.68, 0.73]

[-0.12, -0.05]

[-0.07, -0.02]

[-0.16, 0.02]

25%

[0.19, 0.21]

[7.12, 7.18]

[6.46, 6.52]

[1.03, 1.07]

[-0.13, -0.05]

[-0.06, -0.01]

[-0.17, 0.01]

30%

[0.19, 0.21]

[7.33, 7.41]

[6.65, 6.72]

[1.42, 1.47]

[-0.12, -0.04]

[-0.04, 0.01]

[-0.17, 0.01]

35%

[0.16, 0.19],

[7.03, 7.13]

[6.36, 6.45]

[1.87, 1.92]

[-0.09, -0.02]

[0.01, 0.06]

[-0.17, 0.14]

40%

[0.08, 0.11]

[6.01, 6.15]

[5.38, 5.52]

[2.35, 2.41]

[-0.03, 0.04]

[0.10, 0.15]

[-0.16, 0.02]

45%

Notes: This table reports the 95% confidence intervals of price-deviations for each of the seven products offered in the market
when government enters the market and offers drugs for free to low income patients below a level of threshold. The standard
errors are computed using bootstrap. Please refer to the discussions in section 1.5 for detailed explanation.

[3.79, 3.90]

Taxus Tab 10Mg X 30

[-0.09, -0.02]

Femara Tab R 2.50Mg X 30
[0.16, 0.19]

[-0.06, -0.01]

Aromasin Tab R 25Mg X 30

Nolvadex Tab 10Mg X 30

[-0.16, 0.02]

15%

Arimidex Tab 1Mg X 28

Products

Level of Income Threshold

Table A.8. Confidence Interval of price deviations in Counterfactual Exercise 2

A.7

Counterfactual Exercise with Two free drugs

In this robustness check, we run the counterfactual exercise where government offers
two drugs for free - Tamoxifen generic version and Anastrozole generic version. Note that,
Tamoxifen, being a SERM product is more frequently prescribed to women who have not
gone through menopause, while Anastrozole being an AI product, is typically prescribed to
postmenopausal patients. The goal of this exercise is to capture the substitution patterns
and price responses when the government chooses to offer both those drugs for free. Our
results from first counterfactual are reported in table A.9, and from second counterfactual
are reported in the figure A.2.
Our results show that, consumers with lower income are more likely to self-select and
consume the free drug, while the consumers with higher income would opt for the products
offered in the market even when both have equal probability of having the government product in their choice set. This pattern holds for both Tamoxifen and for Anastrozole, although
for Anastrozole, the self-selection of low-income patients is less pronounced compared to
Tamoxifen. In other words, compared to generic Anastrozole, when generic Tamoxifen is offered for free, it is more likely that a high income patient would choose to pay out-of-pocket
and buy a branded drug in the private market.
The price effects of providing two drugs for free are reported in figure A.2. As the results
suggest, depending on the level of threshold, Taxus tablet prices may go up by around
5% to 7%. Anastrozole prices also increase in response, but the increase is much less in
magnitude. Note that, prior to the entry of the government, conditional on buying, the
low income consumers were more likely to buy the Taxus tablets as these were the cheap
alternatives available in the market. Anastrozole generic drugs were at least three times as
costly as generic Tamoxifen prior to the government entry. Therefore, conditional on buying,
the low income consumers were much less likely to buy the Anastrozole generic drugs prior
to government entry. Therefore, given this, the residual demand faced by Taxus (from the
remaining low income patients) is less elastic, as those consumers are relatively higher income
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consumers compared to the bottom fraction. In contrast, the residual demand curve faced
by Anastrozole post government entry is similar to the case when there is no public drug.
Hence, re-optimized equilibrium price of Taxus goes up in response to the government’s entry
while re-optimized generic Anastrozole does not see a significant jump in the price in our
counterfactual exercise.
Table A.9. Income Distribution of Beneficiaries of the Free Drug when Government distributes two free drugs: ‘Generic Tamoxifen’ and ‘Generic Anastrozole’
Deciles in Income

Generic Anastrozole

Generic Tamoxifen

Distribution

(No cost)

(+ive cost)

(No cost)

(+ive cost)

Bottom 10%

10.18%

10.50%

11.27%

13.20%

10% - 20%

10.13%

10.44%

11.38%

12.56%

20% - 30%

10.08%

10.35%

11.27%

12.32%

30% - 40%

10.13%

10.39%

11.29%

12.09%

40% - 50%

10.08%

10.32%

11.18%

11.62%

50% - 60%

10.12%

10.33%

11.01%

11.43%

60% - 70%

10.12%

10.29%

10.92%

10.79%

70% - 80%

10.12%

10.21%

10.45%

9.41%

80% - 90%

10.09%

9.89%

8.09%

5.99%

Above 90%

8.95%

7.30%

2.35%

1.80%

Notes: This table records the income distribution of consumers who benefit from the free
drug provision when government distributes ‘Generic Tamoxifen’ and ‘Generic Anastrozole’ for free. We record the percentage fraction of consumers who get free drug in a
given decile in the income distribution. Under no-cost, government drugs are available
free of cost, while under +ive cost, consumers incur a cost while consuming government
drug (see the discussion in section (1.5) for details).
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Figure A.2. Counterfactual Result: Price Deviation (in %) with level of Income Threshold
Arimidex Tabl 1 Mg X 28

Aromasin Tabl Recub. 25 Mg X 30
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Notes: This figure plots percentage deviation of equilibrium price for each of the seven
products offered in the market when government enters the market and offers ‘Generic
Tamoxifen’ and ‘Generic Anastrozole’ for free to low income patients below a level of
threshold. We plot income threshold in x-axis which varies from 0% to 65%. Corresponding equilibrium price deviation for each product is plotted in the y-axis.
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A.8

Robustness Checks: Distribution of consumer welfare when
income threshold is at 20%

Figure A.3. Counterfactual Result: Distribution of Consumer Surplus wrt Income
Distribution of Deviation in Consumer Surplus for Consumers Below Threshold, Income Threshold = 20%

Percentage Deviation in Consumer Surplus

10

8

6

Consumer surplus variation, Quota= 20%
Income Threshold Line
Line with Zero Deviation (Quota = 0)

4

2

0
0.35

0.4

0.45

0.5

0.55

0.6

0.65

0.7

Log income

Notes: This figure plots the percentage deviation in consumer surplus in y-axis and log
income in x-axis for consumers below income threshold where income threshold is set at
20% (bottom 20% patients in the income distribution). The horizontal green line shows
the line of zero deviation, hence, any point to the north of this line is positive deviation.
The vertical red line shows the income threshold line.
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Figure A.4. Counterfactual Result: Distribution of Consumer Surplus wrt Income
Distribution of Deviation in Consumer Surplus for Consumers Above Threshold, Income Threshold = 20%
0.02

Percentage Deviation in Consumer Surplus

0

-0.02

-0.04

-0.06

-0.08

-0.1

-0.12
0.65

Consumer surplus variation, Income Threshold = 20%
Income Threshold Line
Line with Zero Deviation
0.7

0.75

0.8

0.85

0.9

0.95

1

1.05

Log income

Notes: This figure plots the percentage deviation in consumer surplus in y-axis and log
income in x-axis for consumers below income threshold where income threshold is set at
20% (top 80% patients in the income distribution). The horizontal green line shows the
line of zero deviation, hence, any point to the south of this line is negative deviation.
The vertical red line shows the income threshold line.
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APPENDIX B
SUPPLEMENTARY APPENDIX CHAPTER 3

B.1

Counterfactual Estimation

This appendix presents a detailed description of each of the steps used in the counterfactual estimation.
B.1.1

New price equilibrium

To introduce the tariff in the cost structure of a specific cellphone model, I identify the
contribution of the camera component to the marginal cost using the supply estimation.
Given the logarithmic shape of the marginal cost, the marginal contribution to each component is easy to compute. Having calculated the marginal contribution of the display module
to the marginal cost, a 10% increase is applied to simulate the rise in the component’s price
due to the introduced tariffs.
γk
δM Cjm
= M Cjm P
δk
g∈ωjm γg

where k ∈ ωjm +

(B.1)

Using the specification for marginal cost presented in equation 3.10, it is possible to compute each product feature’s contribution to its marginal cost by taking the derivative of
the marginal cost with respect to each product feature. Equation B.1 shows the marginal
contribution of the characteristic k of product j to its marginal cost measured in USD. This
expression suggests that the coefficients vector γ work as weights for the contribution of each
characteristic to the marginal cost. This functional form allows us to compute the counterfactual marginal cost for the firms affected by the simulated tariff. This can be achieved
by multiplying the variation of the camera module cost by the marginal contribution of this
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feature to the marginal cost represented in equation B.1.

I calculate a new equilibrium price vector using a fixed point algorithm with the counterfactual marginal costs at hand. Then, I set the initial price vector equal to the marginal
cost and iterate over market shares and prices until a fixed point is reached where market
shares and prices are in equilibrium.
B.1.2

Production location scheme

Each firm production location scheme depends on the new equilibrium price vector,
which is a function of competitors’ production allocation. After observing the counterfactual marginal cost and the new equilibrium price vector, firm f computes the variable
profit for both possible production locations for product j. Suppose the difference in the
expected variable profit from the alternative location and the observed location is greater
than the upper bound for the sunk cost of switching the production location. In that case,
the production will move from the observed location to the alternative site.

In this exercise I assume that the new tariff on camera modules applies only to devices
assembled in India. In the case of imported devices, the marginal cost does not suffer any
change. Note that if a firm decides to produce a specific product abroad, its decisions will
not change once the counterfactual tariff on imported components of phones assembled in
India is implemented. This affirmation is based on the fact that if firm f decides to import
product j given the observed local cost structure, it will continue to import good j once the
cost structure of producing in India increases due to the tariff. Under these circumstances,
the only possible change in production allocation will have to be from production in India
to production abroad. In this case, firm f will produce product j abroad if:
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[πf (LA
pcf ), ξ, ω)] − [πf (LLj (⃗pcf ), ξ, ω)] > SC(LLj )
j (⃗

(B.2)

In the last expression, for simplicity I drop the market subscript. Here, LA
pcf ) is the
j (⃗
location scheme for all products observed in the market with product j ∈ Jf is produced
abroad and LLj is the location scheme where j ∈ Jf being produced locally. Here, the
location scheme depends on the equilibrium price vector. Note that LA
pcf ) and LLj (⃗pcf ) are
j (⃗
identical, except for location j which represents product j’s production location. Equation
B.2 suggests that firm f will prefer to produce product j abroad if the difference between the
two locations’ variable profit is greater than the sunk cost related to switching production.
B.1.3

Product set

The algorithm proposed to compute the counterfactual product set can be divided into
two different steps, the first where firms decide production location, and the second where
firms choose their product set. To illustrate how this procedure works let’s take firm f which
operates in market m. I will define Jˆf as firm f ’s set of potential products. As a starting
point I use firm’s f observed product set which depends on the production allocation scheme
such that Jf m (Lf m ) ⊆ Jˆf .

In the first step, firm f will define its product allocation scheme for each product. Let’s
use product j ∈ Jˆf as an example. First, I compute the counterfactual profits for firm f
in market m using the observed product set and production allocation. Then I calculate
the counterfactual profit πfc m (Lm ) and πfc m (Lm|j ) which uses the observed product set and
a new production allocation where product j switched production location. If the difference
between the two counterfactual profits is greater than the estimated sunk cost for switching
the production location of product j, then the production allocation for j is switched. This
operation is repeated for all products j ∈ Jˆf .

150

In the second step, I use the counterfactual production allocation for firm f denoted by
(L∗f ) and compute the baseline counterfactual profit πfc m (L∗m ). I start by assuming that the
baseline profit is the highest possible profit that firm f can reach by deviating from the
observed set of products, then πfc m (L∗m ) = πf∗cm . Now I take one-step deviations from the
observed product set Jf m such that the new product set Jfcm results from either adding or
deleting one product at a time. I then compute firm f ’s profit resulting from the deviation
denoted by πfdm . If πfdm < πf∗cm the process stop, and I am back to πf∗cm as the highest possible
profit. If to the contrary, πfdm > πf∗cm then Jfcm is the new baseline product set and the highest
possible profit for firm f is updated to be equal to πfdm . The next step is to take one-step
deviations from the current product set Jfcm and repeat the loop until no deviation yields
a higher payoff. Once no deviation has been observed for firm f , I move to the next firm
and repeat this procedure. Finally, the procedure keeps looping over firms until there is no
deviation of neither the firms’ product set or production allocation schemes.

B.2

Counterfactual robustness check

This section shows results from the three counterfactual exercises described in Section
5, assuming that the actual sunk cost of switching production locations equals 90% of the
upper bound and 110% of the lower bound. The welfare measures presented in table B.1
suggest that there is no significant difference in using different assumptions for the estimation of switching production sunk cost. However, the results concerning the proportion of
phones that would be manufactured in India presented in table B.1 do change. The main
reason is that if the sunk cost of moving production to India is high, more firms will find
it more profitable to produce abroad. This means that, in general, my estimation may be
conservative given that the counterfactual presented in Section 5 considered a smaller sunk
cost of moving production to India, but the main result holds: not deferring the last phase
of the PMP would have resulted in a decrease in the proportion of phones manufactured in
India.
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Table B.1. Counterfactual Results: Welfare
Marginal Average
Cost
Price
Front Back Camera
0.17%
0.4%
Display
1.26%
1.2%
Front Back Camera + Display
1.39%
1.3%
Tariff on

Percentage change
Avg. Consumer Total Consumer
Surplus
Surplus
−0.4%
−0.7%
−0.4%
−1.6%
−0.4%
−1.6%

Total Producer
Surplus
−0.3%
1.2%
1.3%

Note: This table shows the average variation in marginal cost, prices, consumer surplus, total consumer
surplus, and total producer surplus for three different simulations. The first simulation considers a
10% ad-valorem import tariff on the back and front camera module. The second simulations consider a
10% ad-valorem import tariff on the display module. The last simulation consists of a 10% ad-valorem
import tariff on the camera and display modules. All the counterfactual scenarios assume a sunk cost
of switching locations equal to 1.1 times its lower bound and 0.9 times its upper bound. All simulations
correspond to the last 12 months of the data.

Table B.2. Counterfactual Results: Production in India
Percentage change
Quantity Indian Produced
Proportion
Front Back Camera
−0.3%
−19.3%
Display
−1.2%
−57.1%
Front Back Camera + Display −1.2%
−59.9%
Tariff on

Number of Removed Products
Feature
SmartPhone
Phone
25
124
194
182
213
196

Note: This table presents the average variation in the number of units sold in the market, the proportion
of local production, and the number of feature phones and smart phones that exit the market in each
scenario. The first simulation considers a 10% ad-valorem import tariff on the back and front camera
module. The second simulations consider a 10% ad-valorem import tariff on the display module. The
last simulation consists of a 10% ad-valorem import tariff on the camera and display modules. All the
counterfactual scenarios assume a sunk cost of switching locations equal to 1.1 times its lower bound
and 0.9 times its upper bound. All simulations correspond to the last 12 months of the data.

... ...
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